United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE, United States District Judge.
Annamalai Annamalai, an inmate who is currently incarcerated
at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois
(“USP-Marion”), brings this habeas corpus action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the execution
of his sentence in Unites States v. Annamalai, et
al., No. 1:13-cr-00437-TCB-CMS (N.D.Ga. 2015).
Petitioner asserts that he is being held in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, but insists he is
not challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence.
matter is now before the Court for review of the Petition
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in United States District Courts, which provides
that upon preliminary consideration by the district judge,
“[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) gives this Court the authority
to apply the rules to other habeas corpus cases.
a two-week jury trial, Annamalai was convicted on 34 counts
of 10 different federal offenses, including conspiracy to
commit bank fraud, bank fraud, tax fraud, conspiracy to
commit bankruptcy fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money laundering,
perjury, perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding, obstruction of
justice, and conspiracy to harbor a fugitive. See United
States v. Annamalai, et al., 1:13-cr-437-TCB-CMS (Doc.
207, August 25, 2015). He was sentenced to 327 months in
federal prison. Id., Doc. 355. His direct appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit is pending. See United States v.
Annamalai, 15-11854 (11th Cir.).
contends he is illegally confined in USP-Marion. His argument
is based on Requests for Admission (“RFAs”)
allegedly filed in several federal cases and the state
equivalent of RFAs in several Indiana and Illinois state
cases. Specifically, he appears to have issued RFAs to the
prosecuting attorneys from his criminal case, the Attorney
General of the United States and other officials seeking
“admissions” that he is being held in custody
illegally, that the recipient will take steps to ensure he is
released from custody, and that his “immigration
benefits” be reinstated, etc. Based on the exhibits
filed, no responses were received to the RFAs. Annamalai
therefore urges the Court to consider these admissions and to
order that he be immediately released from custody and his
initial matter, Annamalai blatantly mischaracterizes his
claims. Despite his repeated insistence that he is not
challenging the validity of his conviction, that is precisely
what he is attempting to do by asking the Court to accept
“admissions” that his conviction was wrongly
obtained. For example, one of the RFAs asks the U.S. Attorney
for the Northern District of Georgia to admit that Annamalai
“is an innocent Hindu High priest, man of honor, and
did not commit any of the crimes as shown in the
indictment(s) in the criminal action no 1:13-cr-437-TCB-CMS,
and his conviction was secured with false pretences and in
violation of suppressing several exculpatory materials
favorable to Mr. Annamalai Annamalai (defendant)
[sic].” (Doc. 4, p. 10). Annamalai then asks
the U.S. Attorney to “admit” that he will not be
prosecuted again for those crimes. Id., p. 11.
Similarly, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern
District of Georgia was asked to “[a]dmit that 
Annamalai Annamalai and [P]avarthi Sivanadiyaan “DID
NOT” commit any crimes at all, and they were falsely
indicted and convicted by the Plaintiff (UNITED STA[T]ES OF
AMERICA) in the case no(s) 1:13-cr-00437-TCB-CMS and
1:14-cr-391-TCB respectively, with false evidences, and via
perjured testimony, to deprive the life, liberty and
properties belonging to Annamalai and Sivanadiyan.”
Id., p. 31. These are obviously challenges to the
legality of Annamalai’s convictions, not to the
execution of his sentence or the conditions of his
confinement. The fact that Annamalai has couched it in the
form of purported admissions by prosecuting attorneys and
officials does not change the nature of the
prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally
limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by
bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the
court which sentenced him. See Kramer v. Olson, 347
F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). Under very limited
circumstances, a prisoner may employ 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge his conviction and sentence- specifically, Section
2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which
authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition
where the remedy under Section 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” A
procedure for postconviction relief “can fairly be
termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a
convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial
rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as
having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
order to trigger the savings clause, a petitioner must meet
three conditions: (1) he must show that he relies on a new
statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional
case; (2) he must show that he relies on a decision that he
could not have invoked in his first Section 2255 motion
and that applies retroactively; and (3) he must
demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental
defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). The
Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “there must be
some kind of structural problem with [S]ection 2255 before
[S]ection 2241 becomes available. In other words, something
more than a lack of success with a [S]ection 2255 motion must
exist before the savings clause is satisfied.”
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir.
satisfies none of these requirements. He does not rely on new
statutory interpretation. While it appears he is alleging
fundamental defects in his conviction, he fails to explain
how a Section 2255 proceeding would be “inadequate and
ineffective.” His Petition challenges the validity of
his conviction and sentence for which is imprisoned, which
could be raised in a Section 2255 proceeding in the
sentencing court (Northern District of Georgia). As such,
Annamalai’s Petition does not satisfy the savings
clause, and Section 2241 is not the proper vehicle for review
of his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the Petition
will be dismissed.
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
DISMISSED without prejudice to bringing his
claims in the proper court in a Section 2255 filing. All
pending motions are DENIED as moot.
Annamalai wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a
notice of appeal with this Court within sixty (60) days of
the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Annamalai plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If he does choose to appeal and is
allowed to proceed IFP, Annamalai will be required to pay a
portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee in order to
pursue his appeal (the amount to be determined based on his
prison trust fund account records for the past six months)
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See Fed.
R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v.
Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008);
Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.
1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th
Cir. 1998). A timely ...