United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Yuri Chachanko, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at
the United States Penitentiary located in Greenville,
Illinois, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the validity of his sentence
in Unites States v. Chachanko, No. 01-cr-00052-SPW-1
(D. Mont. 2005) (“Criminal Case”). Chachanko
asserts that he wrongfully received a level 2 enhancement at
sentencing for “reckless endangerment during
flight.” (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 10).
matter is now before the Court for review of the Petition
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in United States District Courts, which provides
that upon preliminary consideration by the district judge,
“[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) gives this Court the authority
to apply the rules to other habeas corpus cases.
pled guilty in 2005 to conspiring to obstruct or to attempt
to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery of two casinos and
forcibly taking money from a casino at gunpoint in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and of “using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violation”
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Criminal Case, Doc.
47 (Plea Agreement). He was sentenced to a total prison term
of 219 months. Id. at Doc. 77. Chachanko filed an
appeal challenging the application of the reckless
endangerment enhancement to his sentence under to §3C1.2
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
(Doc. 1, p. 2); United States v. Chachanko, No.
06-30331 (9th Cir. May 14, 2007).
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), Chachanko filed
a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing that his conviction
under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) was invalid because the
definition of a “crime of violence” under Section
924(c)(3)(B), the residual clause, is unconstitutionally
vague. United States v. Chachanko, No.
16-96-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 5897013 (D. Mont., Nov. 29, 2017). The
district court denied his motion, holding that even if
Section 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague,
Chachanko's sentence was valid because robbery is a crime
of violence under the force clause of Section 924(c)(3)(A).
Id. at *4.
prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally
limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by
bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the
court which sentenced him. See Kramer v. Olson, 347
F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). Under very limited
circumstances, a prisoner may employ 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge his conviction and sentence. More specifically,
Section 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which
authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition
where the remedy under Section 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
“A procedure for postconviction relief can fairly be
termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a
convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial
rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as
having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
In order to trigger the savings clause, a petitioner must
meet three conditions: (1) he must show that he relies on a
new statutory interpretation case rather than a
constitutional case; (2) he must show that he relies on a
decision that he could not have invoked in his first Section
2255 motion and that applies retroactively; and (3)
he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental
defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). The
Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “there must be
some kind of structural problem with [S]ection 2255 before
[S]ection 2241 becomes available. In other words, something
more than a lack of success with a [S]ection 2255 motion must
exist before the savings clause is satisfied.”
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir.
errors can be raised on direct appeal, but not in a
collateral attack pursuant to Sections 2255 or 2241. A claim
that a defendant was erroneously sentenced under the
sentencing guidelines is one such claim. As the Seventh
Circuit has noted, “[W]e held in Hawkins that
the error in calculating the Guidelines range did not
constitute a miscarriage of justice for § 2255 purposes
given the advisory nature of the Guidelines and the district
court's determination that the sentence was appropriate
and that it did not exceed the statutory maximum.”
United States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708-09 (7th
Cir. 2014); see also Hawkins v. United States, 706
F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013), supplemented on denial of
rehearing, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013). More recently, the
Seventh Circuit reiterated that the sentencing guidelines
have been advisory ever since the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Perry v. United States, 877 F.3d 751 (7th Cir.
petition, Chachanko argues that the sentencing enhancement he
received for reckless endangerment during flight was
unlawful. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§3C1.2. Although he challenged this enhancement on
appeal and lost, he claims he is innocent of this enhancement
because (1) the police chase lasted less than one mile and
there were no other cars on the road; (2) the police chase
occurred in relation to a separate robbery state conviction
prosecuted in state court not his federal robbery conviction;
and (3) the language in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
“reckless endangerment during flight” is vague.
(Doc. 1, pp. 10-11).
sentencing guideline enhancement and sentencing range that
applied to Chachanko, however, were advisory, not mandatory,
because he was sentenced in 2006 after the Booker
decision. Furthermore, Chachanko's sentence was within
the statutory maximum, as he received a sentence of 219
months total, and the statutory maximum sentence for a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1951 is 240 months, and 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) is 84 months. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that because “they merely guide
the district courts' discretion, the Guidelines are not
amenable to a vagueness challenge.” Beckles v.
U.S., 137 S.Ct. 886, 894 (2017). Thus, Chachanko cannot
demonstrate a miscarriage of justice so as to permit a
Section 2241 petition. The savings clause affords Chachanko
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
Chachanko wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a
notice of appeal with this Court within sixty (60) days of
the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Chachanko plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If he does choose to appeal and is
allowed to proceed IFP, Chachanko will be required to pay a
portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee in order to
pursue his appeal (the amount to be determined based on his
prison trust fund account records for the past six months)
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See Fed.
R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v.
Gerlinger,547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008);
Sloan v. Lesza,181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.
1999); Lucien v. Jockisch,133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th
Cir. 1998). A timely motion ...