United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
DUSTIN R. COREY Plaintiff,
GINA MARTIN, et al., Defendants.
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
BILLY MCDADE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a pro se prisoner, files an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 asserting violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments related to his December 19, 2018 transfer from the
Peoria Adult Transition Center (“PATC”) to the
Greene County Work Camp (“GCWC”). The Court is
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to “screen”
Plaintiff's complaint, and through such process to
identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the
entire action if warranted. In reviewing the complaint, the
court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally
construing them in the plaintiff's favor. Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). While the
pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations”, it requires “more than an
accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed.Appx.
588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Enough facts must be provided to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422
(7th Cir. 2013)(citation omitted).
March 21, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to PATC under a
term of work release where he worked several jobs. On August
5, 2018, Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury and was
off of work, receiving workers' compensation benefits. On
December 19, 2018, he was summarily transferred from the PATC
work release program to GCWC. Plaintiff claims that this was
done without notice or hearing and was contrary to an
“implicit promise” that work release would only
be revoked if he violated the terms. Plaintiff alleges a
Fourth Amendment claim for an unreasonable search and seizure
and Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. While Plaintiff
also attempts to invoke Fifth Amendment due process this
“only comes into play when actions are taken under
color of federal, not state, law. There being no allegations
implicating federal law, there can be no Fifth Amendment
violation.” Salazar v. City of Chicago, No.
84-10156, 1985 WL 2482, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1985);
Narcizo v. Indiana, No. 1300333, 2013 WL 6036933, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2013).
noted, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment
protections against an unreasonable search and seizure.
However, prisoners' claims as to search and seizure,
other than those alleging intrusion into the body, are
reviewed under the Eighth rather than the Fourth Amendment.
This is so, as convicted prisoners do not have the same
privacy expectations as non-convicted persons. King v.
McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 900 (7th Cir. 2015). In
King, the Seventh Circuit found that a
prisoner's claim was not to be reviewed under the lower
pleading standard of the Fourth Amendment, as this was
reserved for individuals who had not been convicted of a
crime. It determined that reviewing a prisoner's claim
under a Fourth Amendment analysis would, in effect, create an
impermissible “Eight-Amendment-light” standard.
Id. at 901.
result, the Court properly reviews Plaintiff's claim
under the Eighth Amendment. Here, however, the Court finds
that Plaintiff fails to plead a cognizable Eighth Amendment
claim. This is so, as Plaintiff fails to establish that he
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Defendants'
alleged conduct is not determined to have violated the Eighth
Amendment as it is generally recognized that prisoners do not
have a constitutionally protected interest as to the prison
where they will be assigned. Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 225 (1976). “States may move their charges to
any prison in the system. Community correctional centers are
low security institutions but still prisons, and inmates have
no more claim to be sent there than they have to avoid
commitment to maximum-security penitentiaries.”
DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir.
further, fails to substantiate an Eighth Amendment claim as
he does not assert that he suffered a physical injury due to
the transfer to GCWC. See Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d
520, 524 (7th Cir. 1997), as amended (May 29, 1997)
(dismissing claim which “showed neither physical harm
nor the kind of extreme and officially sanctioned
psychological harm that might support a claim for damages
under the Eighth Amendment.”)
also asserts a claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In order to state a claim for a
violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first
identify the deprivation of a constitutionally recognized
liberty or property interest. Domka v. Portage
County, 523 F.3d 776, 779-80 (7th Cir. 2008). As noted,
prisoners do not have a liberty interest in their placement
and a transfer will not implicate a liberty interest unless
it causes plaintiff to be subjected to “atypical and
significant hardship” not incidental to ordinary prison
life. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005)
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995)). The fact that Plaintiff was on work release does not
change this analysis as prisoners on work release have no
greater demand to due process than do those serving full
custodial sentences. See Domka, 523 F.3d at 781.
Plaintiff fails to plead any particular atypical conditions
at GCWC alleging, generally, that he has experienced a
“loss of personal liberty ” and placement under
“harsh elements of prison conditions.” Plaintiff,
however, is a prisoner and lawfully subjected to loss of
personal liberty. While Plaintiff makes a conclusory
allegation of harsh prison conditions, he does not plead any
particulars or establish that these conditions are atypical
as compared to everyday prison life. While Plaintiff wishes
to be restored to the more unfettered freedoms attendant to
work release, he does not have a constitutional right to
also asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim of “state
created danger.” While this is not a particularly
cognizable claim, Plaintiff raises it in relation to his loss
of liberty, previously discussed, and his loss of property.
Plaintiff pleads that he lost his personal property when
summarily transferred from PATC, attempting to assert it
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davis v. Biller,
41 Fed.Appx. 84, 8485 (7th Cir 2002) . “Prisoner's
allegation, that Illinois prison guards disposed of his
personal property, did not state constitutional claim, since
prisoner had adequate state post-deprivation remedy, i.e., a
tort suit in Illinois Court of Claims.” See
also, Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592-93
(7th Cir. 2001.) This claim, too, is denied. Plaintiff's
recourse is to pursue any action related to personal property
in the Illinois Court of Claims.
IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. Any amendment to the Complaint would be futile as
Plaintiff cannot assert a colorable 8 1983 claim under the
facts alleged. This case is therefore closed. The clerk is
directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.
Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry
of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, ...