United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Reona J. Daly United States Magistrate Judge
matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge
Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a)
for a Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Augusta Williams. It is
RECOMMENDED that the District Court
ADOPT the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 99) be GRANTED.
Shung Moore filed this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging his constitutional
rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”). Following the
Court's Memorandum and Order (Doc. 88), Plaintiff is
proceeding on the following claim:
Count 4:Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against Augusta Williams (f/k/a Maciura)
for delaying and denying treatment for Plaintiff's
painful facial MRSA infection between April 10-15, 2015.
Williams filed a motion for summary judgment arguing she was
not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical
needs. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 104) asserting
Defendant Williams was deliberately indifferent by delaying
medical treatment for his MRSA infection.
alleges on April 11, 2015, he “tried to get the
attention of Defendant Maciura as she was exiting N2-2
Gallery” and that she did not respond to him when she
passed by his cell (Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1 at
19-20). Plaintiff states that Officer Griffin came back to
his cell approximately five minutes later to ask what
Plaintiff needed with Defendant Maciura (Id. at 20).
Plaintiff alleges he showed him swelling on the left side of
his face and told Griffin he needed antibiotics because his
MRSA was “flaring up again” (Id.).
Griffin left and returned a few minutes later to inform
Plaintiff that Maciura scheduled him for sick call the
following day (Id.)
April 12, 2015, Plaintiff was seen by a registered nurse for
his MRSA infection at 8:50 a.m. and again at 12:10 pm
(Plaintiff's Medical Records, Doc. 99-1 at 1-2). During
the second visit, Dr. Trost was contacted by Defendant
Maciura via telephone and Trost prescribed Bactrim DS, an
antibiotic to be given orally, twice a day for 10 days
(Id. at 2). It was also documented Plaintiff was to
be scheduled to see the physician/nurse practitioner the
following day (Id.). On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff
was scheduled for the nurse practitioner call line but the
appointment was cancelled because Plaintiff went to yard
(Id.). The nurse practitioner ordered Plaintiff be
rescheduled for the medical call line as a priority
(Id.). On April 14, and 15, 2015, Plaintiff was
scheduled to see a physician, but was not seen due to a lack
of time (Id. at 3). On April 16, 2015, at 3:00 a.m.
Plaintiff was seen by RN Hannah and complained he was not
receiving treatment for his MRSA (Id. at 4). Hannah
noted a cell shake down found no sulfa (Id.).
Plaintiff was given a card of sulfa and scheduled to be seen
by the physician that day (Id.). On April 16, 2015
at 12:45 p.m., Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Trost (Id.
at 5). Trost examined Plaintiff and noted the plan was an
oral antibiotic to be taken orally twice a day for ten days
(Id. at 4). Plaintiff was seen by Trost again on
April 17, 2015 (Id. at 5). In addition to the
antibiotic, Plaintiff was prescribed 800 mg ibuprofen, gel
shampoo, and prescription lotion (Id.).
alleges Defendant Maciura delayed treatment of his MRSA by
making two false entries in his medical records because he
did not receive antibiotics on April 12, 2015, and he did not
refuse his call-line pass by going to yard on April 13, 2015
(Doc. 1 at 24).
judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate
of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In determining
a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences
in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted).
Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; see also Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). As the Supreme
Court has recognized, “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order
to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must first show
that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently
serious” and second, that the “prison officials
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.
2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
following circumstances are indicative of an objectively
serious condition: “[t]he existence of an injury that a
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy
of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition
that significantly affects an individual's daily
activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial
pain.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522-23
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111
F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Foelker v.
Outagamie Cnty., 394 F.3d 510, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.”).
inmate must also show that prison officials acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely deliberate
indifference. Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the officials were “aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists” and that the officials actually drew that
inference. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A plaintiff does
not have to prove that his complaints were “literally
ignored, ” but only that “the defendants'
responses were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the
inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly
disregarded his needs.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 524
(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th
Cir. 2000)). Negligence, gross negligence, or even
recklessness as that term is used in tort cases, is not
enough. Id. at 653; Shockley v. Jones, 823,