Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sroga v. City of Chicago

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

October 16, 2019

KEVIN SROGA, Plaintiff,


          Virginia M. Kendall United States District Judge.

         Kevin Sroga brings this suit against the City of Chicago, Department of Police, and the State of Illinois in connection with his unsuccessful application to become a Police Officer. After consolidating this suit with a factually similar suit Sroga had filed, the Court directed Sroga to file a consolidated complaint. (Dkt. 55). He has done so, alleging claims including age, race, and gender discrimination and various state-law claims. The City of Chicago has moved to dismiss Sroga's consolidated complaint. For the reasons stated here, the City's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is denied. The City's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part. The City's motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts II and III. The Court grants the City's motion to dismiss Counts I and IV-IX and does so without prejudice, with leave for Sroga to amend his complaint consistent with this opinion, if possible, within 21 days of the publication of this opinion.


         The following factual allegations are taken from Sroga's consolidated complaint (Dkt. 65) and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016).

         Sroga responded to an October 2013 job announcement posted by the City for the position of Probationary Police Officer. (Dkt. 65 at ¶ 12). The announcement advertised that applicants who passed a written exam, supplied required documents, and who otherwise met certain minimum qualifications would be considered for hire. (Id. at ¶ 13). The announcement provided that qualifying candidates would receive a lottery number which would serve as the order of selection for hire. (Id. at ¶ 13).

         Sroga applied for the position and took the Chicago Police Officer Entry Examination on December 14, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 15). Soon after, Sroga received a letter from the testing agency stating that he had passed the exam and that his lottery number was 1, 546 out of 12, 713, and that he would be called for the hiring process according to his lottery number. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18).

         Sroga continued on in the hiring process and in October 2014 took the P.O.W.E.R. test-an agility test. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23-24). The P.O.W.E.R. test has different passing standards for male and female applicants. (Id. at ¶ 22). Sroga passed the P.O.W.E.R. test and was further processed for psychological testing, drug testing, medical exams, and more, which he completed. (Id. at ¶ 25).

         While not entirely clear from the consolidated complaint, it appears that, in 2015, Sroga again applied to take the “Police Officer Exam.” (Id. at ¶¶ 20 & n.1, 25). He notes that he was 40 years old when he applied to take the exam but was 41 years old when the exam was administered. (Id.).

         The City of Chicago Municipal Code § 2-152-410(e) provides that “no person above the age of 40 may receive initial appointment as a probationary career service police officer with the police department.” On November 16, 2014, Sroga turned 40 years old. (Id. at ¶ 26). Sroga alleges that after this time, the City ceased processing his application. (Id. at ¶ 32). Sroga received no communications from the City or any other entity notifying him that his applications had been disqualified or that he was no longer being considered for the position. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). Sroga has reached out to the City, and the City has informed him that he has not been disqualified from consideration. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-37). Despite this, he has not received further processing. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-37, 46). Sroga alleges that the City has continued to process applicants who are younger or who are Black and Hispanic, including those who had a lottery number higher than his and who should have been processed after him. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 49, 55).


         In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must carry his burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014). To determine whether jurisdiction exists, the Court turns to the complaint along with evidence outside of the pleadings. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). A court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction must dismiss the action without proceeding to the merits. See MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 935 F.3d 573, 581 (7th Cir. 2019).

         To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Olson v. Champaign Cty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Toulon v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d 725, 734 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.).


         Sroga brings claims for age discrimination against the City (Count I), race discrimination against the City (Counts II and III), and gender discrimination against the City and State (Count IV). He also brings a claim under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the City and State (Count V), negligence and gross negligence claims against the City (Counts VI and VII), and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against the City (Counts VIII and IX). (Dkt. 65).[1]

         A. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.