James B. Hanson, Petitioner-Appellant,
United States of America, Respondent-Appellee.
September 4, 2019
from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois. No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG - J. Phil
WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
a six-year investigation into a methamphetamine operation,
James Hanson was indicted on May 5, 2009, with conspiracy to
manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine in excess of 500 grams. The
Government established Hanson's three prior drug offenses
and Kentucky felony third-degree residential burglary
conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson pleaded guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agreement, the
government listed only one prior felony drug conviction under
21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially
qualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson's
prior burglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing
range under the Guidelines.
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), the
Probation Officer calculated Hanson's total offense level
as 34, with a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing
Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting a sentencing hearing where the
district court heard from both parties, the district court
adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson to 262 months in prison
followed by ten years of supervised release. On appeal,
Hanson challenges the district court's denial of his
collateral challenge to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255. We conclude that the district court did not commit any
reversible errors and affirm.
argues that the district court erred when it included his
third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing
Hanson's status to a career offender. We review the
district court's legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski
v. United States, 904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).
sentences may be changed if the sentence "was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law ... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
"[N]ot every error is corrigible in a post-conviction
proceeding, even if the error is not harmless."
Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823 (7th
Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may not be
cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.
held that "relief under § 2255 is available
'only in extraordinary situations, such as an error of
constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a
fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.'" United States v.
Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th
Cir. 2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within
one year of the latest of four dates, including the date of
final judgment and "the date on which the right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."
28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1) and (3).
§ 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final
judgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed
Hanson's appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became
final on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a §
2255 motion within one year. The statute of limitations to
file a § 2255 motion for Hanson's final conviction
ended on November 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson's motion
under § 2255(f)(1) is untimely.
Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis recognized
a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a §
2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court
stated in Mathis that the rules being applied came
from precedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct.
2243 (2016). "Our precedents make this a straightforward
case. For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear
that application of ACCA involves, and involves only,
comparing elements." Id. at 2257. Instead, the
Supreme Court distinguished between "elements" and
"means," where "elements" are
"constituent parts" of a crime and
"means" are "various factual ways of
committing some component of the offense." Id.
at 2249. Hanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in
Mathis intended to create a new rule upon which the
statute of limitations may run.
briefly address Hanson's letter to the court, which
confuses the Government's argument that Mathis
must be declared retroactive "by the Supreme
Court." Rather, the Government states in its brief:
"[nevertheless, the measuring period begins when the
Supreme Court declares a new right, not when the courts
acknowledge the right to be retroactive." We understand
the Government's position as not requiring the right to
be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but rather the
Supreme Court must declare a new right for the courts to
argues the district court misapplied the career offender
enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, resulting in a
"miscarriage of justice." Sentencing errors that
can be raised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable
upon collateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include
sentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in
the law or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory
maximum. See Narvaez v. United States,674 F.3d 621,
627 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting relief under the
pre-Booker mandatory guidelines); and see Welch
v. United ...