United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Ashton Daniel, an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently
incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center, brings this
action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Daniel's original Complaint
(Doc. 2) alleged a single count against Dr. Lipchitz and
Jacqueline Lashbrook for discontinuing his insomnia
medication while at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”). The Court dismissed the
original Complaint for failure to state a claim, and Daniel
was given leave to amend. (Doc. 8). In the First Amended
Complaint (Doc. 9), Daniel alleges that Dr. Lipchitz and
Cristine Brown failed to ensure that medical staff followed
proper medication distribution protocol at
Pinckneyville. He asserts that the Defendants were
negligent and committed medical malpractice. Daniel seeks
declaratory judgment and monetary damages.
case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section
1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to
filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
First Amended Complaint
First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9), Daniel makes the following
allegations: Dr. Lipchitz, the tele-psychiatrist at
Pinckneyville, and Cristine Brown, the head administrator of
medical services, were in charge of ensuring that healthcare
staff followed proper medication distribution. They both
failed in that duty and, as a result, Daniel was allowed to
collect several pills and attempt suicide on two separate
occasions. (Doc. 9, p. 6). Daniel first collected thirty
pills and attempted suicide. He was taken to the infirmary
and placed on suicide watch, but his stomach was not pumped.
(Id. at p. 7). He suffered from pain, nausea,
dizziness, tremors, and chills, as well as psychological
symptoms, include hearing voices and having visions.
(Id.). On a separate occasion he collected three
pills and again attempted suicide. (Id. at p. 6).
on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide the pro se action into
the following two counts:
Count 1: Dr. Lipchitz and Cristine Brown were
deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment by
failing to ensure that medical staff properly distributed
medications to Daniel.
Count 2: Dr. Lipchitz and Cristine Brown committed
medical negligence and/or malpractice by failing to ensure
that medical staff properly distributed medications to
parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order
should be considered dismissed without prejudice as
inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
again fails to state a claim in his First Amended Complaint.
He alleges that Lipchitz and Brown failed to ensure that
their staff followed proper medication distribution protocol.
But Defendants cannot be liable for failing to properly
supervise their staff, because respondeat superior,
or supervisor liability, is not recognized under Section
1983. Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 746
F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of
Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)). In
order to be held individually liable, a defendant must be
“personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry,
266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill.
State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
“A defendant 'will be deemed to have sufficient
personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing
the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his
knowledge or consent.'” Id. (citing
Chavez, 251 F.3d at 652). There is no indication in
the allegations that either defendant directed the
distribution protocol or that they knew the protocol was not
being followed and that Daniel was hording medications.
Daniel also fails to allege that either defendant treated
Daniel after his suicide attempts. To the extent that Daniel
alleges that the defendants were negligent, negligence does
not amount to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, his claim
in Count 1 is DISMISSED for failure to state
Daniel fails to state a claim that any defendant violated his
constitutional rights, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Daniel's medical
negligence and/or malpractice claim under state law. See
also Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501
(7th Cir. 1999); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103
F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Count 2 is also
Daniel's second attempt to provide the Court with factual
allegations that would state a claim. He fails to offer any
facts that would raise his claim to a viable constitutional
violation. The Court finds that any additional amendment
would be futile. Accordingly, the First Amended Complaint,
along with this action, will be DISMISSED with
prejudice. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328,
347 (7th Cir. 2012); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d
623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011); Garcia v. City of Chicago,
Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994).