United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANDREA
R. WOOD JUDGE
Plaintiff
Richard Bilik is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections. This lawsuit concerns two medical
issues Bilik has suffered since he has been incarcerated:
first, he suffered a Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus
Aureus (“MRSA”) infection while incarcerated at
Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”);
and later, during his incarceration at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”), he experienced the regrowth of
a cyst on his cranium that caused him substantial pain. Bilik
claims he did not receive constitutionally-sufficient medical
treatment for either condition. As a result, he has brought
the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
various officials at Stateville and Menard for their
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Now before the Court
are five motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint
(“TAC”) for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Three Stateville
nurses (Defendants Stacey Keagle, Gary Drop, and Athena
Rossiter Raheem), [1] and one Menard sergeant (Defendant David
Fedderke) have each filed his or her own individual motion to
dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 194, 205, 217, 225.) In addition, the
remaining Defendants (with one exception) have filed a
consolidated motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 210.) For the
reasons that follow, the motions filed by Keagle, Drop,
Raheem, and Fedderke are all denied, while the consolidated
motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
For the
purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts all
well-pleaded facts in the TAC as true and views the facts in
the light most favorable to Bilik as the non-moving party.
Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614,
618 (7th Cir. 2007).
At all
relevant times, Bilik was an inmate incarcerated in
facilities run by the Illinois Department of Corrections.
(TAC ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 182.) On June 9, 2010, while
incarcerated at Stateville, Bilik developed a MRSA infection
on his face. (Id. ¶ 3.) The infection caused
substantial swelling on Bilik's face that was plainly
visible to anyone who saw him. (Id. ¶ 5.) In
addition, Bilik suffered extreme pain that frequently caused
him to weep and rendered him unable to eat or sleep.
(Id.) Every time a correctional officer or nurse
visited his cell tier, Bilik cried out for medical
assistance. (Id. ¶ 6.) Yet, each and every
time, his pleas were ignored. (Id. ¶ 7.)
Consequently, Bilik was left in agony from the untreated MRSA
infection for a week. (Id.) Only after Bilik was
transferred to a different prison on June 16, 2010 did he
receive appropriate medical care. (Id. ¶¶
7, 18.)
Later,
while incarcerated at the Cook County Jail, Bilik underwent
surgery to remove a large cyst on his cranial
vertex.[2] (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)
Following the surgery, Bilik's surgeon advised him to
return for a follow-up examination to ensure that the entire
cyst had been removed. (Id. ¶ 11.) At the time
of his scheduled follow-up examination, Bilik was
incarcerated at Menard. (Id. ¶ 12.) Due to a
lock-down at Menard, Bilik missed the follow-up examination,
which was never rescheduled. (Id. ¶¶ 12,
69.)
Ultimately,
the cyst did in fact grow back during Bilik's time at
Menard. (Id. ¶ 13.) As a result, Bilik
experienced intense headaches that painkillers did not
sufficiently alleviate. (Id.) Moreover, the pain
caused by the cyst was so great that it kept Bilik largely
confined to his cell. (Id. ¶ 14.) Bilik
submitted several grievances to both his counselor and a
grievance officer. (Id. ¶ 62.) Yet he received
no medical assistance in response to the grievances.
(Id. ¶ 63.) Instead, Fedderke, a sergeant at
Menard, came to Bilik's cell to demand that he stop
filing grievances. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 63-64.)
That message was delivered at the behest of Defendant
Jacqueline Lashbrook, a major at Menard who had primary
responsibility for the area in which Bilik was incarcerated.
(Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 44, 63-64.) Moreover, to
drive the message home, Fedderke tossed Bilik's
belongings around his cell. (Id. ¶ 64.)
In his
TAC, Bilik claims that prison officials and staff at
Stateville and Menard were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Count I,
Bilik brings a deliberate indifference claim related to the
MRSA infection he suffered at Stateville. (Id.
¶¶ 53-58.) He names as Defendants numerous
Stateville correctional officers (“Stateville
COs”) and nurses (“Stateville Nurses”) who
he alleges knew of his MRSA infection but nonetheless ignored
his pleas for medical assistance. In addition, he also names
Stateville's Warden, Marcus Hardy, as a Defendant. Count
II asserts a deliberate indifference claim concerning the
cranial cyst Bilik contends was not adequately treated during
his time at Menard. (Id. ¶¶ 59-72.) That
count names as Defendants Fedderke, Lashbrook, and
Menard's Warden, Kim Butler. Finally, Count
IV[3]
is another deliberate indifference claim, this one brought
against Robert Shearing, a medical doctor working at Menard
who Bilik alleges failed to arrange for a follow-up
examination of his cyst.[4](Id. ¶¶ 73-78.)
DISCUSSION
To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This pleading standard does not
necessarily require a complaint to contain detailed factual
allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather,
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In each
of the motions to dismiss (with the exception of
Fedderke's motion), Defendants contend that Bilik does
not plead sufficient facts in support of his deliberate
indifference claims. Specifically, they claim that
Bilik's allegations fail to demonstrate that they were
personally involved in the purported constitutional
deprivation and that they acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Moreover, in the individual motions to
dismiss, Keagle, Drop, Raheem, and Fedderke argue that the
claims against them were brought after the running of the
statute of limitations. The Court begins by addressing the
statute of limitations defense and then addresses whether
Bilik successfully states claims against Defendants.
I.
Statute of Limitations
A.
Keagle, Drop, and Raheem
Although
Keagle, Drop, and Raheem each filed their own motion to
dismiss, all three motions are basically identical in
substance. Their motions primarily contend that the claims
against them must be dismissed as untimely because they were
not named in the lawsuit until after the running of the
statute of limitations.
The
statute of limitations provides an affirmative defense to
constitutional tort claims. E.g., United States
v. N. Tr. Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004).
Generally, a complaint need not state all facts necessary to
overcome an affirmative defense, which is why it is
“irregular to dismiss a claim as untimely under Rule
12(b)(6).” Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688,
691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds at the pleading
stage may be warranted, however, when a plaintiff pleads
facts that effectively establish the defense. Id.
The
statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is
“governed by the personal injury laws of the
state” in which the injury occurred. Hileman v.
Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2004). In the present
case, the injury occurred in Illinois, so the statute of
limitations is two years. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202. For
deliberate indifference claims in which a prisoner contends
that the defendants refused to treat his medical condition,
every day the defendants “prolong[] [the
prisoner's] agony by not treating his painful condition
mark[s] a fresh infliction of punishment that cause[s] the
statute of limitations to start running anew.”
Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 2001).
Where the refusal continues for the entirety of the
prisoner's incarceration, ...