United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN
E. COX U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Rodney C. (“Plaintiff”)[2] appeals the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying his application for
Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act.
Plaintiffs Brief in Support of his Motion to Reverse the
Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [15], which
this Court construes as a motion for summary judgment, is
GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
[dkt. 20] is DENIED. The Administrative Law Judge's
decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff
filed for Disability Insurance Benefits in October 2009,
alleging he had a disability onset date of June 7, 2004. (R.
24, 154.) Plaintiffs application was denied by the state
agency both initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 81-82.)
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ'), which occurred on August 4, 2011.
(R. 380.) On November, 2, 2011, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled, and the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review of that
decision. (R. 1-3, 24-34.) Plaintiff appealed that decision
to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois; the Commissioner moved for Entry of Judgment
with Remand, and the case was remanded for additional
proceedings in September 2013. (R. 624.)
On
remand, Plaintiff won a partially favorable decision; the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was disabled from June 7, 2004 through
December 31, 2008, but that the disability period ended on
January 1, 2009. (R. 523-38.) Plaintiff appealed to the
District Court again, and the decision was remanded again on
the Commissioner's agreed motion for remand. (R. 990-92.)
On the
second remand, ALJ Mathew Johnson held a hearing on August
31, 2017, and issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was
not disabled, following the five-step analytical process
required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity from January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2014. (R.
873.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had
severe impairments of degenerative disc disease status-post
surgical fusion, obesity, diabetes mellitus and associated
peripheral neuropathy, obstructive sleep apnea, and
hypertension. (R. 873.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a
listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (R. 876.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff retained
the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work, except he could not perform work
requiring climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, kneeling, and
crouching, more than occasional exposure to vibration,
working around hazardous environments, or operating a motor
vehicle. (R. 877.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff could not perform any of his past relevant work.
(R. 883.) He also found that Plaintiff was a younger
individual with “limited education, ” and that
and is able to communicate in English. (R. 884.) At step
five, based on the VE testimony and the findings about
Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy, including
packer, assembler, and inspector. (R. 885-86.) As such, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (R.
886.)
In
finding that Plaintiff had “limited education, ”
the ALJ determined that the “record does not
convincingly support assertions of illiteracy.” (R.
884.) In support of this ruling, the ALJ relied on the
following facts: 1) Plaintiffs completion of the
11th grade; 2) his ability to grocery shop, pay
bills, and visit social networking sites on the internet; 3)
Plaintiffs acknowledgement that he could read at a
“2nd grade level, ” 4) Plaintiffs 2009
Function Report indicated he could read at a 2nd
grade level, but could pay bills, handle a savings account,
and use a checkbook (R. 192-194), whereas his later records
indicate greater difficulty reading, and 5) Plaintiff had
previously worked as a delivery truck driver for many years
before his alleged disability. (R. 884-85.)
At the
hearing, the ALJ expressed skepticism that a person could
complete the 11th grade and be illiterate. (R.
904-905.) The ALJ asked Plaintiffs attorney to locate the
school records for Plaintiff for evidence that he was
illiterate. (Id.) Plaintiffs attorney provided those
records, but they were inconclusive. The ALJ noted that they
showed a marking of “F” in the scholarship
category, and implied that this showed that Plaintiff had
struggled in school. However, the key at the bottom of the
records shows that “F, ” counterintuitively,
stands for “Fair or Acceptable Progress.” (R.
1216.) However, those grades were for the first two grading
periods of Plaintiff s high school career in October 1972 and
February 1973. The records show that Plaintiff subsequently
earned grades of “S” and “N” before
being marked a “no show” in September 1975.
Unfortunately, there is no indication of what “S”
or “N” stand for in the key at the bottom of
Plaintiff s scholastic records.
As for
Plaintiffs ability to perform activities of daily living,
Plaintiff testified that he was able to go shopping if his
husband put pictures of the items on the shopping list, and
that Plaintiff could not read the list himself. Although
Plaintiff indicated that he visited social network sites on
the internet, the ALJ did not question him as to what such
internet usage entailed, and the Court does not have any
additional testimony from Plaintiff on that issue. (R. 189.)
Plaintiff also testified that he would use something called a
“street guide” to complete his delivery driving
job, and would match the numbers on the guide to allow him to
find the address; he stated that he could not read the words
in the directions. (R. 930.) Furthermore, Plaintiff explained
that he was able to pass his licensing examination to be a
truck driver by using an audio recording that was available
to people who stated that they could not read the
examination. (R. 910.) Finally, the ALJ did not question
Plaintiff on what he meant when claimed a 2nd
grade reading level in 2009, but Plaintiff testified that he
could only read small words, and could not read whole
sentences. (R. 928.)
II.
Social Security Regulations and Standard of Review
Section
405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings
of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review
of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether
the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence
or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227
F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevenson v. Chater,
105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct.
1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Skinner v. Astrue, 478
F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating
facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence,
or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478
F.3d at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,
413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ's decision must
be affirmed even if “reasonable minds could
differ” as long as “the decision is adequately
supported”) (citation omitted).
The ALJ
is not required to address “every piece of evidence or
testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ's analysis must
provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision
to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245
F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies
benefits, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge
from the evidence to his conclusion.”
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least
minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence with
enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate
review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart,
425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue,
496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). ”An ALJ has a duty
to fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions .
. . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we
can follow his reasoning.” See Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
III.
Discussion
At step
five of the sequential analysis, the Commissioner has the
burden of proving that jobs exist in the regional economy
that a person of the claimant's vocational profile could
perform. Educational attainment is one factor-together with
age, work experience, and RFC-that an ALJ must consider in
developing the vocational profile. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1560(c)(1), 404.1564. The ...