United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
GILBERT C. SISON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
limited by the Court's threshold order (Doc. 12),
Plaintiff Titus Linton brings this pro se action
against Defendant Angela Crain and alleges a single Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against her. Linton
claims that Crain falsified statements about his medical care
and failed to provide sufficient care commensurate to his
medical needs. Before the Court is a motion for summary
judgment filed by Crain (Doc. 45). The matter has been
referred to the undersigned by Chief Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 72.1(a)(2). For
the reasons delineated below, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Defendant
Crain's motion for summary judgment.
Findings of Fact
who at all times relevant to this action was incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), has a
number of diagnosed medical conditions, including
scleroderma, Raynaud's syndrome, eosinophilic
esophagitis, rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn's disease,
hypertension and proptosis. At his deposition, Linton
testified that he has difficulty walking due to the
scleroderma. (Doc. 46-1 p. 2-3). When he transferred to
Menard from Pontiac Correctional Center in 2014, Linton was
taking a number of prescription medications, and he used
crutches at Pontiac. (Doc. 46-3, p. 1). According to his
deposition, Linton was using a cane prior to his transfer,
not crutches. (Doc. 46-1, p. 4).
had a number of medical appointments throughout April 2014,
and on April 15, 2014, was seen by a doctor, who issued him
permits for a low bunk, low gallery, shower on gallery, slow
walk, double cuff, feed-in cell, front cuff, and no yard.
(Doc. 46-2). Linton was also given a special no-bean diet and
was referred to see the medical director. (Doc. 46-3, p.
11-13). Linton saw Dr. Trost on May 16 and June 5, 2014.
April 17, 2014, Linton filed a grievance complaining that
Menard would not let him have an assistive device to help him
walk. The medical records indicate that Defendant Crain, the
nursing supervisor and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
coordinator at Menard, reviewed his medical records on June
13, 2014, in order to respond to the grievance. Crain wrote
in the records, “[o]ffender to be scheduled with MD for
assessment of medical need for crutch/cane or other assistive
device for ADA.” (Doc. 46-3, p. 25). Crain also sent
Linton a memorandum stating, “I have received your
grievance and reviewed the medical record and offer the
following. I find that you have previously used a single
crutch at the previous institution. I have scheduled you to
see the physician for assessment of gait and questionable
continued need for a crutch.” (Doc. 46-4).
counselor formally responded to the grievance on June 30,
2014, conveying the same information included in Crain's
memo to Linton. (Doc. 46-5). On August 29, 2014, Linda
Carter, a grievance officer, recommended denial of the
grievance as moot because medical treatment is to be
determined by medical professionals. She noted the permits
issued to Linton, and wrote, “I am going to go over and
see this guy today and talk with staff just to see exactly
what it is that he is unable to do. I spoke with Dr. Trost
and he does not feel like this inmate would fall under the
ADA Standards because although his gait is slow and steady he
is still able to ambulate. Dr. Trost did comment that as his
disease process progresses he would probably benefit from a
cane or crutch but does not feel that he is currently at that
point.” (Doc. 46-5). Kimberly Butler, in her role as
Chief Administrative Officer, concurred in the decision to
deny the grievance on September 8, 2014.
testified at this deposition that he spoke to Crain while he
was living in the hospital following a fight in November
2014. (Doc. 46-1, p. 8). He did not expound on the topics
they spoke about. Linton also testified that he wrote Crain
several times and continues to write to her because, at the
time of his deposition, his wheelchair was broken. (Doc.
46-1, p. 8). As to the information in Carter's denial of
his grievance, Linton maintains that he asked Dr. Trost if he
said what was written on the grievance response form and that
Dr. Trost denied it. He acknowledged that Crain never
directly provided him with medical treatment. Linton also
testified writing to Crain about a number of ADA issues at
Menard unrelated to his deliberate indifference claim against
Crain in this case. (Doc. 46-1, p. 12-15).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101,
1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994
(7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material fact
remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753
F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views
the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.
See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v.
Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the
Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a),
“we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in
the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,
giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences
and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his]
favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc.,
756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014).
Eight Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and
the deliberate indifference to the “serious medical
needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.”
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
828 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner is entitled to
“reasonable measures to meet a substantial ...