United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY McDADE UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jesse
Guardiola's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). At the Court's direction,
the Government filed a Response (Doc. 2) and Petitioner has
filed a Reply (Doc. 7). The matter is therefore ripe for
review. For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is
lengthy background is unnecessary. In October 2016 Petitioner
pled guilty to five counts of possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), the
Supreme Court held the word “knowingly” in §
922(g) applies to the status making it unlawful to possess a
firearm, in addition to knowledge that the object possessed
was a firearm. It appears uncontested that Petitioner was not
told he needed to know he had been convicted of a felony or
asked about such knowledge in colloquy-at the time, the
scienter requirement was not understood to apply to
knowledge of one's status. Petitioner therefore filed the
instant petition arguing he ought not remain imprisoned
pursuant to his plea.
labyrinth confronts prisoners held pursuant to a federal
sentence seeking relief through 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A
person may only challenge a federal conviction or sentence
under § 2241 if 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), the
“savings clause, ” allows. Webster v.
Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1135 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Section 2255(e) permits recourse through § 2241 only
where the motion provided under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality”
of the challenged detention. § 2255(e);
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135. The Seventh Circuit has
held § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective where:
(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not
a constitutional case and thus could not have been invoked by
a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could not
have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and
the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is
grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.
Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).
claim must also not be procedurally defaulted, which is to
say it must have been raised on direct review. Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). If a claim has
been procedurally defaulted, a petitioner may only raise it
upon a showing of either cause and prejudice or actual
innocence. Id. Only if a claim meets all these
requirements may a court consider a petition on the merits.
Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Pro se
filings are to be liberally construed. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Government argues as an initial matter Petitioner cannot
utilize § 2241 because he never filed a § 2255
petition and thus is not barred by § 2255(h)(2). This
issue is far from open and shut, as the Government suggests.
Seventh Circuit's precedent on § 2255(e) springs
from In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998).
As the Seventh Circuit explained, one of the petitioners in
that case “could not use a first motion under [§
2255] to obtain relief on a basis not yet established by law.
He could not use a second or other successive motion to
obtain that relief because the basis on which he seeks relief
is neither newly discovered evidence nor a new rule of
constitutional law.” Id. at 610. There is no
doubt that issues with § 2255(h)(2), according to the
Seventh Circuit, form a structural inadequacy with §
2255 sufficient to allow a § 2241 petition.
there may be a similar structural issue with § 2255(f).
That section sets a one-year statute of limitations for
filing § 2255 motions, which runs from the date on
which: (1) the judgment becomes final, § 2255(f)(1); (2)
an impediment created by the United States is removed, §
2255(f)(2); (3) the Supreme Court decides a new rule of
constitutional law (which must also be made retroactive),
§ 2255(f)(3); or (4) evidence supporting a claim could
have been discovered with reasonable diligence, §
2255(f)(4). Subsection (f)(3) parallels subsection (h)(2) and
similarly fails to take into account the potential for a new
statutory interpretation case. Both subsections cut off
federal prisoners' access to habeas relief where their
claim is statutory while allowing similarly situated
constitutional claims. So a petitioner might be unable to
bring a § ...