Appeal
from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will
County, Illinois. Circuit No. 16-MR-1985 The Honorable John
C. Anderson, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant Mark S. Morthland, of Decatur, for
appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee James W. Glasgow, State's
Attorney, of Joliet (Philip A. Mock, Assistant State's
Attorney, of counsel), for appellee.
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Lytton
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
McDADE
JUSTICE
¶
1 In December 2012, plaintiff, Dome Tax Services Company
(Dome), purchased a property in Homer Glen, Illinois, in a
tax sale. In January 2015, the property owners filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, subsequently, filed a motion for
declaration of sale in error. The trial court entered an
agreed order declaring the sale of the property was in error
as a result of the bankruptcy filing, and Dome received a
refund on the amount paid on the certificate of purchase and
subsequent taxes from defendant Will County Treasurer. In
July 2016, Dome filed a complaint for declaratory judgment,
arguing that the treasurer miscalculated the refund. The
parties later filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
trial court ruled in favor of the treasurer and against Dome,
finding that the treasurer properly calculated the refund.
Dome appeals, and we reverse for a recalculation of the
refund.
¶
2 I. BACKGROUND
¶
3 On December 6, 2012, Dome purchased 16424 S. Alberta Court
in Homer Glen, Illinois, in a tax sale. The purchase included
the property's unpaid 2011 taxes. On September 24, 2013,
Dome paid the 2012 property taxes and on September 22, 2014,
paid the 2013 property taxes.
¶
4 On January 8, 2015, the property owners, Paul and Katherine
Kirchner, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code. On July 24, the couple filed a motion
for declaration of sale in error pursuant to section 21-310
of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/21-310 (West 2014)).
The court entered an agreed order declaring that the sale was
in error as a result of the bankruptcy filing. On September
17, 2015, defendant, Will County Treasurer, issued two checks
to Dome refunding the amount paid on the certificate of
purchase and the subsequent 2012 and 2013 property taxes. The
first check was in the amount of $78, 783.83 and the second
check was in the amount of $12, 111.21, totaling $90, 895.04.
¶
5 On July 29, 2016, Dome filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment, arguing that the treasurer miscalculated the
interest on his refund in violation of section 21-315 of the
Property Tax Code (id. § 21-315) and that it
was entitled to an additional $3000 in interest. The
treasurer filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that
the interest was properly calculated under sections 21-315
and 21-320 of the Property Tax Code (id.
§§ 21-315, 21-320). The treasurer explained that
Dome purchased the 2011 property taxes on the Homer Glen
property after a bid for redemption at a penalty of 1% for
six months. Dome then paid the 2012 and 2013 property taxes
at a statutory rate of 12% for six months of each year. After
the court entered the agreed order, the treasurer calculated
Dome's refund as the following: the amount paid for the
certificate of purchase with penalty interest at the rate of
1% per month, or 6% for six months, totaling $29, 099.15; the
amount paid on the 2012 taxes with interest at a rate of 1%
per month from the purchase date to the date Dome was
notified of the bankruptcy, totaling $31, 906.16; and the
amount paid on the 2013 taxes with interest at a rate of 1%
per month from the purchase date to the date Dome was
notified of the bankruptcy, totaling $29, 889.74.
¶
6 Dome filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the treasurer was statutorily required to calculate all
the interest under the same statutory formula and requested
that the refund be recalculated. The trial court ruled in
favor of the treasurer and against Dome, finding that the
treasurer properly calculated Dome's refund in accordance
with sections 21-315 and 21-320. Dome appealed.
¶
7 II. ANALYSIS
¶
8 Dome challenges the trial court's ruling on the
cross-motions for summary judgment. A motion for summary
judgment should be granted only where there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is clearly
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pielet v.
Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29. Whether or not such
an issue exists is to be determined by the court from the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and exhibits in each
case. Schierer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 81
Ill.App.3d 90, 92 (1980). When parties file cross-motions for
summary judgment, "they agree that only a question of
law is involved and invite the court to decide the issues
based on the record." Pielet, 2012 IL 112064,
¶ 28. "However, the mere filing of cross-motions
for summary judgment does not establish that there is no
issue of material fact, nor does it obligate a court to
render summary judgment." Id. A trial
court's decision on a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. Gaston v. Founders Insurance Co.,
365 Ill.App.3d 303, 314 (2006). We find that there are no
issues of material fact and review the parties' arguments
to determine if either party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
¶
9 Dome argues that the treasurer incorrectly applied two
different formulas to calculate the interest on the amount it
paid on the certificate of purchase and the amount it paid on
the subsequent taxes. Dome asserts that if one formula was
applied to calculate the interest on the certificate of
purchase under section 21-315, the same formula should be
applied to the interest on the subsequent taxes paid under
section 21-320. The treasurer alleges that section 21-315 and
section 21-320 provide separate statutory requirements for
calculating ...