United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PHIL GILBERT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Eva Heisch, a detainee at Madison County Jail
(“Jail”), brings this action for miscellaneous
deprivations of her constitutional rights at the Jail
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1 and 1-1). She
seeks declaratory judgment and money damages. (Doc. 1, p.
21). The Court previously reviewed the Complaint and severed
four improperly joined claims (Counts 6, 7, 8, and 11) into
two additional cases. The remaining claims (Counts 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 9, and 10) are subject to preliminary review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is
required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out
non-meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune
from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she received inadequate
medical care at the Jail from 2016 until 2019. (Doc. 1, pp.
11-20; Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-195). She specifically complains of
inadequate treatment for high blood pressure, a prolapsed
urethra, a vaginal mass, other masses, chest pain, diabetes,
and mental health conditions. (Doc. 1, pp. 12-17; 19-20).
Plaintiff claims the Jail's doctors (Drs. Arendell,
Aragona, and Lochard), administrators (Sheriff John Lakin and
Jail Administrator Christopher Eales), and/or staff (Officer
Jordan Griffin) ignored, delayed, or denied her requests for
treatment. (Id.). The Court previously organized the
claims into the following counts, consistent with
Plaintiff's designation of the same in the Complaint:
Count 1: Eales, Griffin, Arendell, and Lakin
denied Plaintiff necessary medical care for her high blood
pressure which caused her to suffer a minor stroke in
December 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Count 2: Arendell, Lochard, Aragona, and
Eales delayed diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff's
vaginal mass and prolapsed urethra for eight months from
October 2018 until April 2019, resulting in unnecessary pain
and bleeding. (Id. at pp. 12-13).
Count 3: Lochard, Aragona, and Eales denied
Plaintiff adequate and timely medical treatment for chest
pain in April 2019, despite her previous diagnosis with
angina and mitral valve prolapse. (Id. at pp.
Count 4: Aragona denied Plaintiff adequate
medical treatment for diabetes following her diagnosis in
October 2018. (Id. at pp. 15-16).
Count 5: Arendell supervised staff who
denied Plaintiff treatment for a mass she initially reported
in September 2016. (Id. at pp. 16-17).
Count 9: Aragona took Plaintiff off of her
blood pressure medication(s) in May 2019. (Id. at
Count 10: Aragona required Plaintiff to take
psychotropic medications against her will in October and
December 2018. (Id. at p. 20).
parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this
Plaintiff's claims arose during her pretrial detention at
the Jail, the Fourteenth Amendment governs her medical
claims. Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.
2013). In order to determine whether each claim satisfies the
applicable standard, the Court must conduct a two-part
inquiry. McCann v. Ogle Cty., Ill., 909 F.3d 881,
886 (7th Cir. 2018) (Miranda v. County of Lake, 900
F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)). The Court first asks whether
“the medical defendants acted purposefully, knowingly,
or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the
consequences of their handling of [plaintiff's]
case.” Id. (quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d
at 353). Negligence is not enough to satisfy the standard.
Id. The second step requires the Court to ask
whether the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.
Miranda, 900 F.3d at 354. When construing the