United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
JOHNSON COLEMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Motion to Dismiss  is granted with prejudice. Civil case
Kevin Sroga initially brought his Complaint on February 21,
2017, and defendants were served in May 2019. Invoking 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Sroga alleges that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated in conjunction with the tow of several
vehicles pursuant to Section 9-80-11(a) of the Municipal Code
of Chicago (“MCC”), which allows for any vehicle
that appears to be deserted and is not moved or used for more
than seven days to be towed. Sroga states that he parked
several cars on North Homan Avenue in Chicago. City officials
towed Sroga's cars on February 18, 2015; several days
before, his cars had received City stickers stating that they
were abandoned pursuant to MCC Section 9-80-110 and that they
could be towed. Along with related state law claims and
alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, Sroga
contends that towing the vehicles was an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment because snow
blocked his cars, making them impossible to move. Further,
Sroga asserts that towing the cars violated his right to due
process because the City towed them on the seventh day,
rather than more than seven days, after he saw the tow
notices on the cars.
Sroga failed to appear at Court hearings on June 3, 2019 and
June 11, 2019 (Dkt. 54, 60), he did appear at the July 11,
2019 hearing and orally moved for leave to file an amended
complaint, which this Court granted. (Dkt. 63.) The Court
allowed Sroga until August 12, 2019 to file his amended
complaint, noting that this was a final extension. Sroga did
not comply. Instead, Sroga filed a motion for an extension of
time to file his amended complaint two days after the
deadline, which the Court denied for failure to demonstrate
excusable neglect for not complying with the Court's
deadline. (Dkt. 64, 66.) Defendants moved to dismiss
Sroga's complaint for a lack of standing and failure to
state a claim, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
respectively. Sroga did not file a brief in response, despite
multiple orders from the Court confirming the briefing
schedule. (Dkt. 66, 70.) Defendants filed a reply brief in
compliance with the Court's schedule. To date, Sroga has
not filed anything further with the Court.
12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of an action over which a
court allegedly lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Standing is a threshold requirement in
every federal claim and must be present at the time the
lawsuit is filed. See Groshek v. Time Warner Cable,
Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S.Ct. 740, 199 L.Ed.2d 617 (2018).
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all of
the plaintiff's allegations as true and views them
“in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 632
(7th Cir. 2013). A complaint must contain allegations that
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
It is a
longstanding rule that a plaintiff waives his claims when he
fails to develop arguments or fails to respond to alleged
deficiencies in a motion to dismiss. Alioto v. Town of
Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting
cases); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir.
2005) (recognizing that a complaint is subject to dismissal
where a plaintiff does not file a response supporting the
legal adequacy of the complaint). Sroga's silence in
response to defendants' motion to dismiss operates as
abandonment of any argument against dismissing the claims.
See Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an argument . . .
results in waiver.”). The Court is therefore compelled
to grant defendants' motion to dismiss on all claims.
Sroga had not waived his arguments on all of his claims,
however, the Court would dismiss the complaint in full
because Sroga lacks standing. To establish the threshold
requirement of Article III standing, Sroga must plausibly
allege facts demonstrating that: (1) he suffered an injury in
fact, (2) are fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
defendants, and (3) are likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.
1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24,
2016). Sroga bears the burden of establishing the elements of
standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
contend that Sroga has not alleged ownership of a single
vehicle. Although Sroga refers to several vehicles that he
parked within the City of Chicago, he does not allege that he
holds title to any of the vehicles at issue. Further, Sroga
has not identified the vehicles in any manner or specified
how many vehicles are even at issue. Thus, Sroga's
allegations fail to satisfy the first element, the existence
of an injury in fact. See Perry v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1999). This Court
does not have jurisdiction over Sroga's claims. Given
Sroga's waiver of his claims and this Court's lack of
jurisdiction, the Court does not address defendants'
additional arguments in support of dismissal.
has been allowed multiple opportunities to prosecute his case
and given many warnings regarding the importance of complying
with Court set deadlines. Thus, the Court grants