United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
M. Rowland United States District Judge.
Quentin Platt filed suit against the Chicago Transit
Authority (“CTA”), Deshone Maddox, and Georgette
Hampton, alleging employment discrimination and wrongful
termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Before the Court is CTA's motion to dismiss
Counts I, III, and IV of Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint. For the following reasons, CTA's motion to
dismiss (Dtkt. 41) is granted without prejudice. Plaintiff
has 28 days from the date of this order to amend his
following facts are alleged in Platt's Second Amended
Complaint and are presumed true for the purpose of resolving
the pending motion. Platt was employed as a CTA bus operator
starting in July 2008. (Dkt. 34 at 3) In April 2009, Platt
suffered disabling lower back injuries. (Id.) As a
result of that injury, Platt underwent medical treatment
including two surgeries for a Spinal Cord Stimulator Implant.
(Id.) These treatments and surgeries required
medically approved time off, and Platt was unable to work for
periods of time covering approximately five years and five
months. (Dkt. 42 at 2) In accordance with CTA's policies,
Platt requested medically required time off that CTA
approved. (Dkt. 34 at 3)
2014, Platt underwent surgery and had a Spinal Cord
Stimulator Implant implanted into his back. (Dkt. 34 at 3)
This surgery rendered him disabled and unable to drive
commercial vehicles. (Id.) From September 19, 2014
through September 18, 2017, Platt was medically unable to
perform his duties as a CTA bus operator. (Id.) CTA
again approved his medically required time off.
result of his disability, Platt requested medical leave and
reasonable accommodations so as to continue working at the
CTA. (Dkt. 34 at 4) In September of 2014, CTA placed Platt on
administrative inactive status known as Temporary Medical
Disability Area 605 (“Area 605”). (Id.)
Platt remained in Area 605 until his termination in September
2017. (Id.) Platt alleges that between September
2014 and September 2017, he made multiple requests for
reasonable accommodations, including requests for
alleges that CTA offered Platt several reassignment
positions, but that he was not medically qualified to accept
them. (Dkt. 34 at 4) So Platt continued to request
reassignment. (Id.) Platt also alleges that
similarly situated individuals were offered vacant
positions-positions for which, Platt claims, he was also
qualified. (Id. at 4-5)
terminated Platt on September 18, 2017. (Dkt. 34 at 5) In
March of 2018, Platt filed charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id.)
That September, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue.
(Id.) Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit alleging
employment discrimination and wrongful termination in
violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Counts I and II are brought against Defendant CTA,
and Counts III and IV are brought against Defendant Deshone
Maddox and Georgette Hampton. Because CTA was unsure which
counts applied to them, CTA moved to dismiss Counts I, III,
and IV pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 42) As clarified by
Plaintiff, Counts III and IV do not name Defendant CTA. (Dkt.
45 at 11) As such, the Court will only address Count I.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint
for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true
all well-pleaded facts in the Plaintiff's complaint and
must “construe the complaint in the ‘light most
favorable to the' plaintiff.” Zahn v. N. Am.
Power & Gas, LLC, 847 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 738
(7th Cir. 2016)). However, the Court is not “obliged to
accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions
of fact.” Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d
656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ill. Bible Coll.
Ass'n v. Anderson, 870 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir.
2017), as amended (Oct. 5, 2017), cert denied
sub nom. Ill. Bible Coll. Ass'n v. Cross, 138 S.Ct.
1021 (2018). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
“While a plaintiff need not plead ‘detailed
factual allegations' to survive a motion to dismiss, she
still must provide more than mere ‘labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action' for her complaint to be considered
adequate….” Bell v. City of Chi., 835
F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678).
argues that Count I should be dismissed as time barred
because Platt failed to file a charge of discrimination
within 300 days of the occurrence of the unlawful employment
practice. (Dkt. 42 at 4) Even if Platt filed in a timely
manner, CTA argues that Platt was not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA. (Id.) CTA asserts
that Platt failed to plausibly plead that he was qualified to
perform the essential functions of his position with or
without reasonable accommodation. (Id.)
Plaintiff's Failure to Accommodate Claims is ...