United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
DANYAHLE L. MOSLEY, #10113-025, Petitioner,
BRYAN M. ANTONELLI, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Danyahle L. Mosley, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed
a Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Doc. 1). Mosley is currently incarcerated at Hazelton
USP in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia, serving a 180-month
sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). United States v. Mosley,
13-cr-30026-NJR-1, Doc. 42 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2013). His
sentence was enhanced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based
on three prior Illinois felony convictions: a 2001
residential burglary pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (1985), a
2004 residential burglary pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (2001),
and a 2008 robbery pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (1999).
now invokes Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016), to challenge his ACCA enhancement based on
these prior convictions and argue that he is entitled to be
resentenced without said enhancement. Specifically, Mosley
argues that the Illinois residential burglary statute
criminalizes broader behavior than the generic federal
definition of “burglary” because it potentially
criminalizes the entry or remainder into “mobile
home[s], trailer[s], or other living quarters” that may
not be buildings or structures under the generic definition.
(Doc. 1, pp. 4- 7). Mosley also makes brief mention of his
prior robbery conviction (Doc. 1, p. 3; Doc. 17, p. 1), but
does not further develop his argument regarding the robbery
statute. Ultimately, Mosley argues that these convictions
were improperly considered to be violent felonies under the
ACCA and can no longer support his enhanced sentence in light
opposes issuance of the writ on multiple grounds. In an
argument Respondent acknowledges is inconsistent with the
current law of the Seventh Circuit, Respondent contends that
inmates who have previously sought post-conviction relief
under Section 2255 may not use Section 2255(e)'s savings
clause to challenge his or her sentence via a Section 2241
petition. (Doc. 13, pp. 4-15). Respondent also argues that
Mosley's failure to raise a similar argument on direct
appeal bars his petition under the procedural default rule.
(Id. at pp. 16-18). Respondent asserts that Mosley
has affirmatively waived his right to collaterally attack his
sentence via Sections 2255 and 2241 in his plea agreement
(Id. at pp. 18-20), and also argues that even if the
Court reaches the merits of Mosley's Petition, his
Petition must fail because his prior Illinois residential
burglary and robbery convictions were properly considered
predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. (Id. at
filed a reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 17).
Facts and Procedural History
April 15, 2013, Mosley pleaded guilty to one count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). United States v. Mosley, No.
13-cr-30026-NJR-1, Doc. 21 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2013). Mosley
entered into a written Plea Agreement, in which he agreed
that he was properly considered an Armed Career Criminal
under the ACCA based on his criminal history, which
explicitly included his prior Illinois robbery and
residential burglary convictions, and would potentially be
subject to a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment.
Id. at pp. 4-7. Mosley also agreed that he:
knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right to contest any
aspect of his conviction and sentence that could be contested
under Title 18 or Title 28 [of the United States Code], or
under any other provision of federal law, except that if the
sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as
determined by the Court (or any applicable statutory minimum,
whichever is greater), the Defendant reserves the right to
appeal the reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at pp. 7-8.
Presentence Report (“PSR”) determined that his
prior criminal history, including his Illinois robbery and
residential burglary convictions, qualified him for the ACCA
enhancement and set his minimum term of imprisonment at 15
years (180 months) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1) and 942(e). Id. at Doc. 38, p. 17. Mosley
did not object to the findings in the PSR, id. at
Doc. 39, and was ultimately sentenced to 180 months
imprisonment. Id. at Doc. 42.
did not file a direct appeal. After being sentenced, he filed
a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relying on Johnson
v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), to
argue that his Illinois robbery conviction could not be
considered a crime of violence under the ACCA. Mosley v.
United States, No. 16-cv-0206-NJR, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 2016). This motion was denied on the merits.
Id. at Doc. 9. Mosley did not appeal the denial of
his Section 2255 petition, but he did seek authorization to
file a second Section 2255 petition from the Seventh Circuit
using the same theory he puts forth in the instant Petition.
That request was summarily denied. Id. at Doc. 16,
petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in
conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to
challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See
Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.
from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been
convicted in federal court is generally limited to
challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which
sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the
“exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his
conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214,
217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to
only one challenge of his conviction and sentence
under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second
or successive” Section 2255 motion unless a panel of
the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion
contains either (1) newly discovered evidence
“sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found ...