United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Andrea
R. Wood United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Tyrone Bell was napping in his parked car when Officers
Daniel Makowski, James Stechly, and Jason Donato of the
Village of Summit Police Department surrounded the vehicle
and accused Bell of being under the influence. The officers
did not perform a field sobriety test, however, and a blood
test administered on the scene found no evidence of alcohol
or illegal substances in Bell's system. Nonetheless,
according to Bell, Officer Stechly fabricated a report
stating that Bell had suffered a blackout and was involved in
a dangerous driving incident. Under Illinois law, that report
resulted in the immediate revocation of Bell's commercial
driver's license (“CDL”). In his First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) here, Bell asserts five
claims arising out of the events leading to the revocation of
his CDL. Two of those claims are the subject of the instant
motion to dismiss: in Count II, Bell asserts a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Stechly for an alleged
violation of Bell's right to occupational liberty under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and in Count IV, Bell asserts a claim against Officer Stechly
and the Village of Summit (“Village”) for willful
and wanton negligence under Illinois state law. Defendants
have moved to dismiss those counts pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 40.) For the following
reasons, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
For
purposes of the present motion, the Court accepts as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the FAC and draws all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in Bell's
favor. See, e.g., Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose
Park, 734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013).
According
to the FAC, Bell was taking a nap in his parked car when he
was surrounded by Officers Makowski, Stechly, and Donato, who
claimed to be performing a wellness check. (FAC ¶¶
11-13, Dkt. No. 29.) At the time, Bell's car keys were on
the passenger seat. (Id. ¶ 12.) After the
officers requested his identification, Bell, who was a
commercial truck driver, showed them his valid CDL.
(Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) Bell informed the officers
that he was fine, but they nonetheless accused him of being
under the influence and ordered paramedics from the Village
Fire Department to perform a blood test on-scene. (Id.
¶¶ 14-16.) No. one performed a field sobriety
test on Bell and the blood test showed no evidence of alcohol
or illegal substances, so Bell was permitted to leave and was
not charged with any crime. (Id. ¶¶
17-18.)
Based
on this incident, Officer Stechly sent an Official Sworn
Police Report to the Office of the Secretary of State of
Illinois, Drivers Services Department (“Secretary of
State”) indicating that Bell had suffered a blackout
and performed a dangerous driving act. (Id. ¶
23.) Because of the report, the Secretary of State revoked
Bell's CDL pursuant to Chapter 92 of the Illinois
Administrative Code, Section 1030.16, and sent him a notice
of cancellation. (Id. ¶¶ 22,
24-25.)[1]Bell was required to surrender his CDL
immediately, even though he had never been involved in any
accident or other incident related to a blackout or attack of
unconsciousness and he was not operating a motor vehicle in a
dangerous manner. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Without
his CDL, Bell was unable to continue working as a truck
driver. (Id. ¶ 28.) To regain his CDL, Bell had
to obtain and submit medical reports, retake various
examinations, and attend driving school-each of which caused
him to incur various costs and fees. (Id.
¶¶ 29-33.)
Bell
has now sued the Village, the police officers involved in the
incident, and the two paramedics who drew blood from him. The
five-count FAC asserts a claim against Officers Makowski,
Stechly, and Donato under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), a § 1983 claim against
Officer Stechly for violation of Bell's Fourteenth
Amendment right to occupational liberty (Count II), a claim
against Officers Makowski, Stechly, and Donato, as well as
the Village, for false arrest under Illinois common law
(Count III), a claim against Officer Stechly and the Village
for willful and wanton negligence under Illinois common law
(Count IV), and a claim against Village paramedics Brandon
Germany and James Tolf for common law battery (Count V).
Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts II and IV.
DISCUSSION
To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a complaint need not include
detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must plead
“factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). When considering a
motion to dismiss, this Court construes the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all
inferences from the alleged facts in the plaintiff's
favor. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819,
826-27 (7th Cir. 2014).
I.
