United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court
Favela’s (“Favela”) Motion to Alter or
Amend a Judgment (Dkt. No. 7) is granted consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). The Court hereby
vacates Favela’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) and terminates one of his two concurrent terms
of supervised release while leaving intact all other
conditions of his criminal judgment. (See United States
v. Russell et al., No. 13-cr-600-2 (N.D. Ill.),
Judgment, Dkt. No. 52.)
pled guilty in 2014 to two counts: conspiracy to commit bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“Count
One”) and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
(“Count Two”). Favela was sentenced to 16 months
of incarceration on Count One and 60 months on Count Two, to
be served consecutively. He also received two concurrent
three- year terms of supervised release, one for each Count.
2016, Favela filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Dkt. No. 1.) Favela
argued in his Motion that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)
required Count Two be vacated. Favela’s violation of
§ 924(c)(1)(A) for use of a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence relied on a definition of “crime of
violence” contained within 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(3)(B). But Johnson dealt with sentence
enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), for people who had previous convictions for a
“violent felony, ” defined in part as
“conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” Johnson, 135
S.Ct. at 2555; see also 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court held that definition to
be so vague as to be unconstitutional. See generally
Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551.
§ 2255 motion, Favela argued that his conviction for the
use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence was
invalid because the definition of “crime of
violence” fell within a catch-all clause - called a
residual clause - contained in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
Favela asserted that the residual clause he was sentenced
under was unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
sentencing judge denied Favela’s petition, citing
Cooper v. Krueger, 2015 WL 8215348 at *3 (C.D. Ill.
2015) (holding that Johnson did not apply to a
conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)) and
found that Favela was not sentenced under the residual clause
ruled unconstitutionally vague in Johnson.
then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Denial of his
§ 2255 petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e), arguing that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s
residual clause is unconstitutional and that conspiracy to
commit bank robbery is not “categorically a crime of
violence.” (Favela’s Mot. at 4, Dkt. No. 7.) The
sentencing court stayed briefing of Favela’s Motion
pending decisions in Sessions v. Dimaya, 13 S.Ct.
1204 (2018) and United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct.
2319 (2019). While Favela’s Motion was pending, his
case was reassigned to this Court.
Dimaya and Davis have been decided, the
Court will now rule on Favela’s Motion to Reconsider
the denial of his § 2255 motion.
Court can grant a Rule 59(e) motion if the movant establishes
that the court committed manifest error of law or fact or if
the movant presents newly discovered evidence that could not
have been discovered at the time of trial. Barrington
Music Products, Inc., 924 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019).
Disposition of Section 2255 Motion
§ 2255 motion and his motion to reconsider focus on the
constitutionality of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Section 924(c) enumerates a range of penalties for
anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” in
furtherance of any “crime of violence” or
“drug trafficking crime.” The statute ...