United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
WILLIAM E. HAWKINS, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
William E. Hawkins filed an amended petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. 8) seeking
early termination of his parole. Respondent filed a response
at Doc. 19 and an Addendum to his response at Doc. 24, and
petitioner filed a reply at Doc. 21. This matter is now ripe
Facts and Procedural History
was convicted in this District (No. 90-cr-30067-01-DRH) of
several offenses arising out of his participation in “a
criminal enterprise based in Southern Illinois that had two
principal facets: the distribution of cocaine and marijuana,
and the commission of interstate burglary and robbery.”
United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 902 (7th Cir.
1998) (direct appeal). He was originally sentenced on August
31, 1992. See, Doc. 19, Ex. 1. The judgment reflects that
petitioner was sentenced on four counts. At issue here is the
sentence for Count 2, distribution of cocaine. Notably, the
Count 2 offense concluded March 27, 1987, while the offense
conduct giving rise to the other counts concluded in
September 1990. Petitioner was sentenced to 420 months (35
years) on Count 2.
reasons that are not relevant here, petitioner was
resentenced on some of the counts in June 2002. Doc. 19, Ex.
2. His sentence on Count 2 was not changed. The judgment
recited that “As to Count 2, the defendant is committed
to the custody of the Attorney General . . .. for a period of
35 years, and the defendant shall become eligible for parole
under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) upon serving one-third of such
term.” Doc. 19, Ex. 2, p. 3.
January 2018, U.S. District Judge Herndon granted
Hawkins' petition for early termination of his supervised
release as to Counts 1 and 4 in his criminal case but denied
his request for early termination of his Count 2 parole in
the absence of a habeas petition. No. 90-cr-30067-DRH, Doc.
651. Hawkins then filed this habeas petition.
for Habeas Relief
seeks early termination of his parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1). He argues that he has been rehabilitated
and is no longer in need of supervision.
argues, correctly, that the Court does not have authority to
terminate his parole. Section 3583(e)(1) permits the Court to
terminate a term of supervised release. That section does not
apply to petitioner's parole. Supervised release and
parole are two different things. Section 3583(e)(1) applies
to supervised release but not to parole.
3583 was enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. The effective date of the Act is November 1, 1987, and
the Act, including § 3583(e)(1), applies only to
offenses committed on or after that date. United States
v. Stewart, 865 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1988). Petitioner
committed the offense charged in Count 2 in March 1987.
Therefore, § 3583(e)(1) does not apply and his parole
cannot be terminated early under that section.
parole is governed by the so-called “old law, ”
18 U.S.C. §§ 420-4218. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4211 and 28 C.F.R. § 2.43, a parole term may be
terminated early by the Parole Commission. This can be done
either on the Commission's own motion, or on motion of
the parolee. Crucially, though, the decision whether to
terminate parole is within the discretion of the Commission,
and that decision is not subject to judicial review.
Valona v. U.S. Parole Commission, 235 F.3d 1046,
1048 (7th Cir. 2000).
short, this Court is without the authority to grant
petitioner the relief he seeks. This is unfortunate because
Judge Herndon has determined that petitioner has been
rehabilitated and is no longer in need of supervision.
However, this Court is bound to follow Seventh ...