United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
ORDER & OPINION
JOE
BILLY McDADE UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on motions in limine by
both parties. (Docs. 63, 64, 65, 66). Defendant has responded
to Plaintiff's motions (Docs. 70, 71), [1] but Plaintiff has
failed to timely respond to Defendant's motions. For the
reasons stated herein, Defendant's motions (Docs. 63, 64)
are GRANTED and Plaintiff's motions (Docs. 65, 66) are
DENIED.
I.
Defendant's Motions
Defendant
has moved to bar evidence offered to prove emotional distress
or otherwise seek punitive damages (Doc. 63) and evidence
offered on the time and effort Plaintiff has spent litigation
the case (Doc. 64). As Plaintiff failed to respond to either
motion before the deadline-or, indeed, at all-these motions
are presumed unopposed. CDIL-LR 7.1(B)(2).
This
Court is unable to find any precedent suggesting the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/3,
under which this action is brought, would support a claim for
emotional distress or punitive damages. As Defendant
correctly points out, the Northern District has held IWPCA
“does not provide for punitive damages.”
Saribekian v. Concrete Drilling & Sawing Co.,
Inc., 1990 WL 133431, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 1990).
In the absence of any argument why the Court should find
otherwise, the Court holds these damages are not available
and, consequently, evidence offered for the purpose of
proving emotional distress or as a basis for punitive damages
would not be relevant and would be unfairly prejudicial.
Thus, such evidence is barred under Federal Rules of Evidence
402 and 403.
Both
the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme
Court have held pro se plaintiffs are not entitled
to attorney's fees under even statutes which explicitly
allow recovery of attorney's fees. Kay v.
Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991); Hamer v.
Lentz, 132 Ill.2d 49, 63 (1989). Having not filed a
response, Plaintiff gives the Court no reason to believe an
award of attorney's fees would be appropriate in this
case; he is proceeding pro se. Therefore, any
evidence regarding the time and effort he spent litigating
the case, which does not bear on his right to relief under
the statute, would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial;
such evidence is excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 402
and 403.
II.
Plaintiff's Motions
Plaintiff's
surviving motions in limine[2] ask the Court to rule on the
admissibility of certain documents (Doc. 65) and exclude
certain evidence as hearsay or for lack of authentication
(Doc. 66). Defendant timely responded. (Docs. 70, 71).
The
first motion appears to be a revival of a motion Plaintiff
filed during the briefing on summary judgment (Doc. 47).
(Doc. 65 at 1). For clarity of the record, that motion was
not denied because the Court accepted Defendant's
argument that the exhibit should be excluded due to discovery
issues, as Plaintiff suggests (Doc. 65 at 1-2; see
Doc. 50 at 1-2). Rather, the Court found the proffered
exhibit was unnecessary to consider at the time and therefore
denied the motion as moot. (Doc. 52 at 9).
However,
the Court agrees with Defendant the request is premature. The
exhibits may be admissible or not depending on what occurs at
trial and how a foundation is provided. The Court cannot say
at this early juncture whether or not they are admissible.
Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED without
prejudice.
In his
second motion, Plaintiff takes issue with three portions of a
proposed final pretrial order: (1) “Plaintiff never
reported to work when [Margina] Arbuckle attempted to call
him in from the on-call list”; (2) “Mark Hutchins
subsequently instructed Arbuckle to stop attempting to
schedule Plaintiff for work because he did not have the
proper work authorization paperwork. Hutchins instructed
Arbuckle that Plaintiff could not work until Plaintiff
resolved his work authorization issues”; and (3)
“On June 25, 2012, Hutchins terminated Plaintiff's
employment because Plaintiff was never available to
work.” (Doc. 66 at 1). Plaintiff contends these
statements are hearsay and the evidence regarding the calls
should be excluded as Defendant has not produced phone
records showing those calls.
Hearsay
refers to “out-of-court statements made by
non-witnesses that are offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” United States v. Taylor, 569
F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2009). The first two statements are
clearly not hearsay. Arbuckle will be a witness at trial, and
as such any testimony she provides that Plaintiff did not
report to work when called will be an in-court statement made
by a witness. Hutchins's instructions to Arbuckle are not
relevant on the issue of whether Plaintiff had the proper
work authorization permit, but rather have relevance in their
effect on Arbuckle's behavior. Therefore, they are not
hearsay. United States v. Marchan, 935 F.3d 540, 546
(7th Cir. 2019); Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)(2). With regard to the
final statement, whether it will constitute hearsay depends
on how evidence is offered of Hutchins's reasons for
terminating Plaintiff's employment and the purpose of
that offering. The Court will deny the hearsay objection
without prejudice as to the third statement, and Plaintiff
may reraise that objection at trial. But nothing indicates
the evidence is fundamentally hearsay and should be excluded
at this time; it will depend on the method of introduction at
trial.
Plaintiff
has provided no legal basis for his assertion that Defendant
must produce authenticated phone records in order for a
witness to testify that a phone call occurred. Nor has he
argued such records were requested in discovery but not
produced. The Court therefore has no basis to ...