United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“Report”) of United States Magistrate Judge
Reona J. Daly (Doc. 66), recommending that the motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendants Simmons, Stueve, and
Walls (Doc. 53) be granted. Plaintiff Tommy Clark filed a
timely objection (Doc. 69). For the following reasons, Judge
Daly's Report is ADOPTED in part.
Clark filed an Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs (Count 1) and retaliated against him for
filing grievances (Count 2) while he was incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center in 2013, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment (Doc. 31). Defendants moved for summary
judgment on both claims (Doc. 53) but only addressed
Clark's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim in
their Memorandum of Law (Doc. 57). Clark filed a response as
to the deliberate indifference claim only (Docs. 64 and 65).
Daly issued a Report setting forth the applicable law and her
conclusions (Doc. 66). She concluded that Defendants Simmons,
Stueve, and Walls are entitled to summary judgment on Count 1
because the record does not support a finding of deliberate
indifference. Specifically, Judge Daly found that Stueve and
Simmons were non-medical prison personnel who were entitled
to rely on the care that Clark received from medical
personnel, and that Walls was not personally involved in any
deprivation because she only became aware of Clark's
condition months after he had been treated. As a result,
Judge Daly recommends that the motion for summary judgment be
granted, that Clark's claims be dismissed with prejudice,
and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and
Clark filed an objection, this Court must undertake a de
novo review of Judge Daly's findings and
recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); see also Govas v.
Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). De novo
review requires the district judge to “give fresh
consideration to those issues to which specific objections
have been made” and make a decision “based on an
independent review of the evidence and arguments without
giving any presumptive weight to the magistrate judge's
conclusion.” Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d
651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court “may accept, reject
or modify the magistrate judge's recommended
decision.” Id. Consistent with these
standards, the Court has reviewed Judge Daly's Report de
judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is filed, the adverse party “must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
genuine issue of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson
v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When deciding a summary
judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor
of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). Summary judgment will be denied where a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hedberg v.
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.1995).
parties do not dispute the facts set forth in the Report. The
following facts, presented in a light most favorable to
Clark, are relevant to the limited objections made by Clark:
Clark noticed one spider bite on his left forearm on April 5,
2013 and two additional bites on his right buttock the
following day. While Stueve was doing his rounds on April 6,
2013, Clark told him about the bites but did not know exactly
what had bitten him. Stueve told him he would get help and
returned with Simmons. Simmons looked at the spider bite and
told him that he needed to see a doctor (Doc. 65-1, p. 4).
She then left to talk to the lieutenant or major. She
returned and told Clark they told her that he could not go to
the Healthcare Unit because the institution was on a Level 1
lockdown (Id.). She instructed him to fill out a
request slip for healthcare so she could put it in the
appropriate box (Id.). Clark filled out the slip.
Simmons returned to Clark's cell, she was accompanied by
Nurse Oakley (Doc. 65-7, p. 1). Nurse Oakley examined Clark
and told him he had a brown recluse spider bite and needed to
go to the healthcare unit and see a doctor immediately.
Nevertheless, she told Clark that a doctor was not available
until two days later. This interaction was in Simmons'
presence. A CMT who saw Clark later that evening put Clark on
the doctor call list for April 8, 2013.
was again seen by Nurse Oakley on April 7, 2013 and given
pain medication. Clark testified that both Simmons and Oakley
told him he needed to go to the healthcare unit but that
there was nothing they could do given the lockdown and the
lack of a doctor on site (Id. 5).
was seen by Dr. Nwaobasi on April 8, 2013 and prescribed
antibiotics. Although antibiotics are typically handed out to
inmates by nurses the same day they are prescribed, Clark did
not receive the antibiotics until he was admitted to the