United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Lisa
A. Jensen United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff
Jonie G. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
challenging the denial of disability benefits. The parties
consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons
set forth below, the decision is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion
and Order.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural History
Plaintiff
filed an application for disability insurance benefits and an
application for supplemental security income on July 18,
2014. R. 264-71. Plaintiff initially alleged a disability
date beginning April 10, 2010 but then amended to October 25,
2014. R. 285. The date last insured is December 31, 2014. R.
136. These applications were initially denied on October 29,
2014 and upon reconsideration on February 9, 2015. R. 121,
133, 150, 165. Plaintiff filed a written request for a
hearing on March 2, 2015. R. 203-04. On April 5, 2016, a
hearing was held by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Barry A.
Miller. R. 76-109. Plaintiff, represented by an attorney,
appeared and testified via video conference. An impartial
vocational expert (VE) also appeared and testified. After the
hearing, the ALJ attempted to secure a medical source
statement from Plaintiff's primary care provider, Dr.
David Hansen. R. 992-93. Dr. Hansen responded stating that he
did not perform a functional capacity evaluation on Plaintiff
and is not managing her foot care. R. 1008. He did not
provide an opinion regarding Plaintiff's functional
capacity. Id.
On
December 27, 2016, the ALJ issued his written opinion denying
Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. R. 180. Plaintiff appealed the
decision to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review. R. 5-8. Plaintiff
now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which
stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Schmidt
v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2007).
B.
Medical History
Plaintiff
has a medical history of diabetes mellitus type 2,
hypertension, lower extremity neuropathy, diabetic foot
ulcers, and right knee arthritis. R. 24. Her great right toe
was amputated in 2010. Id. Plaintiff developed a
septic knee joint requiring arthroscopic irrigation and
debridement on October 25, 2014. R. 847. In November of 2014,
Plaintiff's left third toe was amputated due to
osteomyelitis. R. 859.
Dr.
Nathan Norem, Plaintiff's podiatrist, has treated
Plaintiff's diabetic foot ulcers and diabetic neuropathy
since 2010. R. 940. From November 2014 to January 2017,
Plaintiff has seen Dr. Norem about forty-one times.
See R. 24-75, 875-902, 945-90. In a February 27,
2015 medical source statement, Dr. Norem noted that Plaintiff
could not walk a single block without pain, required a cane,
could not lift ten pounds, could not stand for more than
thirty minutes, must keep her feet elevated for 90% of a
workday, could not sit for more than four hours, would be
absent from work more than 25% of the time, needed to shift
positions frequently, was suffering from foot ulcers and
neuropathy, and will continue to suffer infections and
ulcerations for at least twelve months as her feet were
deformed. R. 940-43.
In
August 2016, Plaintiff had her left fourth toe amputated. R.
45. Plaintiff also had a revisional right foot first ray
amputation in December 2016. R. 58. From September to
December of 2016, Dr. Norem advised Plaintiff to elevate her
feet and minimize activity. R. 47- 56. In a January 26, 2017
letter, Dr. Norem wrote that Plaintiff cannot tolerate
standing or walking for extended periods of time and that
Plaintiff is potentially putting her life at risk every time
she develops another foot ulceration. R. 21. Dr. Norem
reiterated that his February 27, 2015 medical assessment
included all of Plaintiff's ongoing issues including the
need to elevate her foot because of swelling and the high
risk of ulcerations. Id. He explained that while
Plaintiff's swollen foot is not documented in every
single note/visit, that does not mean it does not happen or
will continue to happen. Id.
C.
The ALJ's Decision
In his
written decision denying Plaintiff's claim for benefits,
the ALJ went through the five-step analysis for determining
whether a person is disabled under the Social Security Act.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity. R. 173. At step
two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: diabetes mellitus, history of osteomyelitis,
history of toe amputation, peripheral neuropathy, and
degenerative joint disease of the left knee. R. 174. At step
three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or medically equaling the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, paying particular attention to
listings 1.02, 1.05, 9.00, and 11.14. Id.
Before
moving to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has a
residual functional capacity (RFC), which is what Plaintiff
can do despite her limitations, to perform sedentary work
except she can lift and carry five pounds frequently and ten
pounds occasionally, can stand and/or walk only with an
assistive device and for no more than ten minutes at a time,
can occasionally push and pull with the bilateral lower
extremities, can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
balance, crouch, and crawl, can never climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds or kneel, can frequently stoop, must avoid even
moderate exposure to hazards, must avoid concentrated
exposure to wetness and vibrations, must be allowed to change
posture frequently, being able to shift between siting and
standing for one minute at a time while remaining on task at
least 85% of the time. R. 175.
At step
four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing
past relevant work as an administrative assistant and as a
receptionist as generally performed. R. 180. Because of this
finding at step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
disabled and did not move on to step five. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
reviewing court reviews the ALJ's determination to see if
it is supported by “substantial evidence, ”
meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Moore v. Colvin,743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971)). Accordingly, the reviewing court takes a very
limited role and cannot displace the decision by
reconsidering facts or evidence or by making independent
credibility determinations. Elder v. Astrue, 529
F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). “The ALJ is not required
to mention every piece of evidence but must provide an
‘accurate and logical bridge' between the evidence
and the conclusion that the claimant is not disabled, so that
‘as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of
the agency's ultimate findings and afford [the] claimant
meaningful judicial review.'” Craft v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir.
2004)). An ALJ only needs to “minimally articulate his
reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of
disability.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,
870 (7th Cir. 2000). But even when adequate record evidence
exists to support the ALJ's decision, the decision will
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