United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CASTILLO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Marshall ("Plaintiff) brings this action against Officer
Randy Fries ("Fries"), the City of Elgin
("Elgin"), Dominick Lojko ("Lojko"), and
the Cook County Adult Probation Department
("CCAPD") (collectively, "Defendants"),
alleging false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state
law, "willful and wanton conduct," "respondeat
superior," malicious prosecution, and indemnification.
(R. 18, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-71.) Before the Court is
Lojko's and CCAPD's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 27, Defs.'
Mot.) For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
is a resident of Elgin, Illinois. (R. 18, Am. Compl. ¶
3.) Fries is an officer with the Elgin Police Department, and
Lojko is a probation officer with the Cook County Adult
Probation Department. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) On or
about November 6, 2018, Lojko notified the Elgin Police
Department that Plaintiff was required to register pursuant
to the Illinois Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth
Registration Act, 730 III. Comp. Stat. § 154/1 (the
"Act"). (Id. ¶ 8.) The Act requires
registration for people who have been convicted of
specifically defined criminal offenses. (Id. ¶
9 (citing 730 III. Comp. Stat. § 154/10).) Although
Plaintiff had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery,
he complains that he has never been charged with or convicted
of any offense that would require registration under the Act.
(Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Nevertheless, Lojko
repeatedly told members of the Elgin Police Department that
Plaintiff was required to register, and that he had failed to
do so. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.) On or about
November 27, 2018, Lojko contacted Fries to tell him that
Plaintiff would be attending a case worker meeting with him
two days later at the Rolling Meadows Courthouse, and that
Fries should send Elgin police there to arrest Plaintiff for
failure to register. (Id. ¶ 15.) On November
29, 2018, Plaintiff was arrested at the case worker meeting
and taken to the Elgin Police Department where he was charged
with felony counts of failure to register and failure to
register a change of address. (Id. ¶¶
17-19.) Plaintiff was detained until he posted cash bond the
next day. (Id. ¶ 20.) At some point thereafter,
the Kane County State's Attorney's Office voluntarily
dismissed the charges against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶
21.) This action followed.
action began on January 3, 2019, when Plaintiff filed
apro se complaint. (R. 1, Compl.) Counsel was
subsequently recruited for Plaintiff (R. 11, Order), and on
March 12, 2019, an amended complaint was filed, (R. 18, Am.
Compl.) The amended complaint brings twelve claims against
Defendants: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Fries (Count
1), Elgin (Count 2), and Lojko (Count 3); a claim of false
arrest and imprisonment against Fries (Count 4); a claim of
willful and wanton conduct against Fries (Count 5); a claim
of false arrest and false imprisonment against Lojko (Count
6); a claim of willful and wanton conduct against Lojko
(Count 7); a claim of malicious prosecution against Fries
(Count 8); a claim against Elgin alleging liability under the
legal doctrine of respondeat superior (Count 9); a claim for
indemnification against Elgin (Count 10); a claim against
CCAPD alleging liability under respondeat superior (Count
11); and a claim against CCAPD for indemnification (Count
12). (R. 18, Am. Compl. ¶¶23-71.)
13, 2019, Fries and Elgin filed an answer to the amended
complaint. (R. 26, Answer.) That same day, Lojko and CCAPD
moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing first, that
Plaintiff failed to state a false arrest claim against Lojko;
second, that Lojko is entitled to qualified immunity; third,
that the state law claims against Lojko are barred by state
law sovereign immunity; and fourth, that CCAPD is not a
suable entity under Illinois law. (R. 27, Defs.' Mot., R.
28, Defs.' Mem.) Plaintiff responded to the motion,
conceding to the dismissal of CCAPD but objecting as to
Lojko. (R. 32, Pl's Resp.) Plaintiff contends that the
Section 1983 claim against Lojko is proper because Lojko had
the authority to arrest Plaintiff and effectuated the arrest.
(Id. at 2-4.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that
Lojko is not entitled to qualified immunity because the terms
of the Act are not subject to more than one interpretation,
and thus Lojko should have known it did not apply to
Plaintiff. (Id., at 4-5.) Finally, Plaintiff
contends that the state law claims against Lojko are proper
because Lojko has not demonstrated that a probation officer
is a state employee, and that state sovereign immunity does
not apply where a defendant is alleged to have acted outside
of his authority. (Id. at 5-7.) On June 21, 2019,
Defendants Lojko and CCAPD filed their reply (R. 33, Reply),
and the motion is now ripe for review.
complaint must set forth a "short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he statement
need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests." Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quotation and alteration omitted). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must "state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In construing the complaint, the Court
accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all
reasonable interferences in the plaintiffs favor. Roberts
v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
Detailed facts are not required to survive a motion to
dismiss, but "[l]egal conclusions and conclusory
allegations merely reciting the elements of [a] claim are not
entitled to this presumption of truth." McCauley v.
City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
basis of Defendants' motion is the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity. See R. 28, Defs.' Mem. at
6-8.) Generally, "complaints do not have to anticipate
affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss."
U.S. v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005);
accord Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian
House, 770 F.3d 610, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2014). The general
rule notwithstanding, "The exception occurs where ...
the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything
necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense[.]"
Id. When a qualified immunity defense is presented
in a motion to dismiss, courts "apply the standard of
review under Rule 12(b)(6), accept[ing] as true the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from those allegations,"
Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060, 1064
(7th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Qualified immunity can be grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal when the allegations of the complaint, taken as
true, fail to allege the violation of a clearly established
right. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 665 (7th
Cir. 2019); Landstrom v. Ill. Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1990).
Claims against CCAPD (Counts 11 and 12)
move to dismiss the claims against CCAPD on the basis that
because it is not a legally separate agency from the Office
of the Chief Judge, it is not a suable entity. (R. 28,
Defs,' Mot, ) In response, Lojko agrees. (R. 32, Pl's
Resp.) Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts
11 and 12 against CCAPD is granted.