United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
Nancy A. Compton, Plaintiff,
DuPage County Health Department, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
S. Shah United States District Judge
Compton provided home-based health services to a client
through a program that the State of Illinois funded and the
DuPage County Health Department administered. After the state
stopped funding the program, the county ended its
participation in it. Compton continued working, but stopped
receiving paychecks. She alleges that the county violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law
when the state stopped paying her. She also brings a
breach-of-contract claim. Compton moves for partial summary
judgment on the issue that she was an “employee”
of DuPage County under the FLSA and IMLW. The county moves
for summary judgment on all counts. For the reasons discussed
below, the county's motion is granted, and Compton's
motion is denied.
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and she is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On cross-motions for
summary judgment, “[t]he ordinary standards for summary
judgment remain unchanged.” Blow v. Bijora,
Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017). I construe all
facts and inferences “in favor of the party against
whom the motion under consideration is made.”
should be considered together; summary judgment is
appropriate only when the evidence “as a whole”
shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P.,
651 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Bloodworth v.
Vill. of Greendale, 475 Fed. App'x 92, 95 (7th Cir.
2012) (“Cross-motions must be evaluated together, and
the court may not grant summary judgment for either side
unless the admissible evidence as a whole- from both
motions-establishes that no material facts are in
dispute.”). I need only consider the cited materials,
but I may consider “other materials in the
record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
DuPage County Health Department helped administer a
state-funded program that provided home-based support
services for adults with severe mental illness. 
¶¶ 1-2, 57;  ¶ 5. Steve Gaydos, a county
health department case manager, oversaw the program for three
years.  ¶¶ 3-4, 22;  ¶¶ 17-19.
Gaydos evaluated each home-based client's needs, wrote up
a service plan for the individual, and, if appropriate,
assigned a “respite worker” to provide in-home
services to that client.  ¶¶ 18, 19; 
¶¶ 23-24, 33. Once a month, the respite worker
reported how many hours he or she had worked to Gaydos, who
entered those hours into a state website so the state could
pay the worker.  ¶¶ 6-7, 25-26. If the client
reported that the assigned provider wasn't working out,
Gaydos assigned the client a different respite worker. 
¶¶ 20-21. Gaydos also reported what services each
client received to the state and submitted receipts from the
client to the state for reimbursement.  ¶ 23; 
¶¶ 5, 32.
learned that plaintiff Nancy Compton was seeking work. 
¶ 7. He met with Compton and explained that the state
was hiring respite workers, and helped her fill out an online
application.  ¶ 7;  ¶ 20. The state
accepted Compton into the program.  ¶
After Compton passed a state-run background check, Gaydos
matched her with a home-based client.  ¶ 14; 
¶¶ 21, 46. Gaydos considered Compton a state
employee because the state had conducted the background check
and was paying her.  ¶ 28. The state collected all
of the forms related to Compton's employment.  ¶
did not receive any training or review any materials before
beginning work as a respite worker.  ¶ 37. No one
from the county told Compton what services she should provide
to her client.  ¶ 49. Compton was told that, if she had
any questions or issues, she should report them to Gaydos.
 ¶ 5.
worked 10 to 20 hours per week.  ¶ 38. She
determined what services to administer, how many hours to
work, and when to work by discussing the client's needs
and schedule with the client and his mother. 
¶¶ 39-42. Compton never discussed her schedule with
Gaydos or anyone from the state.  ¶ 43. If she
13:14-14:2. Compton's testimony does not controvert the
county's assertion that Gaydos helped her apply for the
respite-worker job. had to miss a day, she notified the
client's mother.  ¶ 53. Compton bought a number
of word-search, reading, and math books for the client, but
did not seek reimbursement from the county for those
purchases.  ¶ 51-52. She chose what books to buy
based on conversations with the client's mother. 
month, Compton reported her work hours, mileage, and
reimbursement claims to Gaydos, either over the phone or via
text.  ¶¶ 8-10;  ¶¶ 22, 31, 44.
Gaydos then entered Compton's hours into a computer
system, which transmitted the information to the state for
payment.  ¶¶ 8, 57;  ¶¶ 13, 22,
30. The state paid Compton once a month, on an hourly basis,
at a rate determined by the state.  ¶¶ 11, 57;
 ¶¶ 27, 30, 45. Once every few months, Gaydos
would meet with Compton and the client.  ¶ 46.
Gaydos would ask how things were going and collect any
receipts from the client for reimbursement from the state.
 ¶¶ 46-47.
2015, the state stopped funding the program, and the respite
workers stopped receiving paychecks.  ¶¶ 58,
63;  ¶ 8. At some point before December, Compton
told Gaydos that she was not being paid.  ¶¶
12, 58. Gaydos told her to contact the state.  ¶ 12.
Gaydos retired in December, and the county appointed someone
new to oversee the program.  ¶ 6;  ¶ 17.
Overall, Gaydos worked with Compton for about two years. 
2016, the county ended its involvement in the program. 
¶¶ 9, 16.Compton told Sarah Miller, a county
community support specialist and her therapist, that she was
not being paid.  ¶ 34;  ¶¶ 54-56.
Miller reported Compton's payment problems to Jeffrey
Lata, another health department employee.  ¶¶
38, 41, 50;  ¶ 4, 57. Lata told Miller that the
state had not funded the program for a while, and Compton
should contact the state.  ¶ 42;  ¶ 57.
Compton contacted Lata directly, and Lata told her that the
home-based program had ended and the county was no longer
participating in the program.  ¶ 44;  ¶ 11.
brings claims against DuPage County Health Department under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law, and also brings a breach-of-contract claim. She moves
for partial summary judgment on the ground that she was an
employee of DuPage County. In her view, the state and county
were her joint employers.
county argues that Compton was an independent contractor, not
an employee (of either DuPage County or the state).
Alternatively, it argues that if Compton was an employee of
anybody it was the state, not the county. Finally, the county
argues that, even if Compton had been an employee of DuPage
County, the employment relationship ended when county
employees told Compton that the department was no longer
participating in the state program.
The County's ...