United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert
M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge
In a
prior opinion [42], the Court granted summary judgment
against Plaintiff Janet Kotaska on all counts in her suit
against her former employer, Defendant Federal Express
Corporation. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration [45] of the Court's ruling on
her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. For the reasons
explained below, Plaintiff's motion [45] is denied.
I.
Background[1]
The
full background of this case is set forth in the Court's
summary judgment opinion, knowledge of which is assumed here.
See [42, at 2-18]. Nonetheless, the Court will set forth the
facts and procedural history relevant to the instant motion.
Plaintiff
worked for Defendant on two different occasions. From 1998 to
2013 she worked at UGN Station, first as a courier handler
and then as courier. She was terminated at the end of this
first period after she suffered an injury on the job and
failed to secure another position that she could perform
within the permanent lifting restrictions imposed by her
doctor after that injury. [42, at 6-7.]
In
2014, however, Plaintiff's physician updated her
permanent lifting restrictions to what they are today. These
restrictions read as follows:
With regards to work, [Plaintiff] is cleared for light duty
activity. I believe that we could, in fact, increase some of
her weight restrictions. At this point permanent restrictions
would include frequent lifting up 75 pounds from the floor to
waist, 15 pounds frequently from the waist to shoulder and 30
pounds on occasional basis. She should limit overhead use to
only limited frequency and only up to 5 pounds. She could
lift up to 15 pounds overhead with left hand assist.
[Id. at 7 (quoting [28, Ex. 17 to Ex. A.]).] After
that revision, Plaintiff secured a handler position at UGN
Station and began working there on April 6, 2015. [42, at 7,
12.] Within a week of her start date, one of Defendant's
human resources personnel-who knew of Plaintiff's
previous employment and termination-advised Plaintiff's
Human Capital Management Program Advisor, Bradley Fowler, of
Plaintiff's history and her 2013 lifting restrictions.
[Id. at 12.] Shortly thereafter, Fowler launched an
investigation to determine whether Plaintiff could continue
working as a handler at UGN Station. [Id. at 12-15.]
At the investigation's conclusion, Defendant placed
Plaintiff on an involuntary leave of absence and eventually
terminated her on July 23, 2015, after she again failed to
find a position she could perform consistent with her amended
lifting restrictions. [Id. at 15-17.]
After
properly exhausting the administrative process, Plaintiff
filed the instant suit against Defendant in September 2016.
See [1]. In her complaint, Plaintiff brought claims against
Defendant for age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621
et seq. (Count I); gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count
II); disability discrimination and retaliation in violation
of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12010 et
seq. (Count III); and retaliatory termination in
violation of state law (Count IV). [Id.]
On
October 23, 2017, Defendant moved for summary judgment
arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that she could pursue a claim under the ADA as a
qualified individual with a disability.[2] See [22]. On
August 21, 2018, the Court resolved that motion in
Defendant's favor, concluding in relevant part that
Plaintiff had failed to show that she could perform the
essential functions of the handler position even with an
accommodation, and therefore had not shown she was a
qualified individual. See [42, at 29-31]. Specifically, the
Court concluded that Plaintiff had not shown she could
perform, even with a reasonable accommodation, the essential
function of lifting packages over her waist and overhead
given her weight restrictions and the undisputed facts
regarding the packages processed at UGN Station.
[Id.] Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed the
instant motion for reconsideration. [45.]
II.
Standard
The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide an explicit
basis for a motion to reconsider. However, the Court will
address her motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), as Plaintiff has requested. See [48, ¶ 3
(asserting that Plaintiff's motion should be considered
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e))]. Under Rule 59(e), a party may
file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days
that judgment's entry. To prevail on such a motion,
“‘the movant must demonstrate a manifest error of
law or fact or present newly discovered evidence.'”
Ritacca v. Storz Medical, A.G., 298 F.R.D. 566, 568
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Boyd v. Tornier, Inc., 656
F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2011)). In regard to the
“manifest error” prong, the Seventh Circuit has
explained that a motion to reconsider is proper only when
“the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has
made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to
the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of
reasoning but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v.
Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also Wiegel v. Stork Craft Mfg.,
Inc., 2012 WL 2130910, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2012)
(“Reconsideration is not appropriate where a party
seeks to raise arguments that could have been raised in the
original briefing.”). Likewise, “[a]
‘manifest error' is not demonstrated by the
disappointment of the losing party, ” instead it
“is the ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or
failure to recognize controlling precedent.'”
Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606
(7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Because the standards for
reconsideration are so exacting, our court of appeals has
stressed that issues appropriate for reconsideration
“rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be
equally rare.” Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at
1191. Motions for reconsideration are inappropriate for
relitigating arguments that the Court previously rejected or
for arguing issues that could have been raised while Court
initially considered the motion now on reconsideration.
Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512
(7th Cir. 2007); Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.
CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).
Finally, the resolution of a motion for reconsideration is
left to the discretion of the district court. Billups v.
Methodist Hosp., 922 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1991).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff
asserts that the Court misapprehended the facts and/or made
impermissible inferences when it concluded that (1) an
essential function of the Handler position was lifting and
moving packages that weighed more than Plaintiff's
lifting restrictions, but less than 75 pounds, above her
waist and overhead, and (2) that Plaintiff could not perform
that function even with an accommodation. See [42, at 26-27].
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the record does not
support the Court's conclusions (1) that 50 percent of
the packages processed by UGN station weighed 15 pounds or
more and (2) that Plaintiff would be required to lift any of
those packages above her waist and overhead. These two
mistaken assumptions, Plaintiff argues, led the Court to
erroneously conclude that she was not a qualified individual.
Defendant counters that Plaintiff is attempting to shift the
burden of persuasion, and that in fact, Plaintiff failed to
“come forward with ...