United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jimmy Eugene
Rhodes' Renewed Motion for Resentencing and Immediate
Release,  docketed January 3, 2020. (Doc. 36).
Rhodes remains incarcerated at the USP-Marion. On November 5,
2019, this Court granted Rhodes' Habeas Corpus Petition
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, vacating his
career-offender-enhanced 260-month sentence imposed for
Counts 1 and 3 by the Western District of Oklahoma in No.
01-cr-202-R-1 and ordering that he be resentenced by the
Western District of Oklahoma. (Doc. 34).
Court's Order was docketed in Rhodes' criminal case
(No. 01-cr-202-R (W.D. Okla.)) at Doc. 157. The Government
subsequently filed a Motion to Strike Judge Yandle's
Order (Doc. 160), and Rhodes responded by filing a Motion for
Immediate Release (Doc. 161). On December 19, 2019, Judge
David L. Russell denied both motions, stating:
Just as this Court lacks the authority to strike Judge
Yandle's Order, Judge Yandle lacks the authority to order
this Court to vacate Mr. Rhodes' sentence or his
sentencing enhancement or to resentence him. It is simply
beyond the scope of her authority. See Hill v.
Sepanek, 2017 WL 73338, *8 (E.D. Ky. January 6, 2017)
(“This Court cannot compel another court [to resentence
U.S. v. Rhodes, No. 01-cr-202-R (W.D. Okla. Dec. 19,
2019, Doc. 162) (additional citations omitted).
now argues that the Western District of Oklahoma's
refusal to honor this Court's order vacating the sentence
was in error and requests this Court to resentence
him in his criminal case and order his immediate release.
(Doc. 36). However, this Court lacks the power to override
the Western District of Oklahoma's decision in its own
criminal case - only the appropriate appellate court has the
authority to do so. If a litigant is dissatisfied with a
court's disposition of his case or of a post-judgment
motion, his remedy is to appeal the order in question.
has the right to appeal this Court's Order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as set forth
below. Likewise, he may appeal the Western District of
Oklahoma's denial of his motion, providing it is still
possible for him to do so within the applicable time limits
for a criminal case.
courts (and federal appellate courts) often disagree on
matters of legal interpretation, as is illustrated in the
differences between this Court's ruling and that in
Rhodes' criminal case. Rhodes is correct that the
Southern District of Illinois, where he has been incarcerated
since the time he filed this action, was the only
jurisdiction where he could have brought his § 2241
petition. See Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 670
(7th Cir. 2007) (§ 2241 petition “must be filed in
the district in which the petitioner is confined rather than
in the one in which he was sentenced”) (discussing
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004)).
As such, this Court had jurisdiction to rule on Rhodes'
habeas challenge to his sentence in accordance with Seventh
Circuit precedent and with reference to Tenth Circuit
jurisprudence. In that vein, the undersigned determined that
Rhodes was entitled to be resentenced without the Armed
Career Criminal enhancement because his Oklahoma
second-degree burglary convictions can no longer count as
predicate offenses for such enhancement. (Doc. 34, pp.
13-16). However, this Court cannot directly intervene in
Rhodes' criminal case in the Western District of Oklahoma
by resentencing him. It has been the practice of this Court
as well as the other district courts in this circuit to refer
an order granting habeas corpus relief to the original
sentencing court for subsequent proceedings. Rhodes'
motion provides no convincing basis to depart from this
approach. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED
that Petitioner Rhodes' Renewed Motion for Resentencing
and Immediate Release (Doc. 36) is DENIED.
Rhodes wishes to appeal from the denial of this motion, his
notice of appeal must be filed with this Court within 60 days
of the entry of this Order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). A
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) must set forth the issues he plans to
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C).
If Rhodes does choose to appeal and is allowed to proceed
IFP, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate
filing fee (the amount to be determined based on his prison
trust fund account records for the past six months)
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See Fed.
R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v.
Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008);
Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.
1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th
Cir. 1998). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)may toll the 60-day
appeal deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion
must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the
entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be
extended. Other motions, including a Rule 60 motion for
relief from a final judgment, do not toll the deadline for an
not necessary for Rhodes to obtain a certificate of
appealability in this § 2241 action. Walker v.
O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IS SO ORDERED.
 It appears that Rhodes titled his
motion as “Renewed” as a reference to his earlier
filing of a motion for immediate release in the Western
District of Oklahoma (Doc. 161 in his criminal case), as he
had not ...