Goodwin v. S. Kallis

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Petitioner Anthony Goodwin, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Goodwin is currently incarcerated at FCI-Pekin, Illinois, serving a 120-month sentence after pleading guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.^[1] United States v. Goodwin, 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 246 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2011). Goodwin's sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) was enhanced after the sentencing judge determined that he was a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based in part on his four Arkansas residential burglary convictions. (Doc. 1, pp. 18-22).

         Goodwin now invokes Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), to challenge his sentence and argue that he is entitled to be resentenced without this Guidelines enhancement. Specifically, Goodwin argues that because the Arkansas residential burglary statutes under which he was convicted criminalize broader behavior than the generic federal definition of “burglary, ” these convictions were improperly considered to be crimes of violence under the Guidelines and can no longer support his enhanced sentence under Mathis. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-15).

         Respondent opposes issuance of the writ on multiple grounds. Respondent argues that Goodwin cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 2255(e)'s savings clause because his sentence fell within the statutory maximum penalty for his crime of conviction notwithstanding his Guidelines enhancement, so his alleged harm is not a “miscarriage of justice” as required by Seventh Circuit precedent. (Doc. 10, pp. 23-31). Respondent also argues that Goodwin procedurally defaulted on his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. (Id. at pp. 19-23). Finally, Respondent argues that even if the Court reaches the merits of Goodwin's Petition, his Petition must fail because Goodwin's prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions were properly considered predicate crimes of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2011). (Id. at pp. 23-31).

         Relevant Facts and Procedural History

         On June 24, 2011, Goodwin pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States v. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 160, p. 1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 2014). Goodwin entered into a formal Plea Agreement, but this Agreement did not stipulate, discuss, or contemplate in any way Goodwin's criminal history, criminal history category under the Guidelines, or his potential Guidelines sentencing range. Id. at pp. 1-12.

         Goodwin's crime of conviction carried a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years' (240 months') imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2010). While neither party has provided the complete Presentence Report (“PSR”) from Goodwin's underlying criminal case to the Court, there is no dispute that Goodwin was determined to be a career offender due to his prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions, which were determined to be qualifying “crimes of violence” by the sentencing court. (See Doc. 1, pp. 17-22; Doc. 10, pp. 3-4); see also Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, pp. 17-18 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). Neither Goodwin nor his counsel objected to his designation as a career offender after the PSR was released, and Goodwin specifically did not object to any of the PSR's findings at his sentencing hearing. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 7 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).

         Goodwin asserts that before the career-offender enhancement, his Sentencing Guidelines range would have been significantly lower than the range resulting from his career offender status. At Goodwin's sentencing hearing, his counsel argued for a 48-72 month range of imprisonment. (Doc. 1, p. 11); Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 13 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). As a result of the enhancement, however, Goodwin's advisory range was 210-262 months, limited by statute to 240 months. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 9 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). The sentencing court varied significantly downwards from the advisory range and ultimately sentenced Goodwin to 120 months' imprisonment. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 21 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).

         Goodwin did not file a direct appeal. Since being sentenced, he has filed two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the first motion, filed in May 2012, Goodwin argued that his counsel was ineffective at his sentencing hearing. This motion was denied on the merits by the sentencing court. Id. at Doc. 279, pp. 1-5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2012). Goodwin's second Section 2255 motion, filed in June 2016, made similar arguments to those before the Court here, relying on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Id. at Doc. 373. This motion was denied because Goodwin failed to apply for and obtain leave from the Eighth Circuit to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion. Id. at Doc. 381. Goodwin did not appeal the denial of either of his Section 2255 motions.

         Applicable Legal Standards

         Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998).

         Aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the “exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to only one challenge of his conviction and sentence under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or successive” Section 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either (1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense, ” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

         It is possible, however, under very limited circumstances, for a prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence under Section 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition where the remedy under Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”

         The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he could not have invoked in his first Section 2255 motion and that case must apply retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be ...