Appeal
from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Tazewell
County, Illinois, Circuit No. 15-CF-138 Honorable Richard
McCoy, Judge, Presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona,
and Amber Hopkins-Reed, of State Appellate Defender's
Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Stewart J. Umholtz, State's
Attorney, of Peking (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and
Stephanie L. Raymond, of State's Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
McDADE
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
McDADE
JUSTICE.
¶
1 Defendant, Michelle A. Paranto, appeals following her
convictions on three counts of aggravated driving under the
influence (DUI). She argues that the statutory section under
which she was convicted is unconstitutional on its face. She
also contends that the circuit court erred in denying her
request to be screened for drug court, considering improper
factors in aggravation at sentencing, and calculating her
fines. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
¶
2 I. BACKGROUND
¶
3 On October 26, 2014, defendant was involved in a multi-car
accident that resulted in the death of Amy Hardin and
significant injuries to Karla Paranto and Sunna Brown. The
State filed a three-count indictment on April 16, 2015. Each
of the counts alleged that defendant committed DUI in that
she operated a motor vehicle "while there was any amount
of drug, substance, or compound" in her body
"resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of
cannabis." See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2014). Each
count ultimately charged defendant with aggravated DUI; count
I alleged that the car accident was the proximate cause of
Hardin's death (id. § 11-501(d)(1)(F)),
while counts II and III alleged that the accident was the
proximate cause of great bodily harm suffered by Karla and
Brown, respectively (id. § 11-501(d)(1)(C)).
¶
4 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion requesting an
eligibility screening for drug court. The State objected,
arguing that defendant was strictly ineligible for drug court
because she was charged with a crime of violence. The State
also argued that drug court would otherwise be inappropriate
for defendant. Defendant disagreed with the assertion that
she had been charged with a crime of violence. She also
argued that an eligibility screening was mandatory under the
statute governing drug court and that the circuit court was
therefore without discretion to deny her request.
¶
5 The court subsequently issued a written order denying
defendant's request on two grounds. First, the court,
citing People v. Carron, 298 Ill.App.3d 676 (1998),
found that aggravated DUI was a crime of violence, rendering
defendant ineligible for drug court. Alternatively, the court
found that it had discretion to deny the request and did so
based on the seriousness of the charges against defendant.
¶
6 The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial on November
2, 2016. The stipulated evidence showed that defendant was
driving with Karla as her passenger when, at a speed in
excess of the posted limit, she proceeded through a red light
at an intersection. Defendant's vehicle struck a vehicle
driven by Hardin, and the two cars subsequently struck a
number of stationary vehicles, including one occupied by
Brown. A medical examination determined that Hardin died
"from multiple blunt injuries due to a motor vehicle
collision." Karla's injuries included a ruptured
spleen, broken ribs, shattered bones in her leg, loose teeth,
and head trauma-injuries that continued to limit her
mobility. Brown's injuries included trauma to her head,
neck, shoulder, and hip, including ongoing tendinosis and
nerve damage. Defendant agreed to submit to a blood and urine
test, which resulted in a positive finding of 8.3 nanograms
per milliliter of Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and a
positive finding of 210 nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9
carboxy THC.
¶
7 The court found defendant guilty on all counts. Thereafter,
defendant renewed her motion for a drug court eligibility
screening. The court denied the request on the same grounds.
¶
8 At sentencing, the State requested the maximum sentence of
14 years' imprisonment on the most serious charge of
count I. Defendant renewed her request for a drug court
screening, which was again denied. In imposing a sentence,
the court observed: "[T]he Court finds that there are
two statutory factors in aggravation, and those are No. 1,
serious harm and death, and No. 2, deterrence." The
court made no further reference to those factors and then
sentenced defendant to terms of six years' imprisonment
on each count, to be served concurrently. The court also
imposed a fine of $10, 305. The court pointed out that
defendant would serve 1861 days in prison, and with a credit
of $5 for each of those days, her fine would be effectively
$1000.
¶
9 II. ANALYSIS
¶
10 On appeal, defendant raises the following four arguments:
(1) the statute under which defendant was convicted was
unconstitutional on its face, (2) the court committed error
when it denied defendant's request to be screened for
drug court, (3) the court improperly considered two factors
in aggravation, and (4) the court's calculation of
presentence custody credit and concomitant assessment of
fines were erroneous.
¶
11 A. Constitutionality of DUI Statute
¶
12 Defendant contends that the aggravated DUI statute in
effect at the time of her offense was unconstitutional on its
face. More specifically, she asserts that the law failed to
satisfy the rational basis test because "it was not a
reasonable method of accomplishing the desired legislative
objective of keeping cannabis-impaired drivers off the
road."
¶
13 Where a statute does not bear upon a fundamental
constitutional right, it must only survive rational basis
review to be deemed constitutional. Under that test, a
statute will be upheld if it "bears a reasonable
relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means
adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired
objective." People v. Adams, 144 Ill.2d 381,
390 (1991). Where a statute subjects wholly innocent conduct
to a penalty, it "fails the rational basis test because
it does not represent a reasonable method of preventing the
targeted conduct." People v. Madrigal, 241
Ill.2d 463, 468 (2011).
¶
14 Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI in part under
section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2014)).[1] At the time of
defendant's offense in 2014, that section read:
"(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical
control of any vehicle within this State while:
(6) there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in
the person's breath, blood, or urine resulting from the
unlawful use or consumption of [inter alia] cannabis
...