United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Honorable Edmond E. Chang, United States District Judge.
Charles and Donna Hill lived in an apartment right upstairs
from their relative, Keitrion Lewis. R. 1, Compl.
¶¶ 8-10. They allege that, in August 2016, two
Illinois Department of Corrections parole officers and
several Chicago Police Department officers entered and
searched their home without a warrant and without their
consent, apparently mistaking it for Lewis's apartment.
Id. ¶¶ 14-16. The Hills now sue the
individual officers and the City of Chicago for violating
their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering and
searching their home and seizing their property. Defendants
Harrington and Walls have moved to dismiss Counts 2 and 4 of
the Complaint, arguing that those counts are redundant of
Counts 1 and 3, respectively. R. 54, Mot. Dismiss. For the
reasons explained below, Harrington and Walls's motion to
dismiss is granted in part. Count 4 is dismissed, but Count 2
purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the
allegations in the Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In August 2016, the Hills lived at
4436 West Jackson Boulevard, on the second floor.
Compl. ¶ 8. Lewis, lived on the first floor of
the same building. Id. ¶ 10. At the time, Lewis
was on parole under the supervision of the Illinois
Department of Corrections. Id. ¶ 9. Although
the Hills and Lewis are related, their respective apartments
were separate: “distinct units, with different means of
ingress and egress and separated by locked doors.”
August 2016, Defendants Harrington and another parole agent
with the last name Walls were serving as Lewis's parole
officers. Compl. ¶ 9. Elena McKenna, Scott Liebhaber,
Robert Purvis, and Matthew Pufpaf were members of the Chicago
Police Department. Id. ¶ 6. John Gartner, David
Rodriguez, Alan Lasch, and Kevin Geyer were CPD supervisors.
Id. ¶ 12. Steven Suvada was a CPD detective.
Id. ¶ 13.
Hills allege that, on August 31, 2016, all of the individual
Defendants- except Detective Suvada-entered their apartment
without a warrant or any other legal justification. Compl.
¶¶ 14-17. While they were there, the Defendants
searched the Hills' apartment and back porch,
“leaving the home in disarray.” Id.
¶¶ 19-20. They also cut the lock on Charles's
gun locker and seized his firearms and ammunition.
Id. ¶¶ 21-22. During the time that the
Defendants searched the home, the Hills were not allowed to
go inside it. Id. ¶¶ 23-25.
the search, Charles Hill was unable to return to work as a
part-time security guard because his firearms and ammunition
had been seized. Compl. ¶ 27. His firearm and ammunition
have not been returned to him. Id. ¶¶
27-28. The Hills allege that in addition to the loss of the
firearms, ammunition, and gun-locker lock, they
“sustained humiliation and indignities, and suffered
great mental and emotional pain and suffering.”
Id. ¶ 30.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint
generally need only include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain
statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what
the … claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) cleaned
The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule
“reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is
intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a
claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep
plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of
Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009).
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth
are those that are factual, rather than mere legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
and Walls argue that Counts 2 and 4 of the Complaint should
be dismissed because they are redundant with Counts 1 and 3.
The Court will discuss each in turn.
Claim 2 (Scope and Duration)
and Wells argue that Counts 1 and 2 are really the same, and
thus that Count 2 should be dismissed. Mot. Dismiss at 4-5
(“[The] alleged unlawful entry into Plaintiffs'
home is where Plaintiffs' alleged injury occurs in both
Count I and Count II.”). The Hills, on the other hand,
maintain that although the claims are both for violations of
their Fourth Amendment rights, they are chronologically and
legally distinct. R. 60, Pls.' Resp. at 3-5 (“Count
I pertains to the illegal entry and Count II pertains to the
illegal scope and duration of the police occupation of the
home.”). Put another way, Count 1 seeks recovery for
the Defendants' illegal entry into the home,
while Count 2 claims “that defendants overstayed their
occupation of the Hill home and performed a thorough,
invasive search of the home even after it was clear they were
in the wrong place.” Id. at 3. The Hills point