United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
RICKEY A. CARTER, Plaintiff,
DR. SHAH, A. VANSCHEYEK, LYNN PITTMAN, MAJOR CARIE, and DANA SPRAGUE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Rickey A. Carter, an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently
incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings
this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his need for a bottom bunk permit while at Robinson
Correctional Center. He asserts claims against the defendants
under the Eighth Amendment as well as the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq., and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e. Plaintiff seeks declaratory
judgment and monetary damages.
case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section
1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to
filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
makes the following allegations in the Complaint: On April
10, 2019, Plaintiff saw Dr. Lynn Pittman for his diabetes
while his normal doctor, Dr. Shah, was on vacation (Doc. 1,
p. 45). Dr. Pittman examined his hands, fingernails, and
fingers and determined that his body needed special vitamins
that he was not getting from his current diet. She prescribed
him a high protein diet. When Dr. Shah returned from
vacation, he determined that the special diet was not needed
and discontinued the diet. He did not examine Plaintiff's
hands and missed the proper diagnosis (Id.).
12, 2019, while in segregation, Plaintiff was informed by A.
Vanscheyek that he was being moved to a different cell (Doc.
1, p. 46). Plaintiff informed Vanscheyek that he could not be
placed on the top bunk due to his diabetes. Vanscheyek wrote
Plaintiff a disciplinary report for refusing to obey the
order to change cells (Id.). On July 13, 2019,
Plaintiff refused to eat or take his medications and was
placed in the healthcare unit. Six days later, Major Carie
informed Plaintiff he was being moved back to segregation,
and Plaintiff informed Carie that he could not be placed in a
top bunk because he had a bottom bunk permit. Dana Sprague
found Plaintiff's permit and noted that it had expired.
She called Dr. Pittman who deemed that Plaintiff could be
placed in a top bunk even though he had diabetes and was weak
from not eating or taking his prescribed medications
(Id. at pp. 47-48).
20, 2019, Plaintiff fell from the top bunk onto the concrete
floor, injuring his head (Id. at p. 48). Plaintiff
suffered from blurred vision and continuous headaches from
the fall. He was provided with Tylenol and sent back to his
room. On July 30, 2019, he saw Dr. Shah because Plaintiff
ended his hunger and medicine strike (Id. at p. 49).
When Dr. Shah learned of his injuries, he informed plaintiff
that he should not have been placed on the top bunk and
renewed Plaintiff's bottom bunk permit. He also scheduled
an eye doctor appointment for Plaintiff and provided him with
more Tylenol for his headache (Id.).
on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide the pro se action into
the following three counts:
Count 1: Vipin Shah was deliberately indifferent under the
Eighth Amendment to Plaintiff's need for a special
Count 2: Defendants violated his rights under the ADA and/or
RA when they denied him a bottom bunk permit and assigned him
to a top bunk.
Count 3: Vipin Shah, A. Vanscheyek, Lynn Pittman, Major
Carie, and Dana Sprague were deliberately indifferent under
the Eighth Amendment to Plaintiff's need for a bottom
parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order
should be considered dismissed without prejudice as
inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading