United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Anthony Goodwin, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a
Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (Doc. 1). Goodwin is currently incarcerated at
FCI-Pekin, Illinois, serving a 120-month sentence after
pleading guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States
v. Goodwin, 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 246 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 28,
2011). Goodwin's sentencing range under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) was enhanced
after the sentencing judge determined that he was a career
offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based in part on
his four Arkansas residential burglary convictions. (Doc. 1,
now invokes Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016), to challenge his sentence and argue that
he is entitled to be resentenced without this Guidelines
enhancement. Specifically, Goodwin argues that because the
Arkansas residential burglary statutes under which he was
convicted criminalize broader behavior than the generic
federal definition of “burglary, ” these
convictions were improperly considered to be crimes of
violence under the Guidelines and can no longer support his
enhanced sentence under Mathis. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-15).
opposes issuance of the writ on multiple grounds. Respondent
argues that Goodwin cannot satisfy the requirements of
Section 2255(e)'s savings clause because his sentence
fell within the statutory maximum penalty for his crime of
conviction notwithstanding his Guidelines enhancement, so his
alleged harm is not a “miscarriage of justice” as
required by Seventh Circuit precedent. (Doc. 10, pp. 23-31).
Respondent also argues that Goodwin procedurally defaulted on
his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal.
(Id. at pp. 19-23). Finally, Respondent argues that
even if the Court reaches the merits of Goodwin's
Petition, his Petition must fail because Goodwin's prior
Arkansas residential burglary convictions were properly
considered predicate crimes of violence as defined by
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2011). (Id. at pp.
Facts and Procedural History
24, 2011, Goodwin pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and
abetting possession with intent to distribute less than 50
grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. §
2. United States v. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM,
Doc. 160, p. 1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 2014). Goodwin entered into
a formal Plea Agreement, but this Agreement did not
stipulate, discuss, or contemplate in any way Goodwin's
criminal history, criminal history category under the
Guidelines, or his potential Guidelines sentencing range.
Id. at pp. 1-12.
crime of conviction carried a statutory maximum penalty of 20
years' (240 months') imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C) (2010). While neither party has provided the
complete Presentence Report (“PSR”) from
Goodwin's underlying criminal case to the Court, there is
no dispute that Goodwin was determined to be a career
offender due to his prior Arkansas residential burglary
convictions, which were determined to be qualifying
“crimes of violence” by the sentencing court.
(See Doc. 1, pp. 17-22; Doc. 10, pp. 3-4); see
also Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, pp. 17-18
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). Neither Goodwin nor his counsel
objected to his designation as a career offender after the
PSR was released, and Goodwin specifically did not object to
any of the PSR's findings at his sentencing hearing.
Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 7 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).
asserts that before the career-offender enhancement, his
Sentencing Guidelines range would have been significantly
lower than the range resulting from his career offender
status. At Goodwin's sentencing hearing, his counsel
argued for a 48-72 month range of imprisonment. (Doc. 1, p.
11); Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 13
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). As a result of the enhancement,
however, Goodwin's advisory range was 210-262 months,
limited by statute to 240 months. Goodwin, No.
10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 9 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). The
sentencing court varied significantly downwards from the
advisory range and ultimately sentenced Goodwin to 120
months' imprisonment. Goodwin, No.
10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 21 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).
did not file a direct appeal. Since being sentenced, he has
filed two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the first
motion, filed in May 2012, Goodwin argued that his counsel
was ineffective at his sentencing hearing. This motion was
denied on the merits by the sentencing court. Id. at
Doc. 279, pp. 1-5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2012). Goodwin's
second Section 2255 motion, filed in June 2016, made similar
arguments to those before the Court here, relying on
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551
(2015), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990). Id. at Doc. 373. This motion was denied
because Goodwin failed to apply for and obtain leave from the
Eighth Circuit to file a second or successive Section 2255
motion. Id. at Doc. 381. Goodwin did not appeal the
denial of either of his Section 2255 motions.
petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in
conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to
challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See
Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.
from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been
convicted in federal court is generally limited to
challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which
sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the
“exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his
conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214,
217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to
only one challenge of his conviction and sentence
under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second
or successive” Section 2255 motion unless a panel of
the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion
contains either (1) newly discovered evidence
“sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
movant guilty of the offense, ” or (2) “a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
possible, however, under very limited circumstances, for a
prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence
under Section 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a
“savings clause” which authorizes a federal
prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition where the remedy
under Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e). See United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d
792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit construed
the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605,
611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A procedure for postconviction
relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so
configured as to deny a convicted defendant any
opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a
defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a
Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within
the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner
must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he
relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a
constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on
a decision that he could not have invoked in his first
Section 2255 motion and that case must apply
retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has
been a “fundamental defect” in his conviction or
sentence that is grave enough to be ...