from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will
County, Illinois. Circuit No. 08-CF-2169 Honorable Carmen
Julia Goodman, Judge, Presiding.
E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Jessica D. Ware, of State
Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State's
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for
JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment and
opinion. Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.
1 A jury convicted defendant, Anthony K. Hawkins, of first
degree murder and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW).
After this court affirmed defendant's convictions and
sentences on appeal, he filed a pro se
postconviction petition. Following a hearing at which
defendant was shackled over his objections, the circuit court
dismissed defendant's petition at the second stage of
postconviction proceedings. On appeal, defendant argues that
the court erred in ordering that he be shackled without
stating the reasons supporting the shackling on the record.
He also argues that postconviction counsel failed to comply
with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c)
(eff. Feb. 6, 2013) in that he did not make amendments to
defendant's petition necessary for an adequate
presentation of defendant's claims. We vacate the circuit
court's order dismissing defendant's petition at the
second stage of postconviction proceedings and remand for new
second-stage proceedings, beginning with the appointment of
2 I. BACKGROUND
3 The State charged defendant with first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2008)) and AUUW (id. §
24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)). Before trial, defendant filed a
motion to suppress certain statements made to the police,
asserting that he had invoked his right to counsel multiple
times during his interrogation. Following a hearing at which
a video recording of defendant's interrogation was
introduced, the court granted in part and denied in part
defendant's motion to suppress. Specifically, the court
found that defendant's earliest references to a lawyer
were vague and not sufficient to invoke his right to counsel.
However, the court found that comments made later in the
interrogation were sufficient and ordered that all
statements made after that invocation of defendant's
rights be suppressed.
4 The matter proceeded to trial, at which a jury found
defendant guilty on both counts. The court subsequently
sentenced defendant to terms of 45 years' and 2
years' imprisonment for first degree murder and AUUW,
respectively. On appeal, this court affirmed those
convictions and sentences. People v. Hawkins, 2013
IL App (3d) 110267-U.
5 On October 11, 2013, defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition. Defendant raised numerous issues in
his petition, including that appellate counsel had been
ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the
circuit court had erred by denying in part his motion to
suppress. He also asserted that his conviction for AUUW was
6 The court appointed postconviction counsel,  advancing
defendant's petition to the second stage of
postconviction proceedings. Postconviction counsel
subsequently filed a petition for relief from judgment,
alleging that defendant's AUUW conviction should be
vacated under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The
court granted that petition for relief from judgment and
vacated defendant's conviction.
7 Months later, postconviction counsel filed a motion to
withdraw. In the motion, counsel stated that he had reviewed
the record together with defendant's pro se
postconviction petition dated October 11, 2013. Counsel
indicated that he had met with defendant in person to
ascertain defendant's contentions of error.
Postconviction counsel concluded that following the ruling on
the petition for relief from judgment, there were no
additional nonfrivolous arguments to be made on
defendant's behalf. With respect to defendant's view
that appellate counsel was ineffective, postconviction
counsel asserted that "the trial court's decision is
in accordance with applicable case law." On May 31,
2016, the circuit court found that counsel had complied with
the requirements of Rule 651(c) and granted his motion to
8 The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
postconviction petition. Defendant, now proceeding pro
se at the second stage, filed a response. At the hearing
on the State's motion to dismiss, held on October 28,
2016, defendant repeatedly requested that he be unshackled so
that he could maneuver through his notes and other paperwork.
At one point, after repeated requests, the court responded:
"I'm not removing them, [defendant]. Do the best you
can do." Defendant's other requests for the removal
of his shackles were not acknowledged and did not draw any
response from the court or the prosecutor. The record does
not include the factors considered by the court when denying
defendant's requests and did not provide any rationale
for keeping defendant shackled. At the conclusion of the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, the court granted the
State's motion to dismiss.
9 II. ANALYSIS
10 Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues
that the court's decision to keep him shackled during the
second-stage hearing, absent any articulated justification by
the court on the record, requires a new second-stage hearing.
Defendant also argues he is entitled to a new second-stage
hearing due to postconviction counsel's failure to file a
Rule 651(c) certificate before withdrawing from the case.
11 It is well accepted that in-court shackling has the
potential to restrict a shackled person's ability to
assist defense counsel and unjustified shackling offends
"the dignity of the judicial process." People
v. Boose,66 Ill.2d 261, 265 (1977). A trial judge's
failure to articulate any basis for the shackling of a person
during court proceedings also constitutes a violation of due
process. People v. Allen,222 Ill.2d 340, 349
(2006). Significantly, in People v. Rippatoe, this
court held that it is demeaning for a trial court to shackle
a person without first considering the necessity of such
restraints. People v. Rippatoe,408 Ill.App.3d 1061,
1068 (2011) ("Where a defendant is forced to appear
pro se, take an oath, testify, question witnesses,
and present his arguments to the court all while shackled,
without any consideration by the trial judge of the necessity
for the shackles, the ...