United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. DURKIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Wrenn alleges that her former employer, Exelon Generation,
LLC, discriminated against her based on: (1) her sex in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Count I); and
(2) her disability in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Count III). Defendant has moved to dismiss
Count I for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 49. That motion is denied.
12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the
complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic
Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint
must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with
“fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While
“detailed factual allegations” are not required,
“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.'” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay,
Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard,
the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir.
Wrenn Alleges a Co-Worker Stalked Her
is a woman who worked for Exelon as a nuclear equipment
operator at a nuclear power plant. R. 38 ¶ 7. John Zura
is a man who also works for Exelon as a nuclear equipment
operator at the same plant as Wrenn. Id. ¶ 8.
Wrenn alleges that in February and March of 2017, Zura began
texting Wrenn that he was attracted to her. Id.
¶ 9. Zura also “followed” and
“liked” Wrenn on social media. Id. Wrenn
contends that she told Zura multiple times that she was not
interested and to leave her alone. Id. Undaunted,
Zura approached Wrenn in the plant's parking lot and told
her: “I know I am making you uncomfortable, but
I've been crazy about you for years.” Id.
Wrenn again told Zura to keep away from her, and Zura said he
would. Id. Nevertheless, on March 8, 2017, Zura
visited Wrenn's home to give her a bag of gifts,
including wine and stuffed animals. Id.
reported Zura's behavior to her union steward on March
10, 2017 because she was “extremely anxious and
frightened by Zura's behavior.” Id. ¶
10. The union steward told Wrenn the union would try to
handle the situation before involving Exelon's human
resources department by telling Zura to leave Wrenn alone and
moving him off of her crew. Id. But that same day,
Zura approached Wrenn in the parking lot and asked if she was
alright. Id. ¶ 11. Wrenn yelled at Zura to
leave her alone. Id. ¶ 11. Five days later, the
union steward told Wrenn that he reported the situation to
the rest of March and April, Wrenn had ongoing discussions
with the union and the human resources department about her
desire that she and Zura not work on the same crew. When Zura
was again on Wrenn's crew on April 7, 2017, she sent an
email to human resources asking why they were continuing to
be assigned together. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Human
resources told Wrenn that they had not finished their
investigation of her allegations and that they did not
believe Exelon could move Zura because of his seniority.
Id. Nevertheless, human resources told Wrenn to
submit a written request that Zura be moved off her crew.
April 24, 2017, Wrenn sought a restraining order against Zura
in Illinois state court. Id. ¶ 22. After a
hearing on June 5, 2017, the court granted the request,
ordering Zura to stay 200 feet away from Wrenn at all times.
Id. ¶ 27-28.
Wrenn's Mental Health
days before seeking the restraining order in April,
Wrenn's physician referred her for mental health
treatment for her “stress and anxiety occasioned by
Zura's stalking and [Exelon's] failure to take any
decisive action.” Id. ¶ 20. Then around
May 18, 2017, Wrenn was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (“PTSD”) and placed on anti-anxiety
medication. Id. ¶ 24.
employment is subject to “fitness for duty”
requirements provided in the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”) regulations. Id.
¶ 52. In accordance with these regulations, Exelon made
a mandatory referral to its Employee Assistance Program
(“EAP”) regarding Wrenn's PTSD diagnosis.
Id. ¶ 25. As a result, Wrenn “was put on
FMLA leave and later short-term disability and would not be
permitted to work until August 2017.” Id.
also alleges that Exelon was required by the NRC regulations
to report the restraining order against Zura. Id.
¶ 54 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(g) (requiring
reporting of “any legal action(s) . . . that requires a
court appearance”)). Wrenn alleges on
“information and belief” that Exelon did not
report Zura in accordance with the regulations. Id.