United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. (D. 11.) For the reasons stated herein, the
Motion is DENIED, and the case remains CLOSED.
24, 2019, this Court entered an Order denying Petitioner
Lorenzo Williams' petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and dismissing his claim, as he
failed to satisfy the procedural requirements to consider the
merits of his petition. (D. 9.) On July 10, 2019, Williams
filed the Motion at hand, arguing a recent ruling by the
Seventh Circuit cures the procedural defects in his petition
and that the Court should reconsider its decision. (D. 11.)
This Order follows.
timely motion under Rule 59(e) is effectively a motion for
reconsideration. “Motions under Rule 59(e) will only be
granted in order to correct manifest errors of law or fact,
to present new evidence, or where there has been an
intervening and substantial change in the controlling law,
and ‘should only be granted in rare
circumstances.'” Leslie v. Roberson, No.
15 C 2395, 2017 WL 4158887, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2017)
(citing Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d
845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999)). A party moving for reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) bears a heavy burden of establishing the
court should reverse its prior judgment. Caisse Nationale
de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264,
1270 (7th Cir. 1996). “A ‘manifest error' is
not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party.
It is the ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or
failure to recognize controlling precedent.'”
Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp.
1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). It is not appropriate to argue
matters that could have been raised in prior motions or to
rehash previously rejected arguments in a motion to
reconsider. Caisse Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1270.
Motion for Reconsideration, Williams argues the Court's
decision to deny his § 2241 petition was in error based
on the Seventh Circuit's June 24, 2019, ruling in
Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2019).
Specifically, Williams asserts (albeit parenthetically) that
in Beason, the court held that “substantive
decisions such as Mathis presumptively apply
retroactively on collateral review under 2241.” (D. 11
at 1.) Williams, however, fails to demonstrate that
Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016),
established a new rule which was unavailable to him at the
time of his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.
Accordingly, his Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
is no stranger to arguing the sentencing enhancement he
received under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, commonly known as the “three strikes
law” (18 U.S.C. § 3559), was incorrectly applied.
November 6, 2001, Williams appealed his conviction to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing, in part, that under
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the
government had to include his prior felonies in the
indictment and prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
he had prior convictions for serious felonies before the
three-strikes enhancement could be applied. United States
v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 839 (8th Cir. 2002). He also
argued that the application of the three-strikes enhancement
at sentencing denied him due process by placing the burden on
him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prior
convictions were not serious violent felonies. Id.
28, 2005, in his first motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, Williams argued his trial counsel demonstrated
ineffective assistance by depriving him the ability to argue
his prior convictions were not crimes of violence under the
three-strikes law by stipulating to the underlying facts of
his previous convictions.
23, 2009, Williams filed a motion to reduce sentence,
arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment
709 to the Sentencing Guidelines, he was entitled to a
resentencing hearing, as his “prior sentences were for
offenses that were not separated by an intervening arrest[,
]” and therefore, should have been considered a single
21, 2014, Williams attempted to file his third successive
§ 2255 motion,  arguing in light of Descamps v. United
States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), and using the modified
categorical approach, his prior convictions for second-degree
robbery did not constitute “serious violent
felonies” under the three-strikes law.
25, 2016, Williams attempted to file his fourth successive
§ 2255 motion, arguing his sentence was unconstitutional
under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251
(2015), and Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257
(2016), because the Supreme Court in Johnson held that the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal ...