United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
LESLIE ANNE ALTON, as personal representative of Julie Alton, deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
SMITHGROUP, INC., Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Sharon
Johnson Coleman United States District Court Judge.
Plaintiff
Julie Alton, now deceased, [1] filed this lawsuit alleging
violations of the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
against her former employee SmithGroup, Inc. SmithGroup filed
the present motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). For the reasons explained
below, the Court denies SmithGroup's motion in its
entirety. [25].
Background
The
following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
SmithGroup is a nationally-recognized design firm. Alton
began working the SmithGroup's Chicago Office as an
Interior Designer III in February 2017.
On May
18, 2018, Alton sent an email to Alina Rudman, the Human
Resources Manager in Chicago, requesting intermittent FMLA
leave. In that email, Alton also told Rudman that she had
questions concerning short-term and long-term disability
insurance, which were part of the benefits provided by the
SmithGroup Health & Welfare Benefit Plan. That same day,
Rudman responded via email explaining that there was a formal
process for FMLA leave and provided Alton with two forms that
Alton and her physician would need to complete: (1)
SmithGroup's Request for Leave and (2) Certification of
Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health
Condition. Three days later, on May 22, Alton sent Rudman the
completed SmithGroup leave form indicating that she had a
medical need for intermittent FMLA leave. Alton's medical
provider sent Rudman the completed Certification of Health
Care Provider form on May 29. Alton had stage IV metastatic
breast cancer.
Alton
and Rudman met on May 22 to discuss her FMLA request. Rudman
testified at her deposition that on that date, it was her
understanding that Alton's cancer was a serious health
condition under the FMLA making Alton eligible for FMLA
leave. Also at the May 22 meeting, Alton asked Rudman for
information regarding long-term and short-term disability
benefits. That same day, Rudman emailed Ed Dodge, Vice
President and Director of Human Resources at SmithGroup,
explaining that Alton had a serious health condition, cancer,
and that she was applying for FMLA leave because she was
starting a new drug protocol. Rudman's email to Dodge
also explained that Alton had questions about short-term and
long-term disability insurance.
SmithGroup
terminated Alton's employment on June 1, 2018. SmithGroup
explains that its leadership made a business decision in
April 2018 to implement a reduction-in-force
(“RIF”) and that it terminated Alton based on her
limited skillset, that Alton had not expanded her skillset,
and that the workload that SmithGroup had coming in did not
align with her skillset. Alton counters that the Chicago
Office Director who approves all terminations, Tim Tracey,
testified at his deposition that he did not terminate Alton
because of her performance. Alton further counters that the
2018 first quarter forecast, upon which SmithGroup's
Chicago leadership relied in making its RIF determination,
indicated that there was 5% understaffing and that 3.5 people
should be added to the staff. Caroline Lopez,
SmithGroup's Director of Operations, testified that she
could not recall a situation in which the forecast indicated
that there was a need for additional staff, yet the
leadership decided that a RIF was necessary.
SmithGroup
also sets forth facts that it decided to terminated
Alton's employment in April 2018 before Alton requested
FMLA leave. Evidence in the record, however, contradicts this
assertion, including evidence that SmithGroup's own
forecast identified several individuals as possibilities for
the RIF, and, that at some point, SmithGroup narrowed the
list to two employees, including Alton.
Legal
Standard
Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact
exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court
must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255; Palmer
v. Franz, 928 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2019). After
“a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted).
Discussion
The
FMLA entitles eligible employees to up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave in a year. King v. Ford Motor Co., 872
F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2017). The Act prohibits employers
from interfering with and retaliating against an
employee's use or attempted use of FMLA leave. Guzman
v. Brown Cty., 884 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018).
“The difference between the two theories is that a
retaliation claim requires the employee to prove
discriminatory or retaliatory intent while an interference
claim only requires the employee to prove that the employer
denied him entitlements provided by the Act.” Pagel
v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2012). Alton
alleges both theories of FMLA liability.
FMLA
Interference Claim
“To
establish FMLA interference, an employee must prove that: (1)
she was eligible for the FMLA's protections; (2) her
employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to
leave under the FMLA; (4) she provided sufficient notice of
her intent to take leave; and (5) her employer denied FMLA
benefits to which she was entitled.” Riley v. City
of Kokomo,909 F.3d 182, 188 (7th Cir. 2018). SmithGroup
concedes that Alton has satisfied the first four elements of
her FMLA interference claim. The Court thus focuses on the
last element-whether a reasonable jury could conclude that
Alton's exercise of her right to take FMLA leave was a
motivating factor in SmithGroup terminating her employment.
Shaffer v. American Med. Ass'n, 662 F.3d 439,
444 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Simpson v. Office of Chief
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