Deprivation of Liberty
In
Count II, Bell alleges that Officer Stechly's actions
deprived him of occupational liberty in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The right to
occupational liberty has long been recognized as protected by
the Due Process Clause. Wroblewski v. City of
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that
“[t]he concept of liberty protected by the due process
clause has long included occupational liberty-‘the
liberty to follow a trade, profession, or other
calling'”); see also Bryant v. Gardner,
545 F.Supp.2d 791, 798 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The right to
occupational liberty does not include the right to any
particular job, however. Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at
455; see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972) (“It stretches the
concept [of occupational liberty] too far to suggest that a
person is deprived of ‘liberty' when he simply is
not rehired in one job but remains free as before to seek
another.”). Instead, it encompasses the liberty to
pursue one's trade, occupation, or calling.
Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at 455.
An
individual's occupational liberty interests are
implicated when, in the course of removing someone from an
employment position, “the state imposes a stigma or
other disability on the individual which forecloses other
opportunities.” Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d
661, 670 (7th Cir. 2001). While such claims are usually
raised in the context of public employment, i.e.,
where the state is the employer, the Seventh Circuit has held
that such claims may be asserted in other circumstances where
government action results in an individual suffering “a
tangible loss of other employment opportunities.”
Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 509 (7th Cir. 2005);
see also Id. at 510 (finding that the plaintiff had
suffered the required tangible loss where placement of his
name on a register of child abusers “place[d], by
operation of law, a significant, indeed almost insuperable,
impediment on [him] obtaining a position in the entire field
of child care”). Here, Bell has alleged not merely that
he lost a particular job but rather that the revocation of
his CDL prevented him from pursuing his occupation as a truck
driver. Accordingly, he has satisfied that aspect of the
pleading requirement. Indeed, Defendants appear to concede
that the revocation of Bell's CDL deprived him of a
liberty interest in pursuing a commercial trucking
occupation, as they do not argue the point.
Nonetheless,
Defendants contend that Bell has no cause of action against
Officer Stechly for deprivation of occupational liberty
because as a police officer he had no power to conduct
hearings regarding a truck driver's fitness; instead,
that authority lies solely with the Secretary of State.
Indeed, “[i]t is well-established that a plaintiff only
may bring a § 1983 claim against those individuals
personally responsible for the constitutional
deprivation.” Doyle, 305 F.3d at 614. But
while Officer Stechly had no direct control over the
procedures by which Bell's CDL was revoked, he was
nonetheless integrally involved in the deprivation. Under
Illinois law, once a police officer submits a report that a
motorist was involved in an accident resulting from a
seizure, an attack of unconsciousness, or a blackout, the
Secretary of State “shall
cancel” the driver's CDL. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 92,
§ 1030.16(c) (emphasis added). The Secretary of
State's revocation decision is not discretionary; once it
receives a report, revocation must follow. Thus, Officer
Stechly personally caused Bell to lose his occupational
liberty interest because his submission of the allegedly
false and fabricated report to the Secretary of State
resulted in the automatic revocation of Bell's CDL.
Moreover, occupational liberty claims focus on the
publication of stigmatizing comments. See McMath v. City
of Gary, 976 F.2d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“[O]nly if the defendants
themselves published the defamatory
material can [the plaintiff] recover for deprivation of his
liberty interest.”) (emphasis in original). And here,
it was Officer Stechly who allegedly published stigmatizing
comments by sending the fabricated report to the Secretary of
State. Thus, Bell has adequately pleaded Officer
Stechly's personal involvement in the deprivation of an
occupational liberty interest.[2]
But
even if a plaintiff has adequately pleaded the deprivation of
a liberty interest, the deprivation still must have occurred
without due process. See Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs.,
Inc.,305 F.3d 603, 616 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Chi. United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, No. 05 C
5011, 2007 WL 4277431, at *5 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 3, 2007)).
Indeed, “any cause of action for deprivation of
occupational liberty [is] confined to a claim under
procedural due process; there is no such cause of action
under substantive due process.” Zorzi v. Cty. of
Putnam,30 F.3d 885, 895 (7th Cir. 1994). So the
question is what process, if any, Officer Stechly owed Bell
and when must that process be available? Simpson v. Brown
Cty.,860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017). To answer
those questions, three factors must be balanced:
“first, the private interest at stake; second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation and the value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards; and third, the government's
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