United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
HARLEY M. BRADY, Plaintiff,
DR. COE and DR. AHMED, Defendants.
Reona J. Daly, United States Magistrate Judge
Harley Brady filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while
he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center. The
undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation on October 15,
2019 (Doc. 54), recommending the Motion for Summary Judgment
for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by
Defendant Dr. Coe be granted, that the Motion for Summary
Judgment for Plaintiff's Failure to Exhaust His
Administrative Remedies filed by Dr. Ahmed be found moot, and
that Dr. Ahmed and Dr. Coe be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation
on October 18, 2019 (Doc. 57), and was granted leave to file
additional objections out-of-time (Doc. 65).
December 9, 2019, with the Report and Recommendation pending,
all parties consented to have a Magistrate Judge conduct all
proceedings in this case. The case was referred to the
undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. In light of the final
consent of the parties and full referral of this matter to
the undersigned, the Report and Recommendation is
ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.
Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant Dr. Coe
(Doc. 41) is GRANTED; the Motion for Summary
Judgment for Plaintiff's Failure to Exhaust His
Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant Dr. Ahmed is
FOUND AS MOOT (Doc. 44); and Defendants Dr.
Ahmed and Dr. Coe are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
Court, however, construes and considers Plaintiff's
objections as motions to reconsider and sets forth its
discussion of the objections below.
Plaintiff indicates he seeks to dismiss Dr. Ahmed with
prejudice, rather than without prejudice. Because dismissal
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is appropriate, the Court declines to reconsider Dr.
Ahmed's dismissal and he remains dismissed without
Plaintiff contends the undersigned's decision as to Dr.
Coe was based on Plaintiff's failure to perform
“extra steps” that he was not obligated to take.
Although not cited by Plaintiff, his argument appears to rely
on the Seventh Circuit's discussion in Thornton v.
Snyder, 428 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court finds
Thornton to be distinguishable from the facts
in this case. Specifically, in Thornton, although
the Court articulated that “[t]here is nothing in the
current regulatory text … that requires an inmate to
file a new grievance after learning only that it will not be
considered on an emergency basis”, the Court noted that
the plaintiff in Thornton had not been provided any
further instruction by the prison system, and the defendants
did not present any evidence as to what the relevant rules
were in the prison system in such circumstance. See
Thornton, 428 F.3d at 692-95. In this instance,
Plaintiff was given clear instructions on how to proceed and
failed to follow these instructions. The Court reiterates
that Plaintiff was required to follow the prison's rules
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). The
Court finds it inapposite that Plaintiff could refuse to
follow the specific instructions of the warden and ARB and
circumvent the intent and purpose of the PLRA to exhaust his
although this grievance mentions Dr. Coe and his refusal to
address Plaintiff's knee condition, Plaintiff does not
complain about Dr. Coe's denial of a low bunk permit, the
issue central to his claim in this lawsuit. Indeed, Plaintiff
makes no mention of a low bunk permit whatsoever in this
grievance. As such, Plaintiff's grievance failed to set
forth sufficient factual details of Plaintiff's
complaint, as required by the Illinois Administrative Code.
20 ILCS § 504.810(c). For this reason, prison officials
did not have a “fair opportunity” to address
Plaintiff's complaint concerning the low bunk permit,
Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2011),
and the grievance did not alert “the prison to the
nature of the wrong for which redress is sought, ”
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted), which is the purpose of the PLRA.
these reasons, the Court finds no basis on which to
reconsider its previous decision and Plaintiff's Motions
to Reconsider are DENIED.
IS SO ORDERED.
 The Court further notes that in
Thornton, summary judgment in favor of the
defendants was reversed because the plaintiff had received
the relief he requested in his grievances and, therefore, he
was not required to appeal to higher channels in the process.
Thus, discussion concerning what actions are required by the