United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STACI
M. YANDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
("Report") of United States Magistrate Judge Mark
A. Beatty (Doc. 189), recommending the undersigned grant the
motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Sherry
Benton, Lisa Krebs, Robert Mueller, and Deborah Zelasko
("IDOC Defendants") (Doc. 145) and Defendants
Michael Scott, Vipin Shah, Arnel Garcia, Venerio Santos, and
Wexford Health Sources, Inc ("Wexford Defendants")
(Doc. 149). Plaintiff filed a timely objection (Doc. 192).
For the following reasons, Judge Beatty's Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED.
Background
Plaintiff
Ramon Clark brings this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting alleged
constitutional violations that occurred while he was confined
at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), Centralia Correctional Center
("Centralia"), and Robinson Correctional Center
("Robinson"). Specifically, Clark alleges the
Wexford Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
testicular cyst in violation of the Eighth Amendment when
they failed to properly diagnose and treat the cyst and
associated pain. He also alleges the IDOC Defendants failed
to ensure adequate medical treatment for his cyst in
violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying his grievances
which complained about the denial of adequate medical care
for his cyst. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
In his
Report, Judge Beatty concluded the defendants were not
deliberately indifferent to Clark's serious medical
needs. As to the IDOC Defendants, Judge Beatty found that
they were entitled to reasonably rely on the medical
professionals' determinations regarding Clark's
course of treatment. Regarding the Wexford Defendants, he
found that Clark received adequate medical treatment for his
cyst. Judge Beatty therefore recommends that Defendants'
motions be granted.
Discussion
Because
a timely objection was filed, the undersigned must undertake
a de novo review of the Report. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b);
see also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th
Cir. 1992). De novo review requires the Court to
“give fresh consideration to those issues to which
specific objections have been made” and to make a
decision “based on an independent review of the
evidence and arguments without giving any presumptive weight
to the magistrate judge's conclusion.” Mendez
v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The
Court “may accept, reject or modify the magistrate
judge's recommended decision.” Id.
For his
objection, Clark contends the IDOC Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by
essentially turning a blind eye to his multiple grievances
about his subpar medical care, and that the Wexford
Defendants were deliberately indifferent by pursuing an
ineffective course of treatment for his testicular cyst.
“[I]ndividual
liability under § 1983 … requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. A
prison official is personally involved if he knows about the
unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones
or deliberately turns a blind eye to it. Johnson v.
Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006). Where an
official learns from a prisoner's grievance or other
correspondence that the prisoner is being deprived of a
constitutional right, the failure to exercise his authority
to investigate and/or address the situation may be sufficient
to establish the official's personal involvement in the
wrong. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th
Cir. 2015). However, a nonmedical official may defer to the
judgment of medical professionals so long as he did not
ignore the plaintiff and had no reason to believe the
plaintiff was not receiving adequate care. McGee v.
Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 2013); Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010).
Here,
the evidence is that between May 2016 and October 2016, Clark
submitted several grievances related to the alleged negligent
medical treatment he was receiving for his testicular pain
and requesting an ultrasound to rule out cancer. Prior to the
denials of the grievances, the IDOC Defendants consulted with
the Health Care Unit which informed them that Clark had
inflammation in the testicles and a benign cyst that was
being monitored. None of Clark's treating physicians
recommended another ultrasound because the cyst was benign,
had not grown in size, and did not require an outside
consultation. It is significant that Clark's primary
complaint in his grievances was not about pain, but the
denial of another ultrasound. Because Clark is not entitled
to demand specific care (See, Pyles v. Fahim, 771
F.3d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 2014)), his objection is overruled as
Judge Beatty's findings with respect to the IDOC
Defendants.
Clark's
deliberate indifference claim against the Wexford Defendants
is premised on their purported failure to adequately address
his testicular cyst and associated pain. It is well settled
that “[a] prisoner's dissatisfaction with a
doctor's prescribed course of treatment does not give
rise to a constitutional claim unless the medical treatment
was “blatantly inappropriate.” Pyles,
771 F.3d at 409; Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d
586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, a review of the medical
records demonstrates that Clark's testicular cyst was
monitored by each of the Wexford Defendants. He received
multiple physical evaluations of the benign cyst, was
prescribed pain medications, and received several ultrasounds
to check for growth. Clark's disagreement with the
treatment decisions he received cannot support a deliberate
indifference claim. Thus, the Court agrees with Judge Beatty
that the evidence, even when viewed in Clark's favor,
warrants granting summary judgment for Defendants.
After
thoroughly reviewing the record before it, the Court finds
Judge Beatty's factual findings and analysis to be
thorough and accurate and ADOPTS his Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 189) in its entirety. Accordingly,
Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 145 and
149) are GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims ...