United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
ORDER AND OPINION
E. SHADID, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Petitioner Yorie Von Kahl's pro
se Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (Doc. 17). After filing his
pro se Rule 59(e) Motion, Petitioner retained
counsel, who has filed a Memorandum in Support of
Petitioner's pro se Motion (Doc. 21). For the
reasons set forth below, Petitioner Yorie Von Kahl's Rule
59(e) Motion (Doc. 17) is GRANTED IN PART on the ground that
the additional arguments presented in his pro se
Reply should have been construed as a motion to amend and the
denial of these claims more thoroughly addressed. The
remaining grounds in his Rule 59(e) Motion are DENIED. The
Court finds that Petitioner is still not entitled to relief
on the additional claims raised in his Reply. Accordingly,
the Judgment is VACATED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter
an Amended Judgment DENYING both Petitioner's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc.
1) and what the Court now construes as Petitioner's
Motion to Amend contained within his Reply (Doc. 14-1).
2018, Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. 1), arguing that the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) had illegally altered his mandatory
parole release date by adding ten years, and that he was
entitled to immediate release. While the relevant background
was included in the Court's January 2019 Order (Doc. 15)
denying the Petition, for convenience, the Court will restate
it here. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence imposed
on June 2, 1983, in No. C3-83-16-03 in the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota. The Judgment
LIFE on Counts 1 & 2 to run CONCURRENTLY; TEN (10) YEARS
on Counts 5, 6, 7 and 8 to run CONCURRENTLY but to run
CONSECUTIVELY to the life sentence on Counts 1 and 2; FIVE
(5) YEARS on Count 9 to run CONSECUTIVELY to the life
sentence imposed on Counts 1 and 2 and the ten year sentence
imposed on Counts 5, 6, 7 and 8; FIVE (5) YEARS on Count 11
to run CONCURRENTLY with the sentence imposed on Counts 1, 2,
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
See Judgment and Probation/ Commitment Order, Resp.
App., 33 (Doc 9-2), Pet. at 13 (Doc. 1)). Petitioner was
sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2), which
provides for release on parole “… at such time
as the Commission may determine.” Id.
initial parole hearing was on June 19, 1984. See,
Pet. at 45 (Doc. 1); Resp. App. 7-9 (Doc. 9-2). A Notice of
Action (“NOA”), dated July 20, 1984, continued
him to a 10-year reconsideration hearing in June 1995.
Id. The NOA further explained that Petitioner had
only been in custody for 17 months, that his offense behavior
was rated Category 8 because it involved murder, and that his
parole guideline was 100 months' imprisonment.
18, 1986, Petitioner received a statutory interim hearing.
See Pet. at 49-50 (Doc. 1); Resp. App. 10-13 (Doc.
9-2). At that time, the BOP had calculated his two-thirds or
mandatory parole release date under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d)
to be February 12, 2013. Id. (“On his life
plus 15 year sentence, Petitioner can serve at most 30 years
which the Bureau calculates to be the two-thirds point of his
aggregate term.”). The hearing panel recommended that
he be continued to a 15-year reconsideration hearing in June
2001; the Parole Commission adopted the recommendation, and
Petitioner was advised of the decision by a Notice of Action
dated July 17, 1986. Id.
also received statutory interim hearings in 1988, 1990, and
1992. See Resp. App. 15-26 (Doc. 9-2). Following
each hearing, the Parole Commission made no change in its
decision to continue Petitioner to the 15-year
reconsideration hearing in June 2001 and no change in its
calculation of the two-thirds or statutory mandatory release
date under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Id. In 1993,
Petitioner appealed the Parole Commission's decision.
Resp. App. 27-29 (Doc. 9-2). By Notice of Action dated July
28, 1993, the Parole Commission affirmed the previous
decision. Id. On April 17, 1995, Petitioner received
another statutory interim hearing, after which the Parole
Commission made no change to the previous decision. Resp.
App. 30-31 (Doc. 9-2). Respondent states that beginning in
1997, Petitioner waived his statutory interim hearing, and he
has continued to waive those hearings through the present.
Resp. at 3 (Doc. 9). In Reply, Petitioner disputes that his
hearings have been voluntarily waived, but argues that he has
been “forced” to waive them after the Parole
Commission has “refused” to provide him with
needed records. Reply at 32 (Doc. 14-1).
7, 1994, Petitioner became aware that the BOP had
recalculated his mandatory release date pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4206(d) as February 13, 2023. Pet. at. 4-5 (Doc. 1).
Petitioner has repeatedly appealed this action within the
BOP. Id. Despite this recalculation by the BOP, a
“Federal 15 year Reconsideration Hearing Prehearing
Assessment, ” created on May 4, 2002, by a reviewer in
the Parole Commission, again stated that the two-thirds or
mandatory release date was February 12, 2013. See
Pet. at 22 (Doc. 1).
filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1),
arguing that the BOP illegally altered his mandatory parole
release date in 1994, adding ten years to his mandatory
release date. Petitioner argues that this calculation is
incorrect, that the BOP had no statutory authority to change
this date, and that the BOP effectively usurped the powers of
the Parole Commission. Respondent filed a response (Doc. 9).
Petitioner filed a timey Reply (Doc. 14-1), which raised four
additional grounds of relief: (1) “the BOP's
7/19/2018 Sentencing Monitoring Independent Computation
Monitoring Data Printout shows Petitioner's Statutory
Release Date as December 22, 2009 and his imprisonment is
unlawful, ” Id. 36-41; (2) the Parole
Commission's “August 1984 Amendments to 28 C.F.R.
§§ 2.12 and 2.14 violate the Constitution's Ex
Post Facto Clause as applied to Petitioner on and since July
17, 1986, and all [Parole Commission Notice of Actions] since
then are void and Petitioner's imprisonment unlawful,
” Id. at 41-49; (3) the BOP's retroactive
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) and [Program
Statement] 5880.30 to add ten years to Petitioner's
Mandatory Release Date” violates due process and does
not justify Petitioner's imprisonment, Id. at
50-55; and (4) the BOP's retroactive application of
§ 3585(b) and Program Statement 5880.30 to recalculate
his mandatory release date was an ex post facto
violation, Id. at 55-57. His reply brief also
included an explanation of why he believes his criminal
judgment was obtained by fraud and collusion. Id. at
January 2019, the Court denied Petitioner's Petition,
finding that the BOP's calculation of the mandatory
release date under§ 4206(d) was correct, and that it was
permissible to correct the mandatory release date. Order
(Doc. 15). Moreover, the Court found that despite the term
“mandatory release date, ” Petitioner was not
entitled to release under § 4206(d) until the Parole
Commission conducts a hearing and determines that Petitioner
is eligible for release. Id. Accordingly, the Court
promptly filed a pro se Motion pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (Doc. 17), listing the following six
errors that he alleges the Court made in its ruling:
1. The judgment has been obtained by collusion with a biased
judge and a fraud on the Court
2. The Court grossly misapprehended Petitioner's core
3. The court misconstrued and misapplied 18 U.S.C. §
4206(d) which governs petitioner's mandatory parole
4. The court misconstrued and misapplied 18 U.S.C. §
4163 which governs petitioner's mandatory good ...