United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment for Defendants' Perjurious Testimony and
Acts (Doc. 47). Plaintiff seeks summary judgment against
Defendants as a sanction for what he alleges was fraudulent
testimony by Anthony Wills and Angela Crain at the April 17,
2019 evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues that Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 11 and 37(b) are inadequate remedies for
the Defendants' conduct and, thus, he should receive
summary judgment as to his claims.
have filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's motion (Doc.
58). Defendants argue that the dispositive motion is
premature and not related to the claims in this case, as it
focuses on the testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 59), as well as
supplemental exhibits (Doc. 62).
extent that Plaintiff seeks summary judgment, that motion is
DENIED without prejudice. Anthony Wills and
Angela Crain are not yet parties to this case. Although
Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his Complaint (Doc.
49), that motion was recently denied without prejudice. Even
if they were current parties in the case, the summary
judgment motion would be premature as merits discovery is
stayed (Doc. 40). Discovery and dispositive motions, at this
time, are limited to the issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted
his administrative remedies. Further, as Plaintiff is seeking
summary judgment, he also bears the burden of persuasion at
trial (i.e., the movant is the plaintiff), and, as such, must
establish all the essential elements of his claim.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). See also Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452,
455-56 (6th Cir. 2012) (if summary judgment movant is
plaintiff, he must show that the record contains evidence
satisfying his burden of persuasion); Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3 d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (at
summary judgment state, party that bears burden of persuasion
at trial must come forward with sufficient evidence of each
essential element of its prima facie case);
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13(1) (3d ed. 2000).
Plaintiff's motion fails to establish all of the elements
of all of his claims which include an Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim and a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Rehabilitation
Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment at
extent that Plaintiff also seeks sanctions for alleged false
testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the Court also
DENIES that motion. Plaintiff takes issue
with Anthony Wills's testimony about the showers at
Menard Correctional Center and Plaintiff's grievance
regarding those showers. Plaintiff points to his Cumulative
Counseling Summary as proof that Wills lied about not
receiving Plaintiff's August 2018 grievance. That summary
indicates that the grievance was received by the grievance
office (Doc. 62, p. 2). There is no indication in the record
that Wills received the grievance. The “location”
of the summary comments does identify the “Assistant
Warden of Programs Office” but does not indicate that
the Assistant Warden reviewed or had knowledge of the
grievance. The comments indicate the grievance office
received the grievance and David L. Dwight, office
coordinator, and Kelly Pierce, corrections clerk, wrote those
comments (Id.). Wills also supplemented his
testimony with an affidavit which stated that the he located
the grievance after the hearing, that the grievance was with
the counselor, and that he was in the process of reviewing
the grievance (Doc. 31-4, p. 1). The Court finds no evidence
to suggest Wills lied about Plaintiff's grievance. The
Court also finds no evidence to support Plaintiff's
claims that Wills testimony regarding the showers at Menard
Plaintiff alleges that Angela Crain gave false testimony at
the evidentiary hearing when she testified about her time as
the ADA coordinator. He also alleges she submitted a false
exhibit after the hearing (Doc. 31-1). Crain testified that
Wills took over as ADA coordinator in September 2018 and that
she was not currently the backup ADA coordinator (Doc. 47, p.
27). As Plaintiff points out in his motion, however, Crain
later clarified with the Court that she was the assistant
coordinator until December 2018 (Id. at p. 28). The
Court finds no evidence that the statements were false, nor
does Crain's clarification make her first statement
false. In fact, prior to denying that she was the backup
coordinator she testified that she served as the coordinator
until December 2018 and transitioned the position over to
Wills during the Fall of that year (Id. at p. 27).
This is consistent with her later clarification that Wills
became the ADA coordinator in September, and she served as
the assistant until December (Id. at p. 28).
the exhibit and Defendants' supplemental response to the
preliminary injunction motion, the response first indicated
that Crain met with Plaintiff on April 24, 2019 (Doc. 31, p.
2). That statement was later clarified, however, to indicate
that she made a notation in Plaintiff's medical record
but did not meet with him in person (Doc. 39, p. 2). The
supporting exhibit remained unchanged as it did not indicate
that Crain met with Plaintiff in person (Doc. 31-1, p. 1).
Nor did it indicate that Crain was the ADA coordinator. As
both responses point out, Crain is the health care unit
administrator (Doc. 39, p. 2). The clarification was accurate
and does not evidence that Crain was trying to mislead the
Court. There likewise is no evidence that Crain was
improperly acting as the ADA coordinator when she made that
statement, as Plaintiff suggests (Doc. 47, pp. 13-14). Thus,
Plaintiff is not entitled to sanctions for testimony given at
the evidentiary hearing.
Plaintiffs summary judgment motion (Doc. 47) is
DENIED. Defendants' motion to strike
(Doc. 58) is DENIED as moot.