United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
WINDSOR W. KESSLER, III, #53740-037, Petitioner,
WILLIAM TRUE, III, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
matter is before the Court on Kessler's Motion for
Reconsideration. (Doc. 5). Kessler, an inmate of the Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) incarcerated at the United
States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (Doc. 1), filed this
habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
challenging his halfway house placement. Specifically,
Kessler alleges that he requested nine to eleven months of
halfway house placement, but his case manager told him that
he recommends six months for everyone, regardless of relevant
criteria. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). The Court dismissed the petition
because Kessler's claims are not cognizable in a habeas
corpus proceeding and would likely fail even if they were
pursued in an appropriate action. (Doc. 3, p. 3).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly
contemplate motions to reconsider. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit has approved of district courts construing motions
pursuant to the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) if it appears that a party is
requesting relief available under those Rules. U.S. v.
Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992).
“[W]hether a motion filed within  days of the entry
of judgment should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
depends on the substance of the motion, not on the timing or
label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch,
517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008). A motion to reconsider
filed more than 28 days after entry of the challenged order
“automatically becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.”
Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir.
59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment in order to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to address newly
discovered evidence. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494.
“A ‘manifest error' is not demonstrated by
the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale
disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize
controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal
60(b) sets forth a more exacting standard than Rule 59(e),
although it permits relief from a judgment for a number of
reasons, including mistake or “any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of judgment.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 60(b) is an
extraordinary remedy and is only granted in exceptional
circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230
F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000). “Reconsideration is not
an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected
arguments.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.
CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).
motion fails under either standard. He simply rehashes
arguments already raised in his initial petition. Further,
his contention that the Court misconstrued his claim as a
challenge to the conditions of confinement, as opposed to a
challenge to the procedure used to evaluate him for halfway
house confinement, evidences a misunderstanding of the issue
addressed by the Court. A habeas petition under Section 2241
is the proper vehicle for relief where a prisoner is
challenging the fact or duration of his
confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d
1079, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994). Kessler is not challenging either
the fact or duration of his confinement. He is not seeking
release from confinement. See Glaus v. Anderson, 408
F.3d 382, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (“If the prisoner is
seeking what can be fairly described as a quantum change in
the level of custody-whether outright freedom, or freedom
subject to the limited reporting and financial constraints of
bond or parole or probation, ... then habeas corpus is his
remedy.”). A complaint related to his halfway house
confinement is a challenge to the conditions of his
confinement, not the fact or duration of
his confinement. He is not, therefore, seeking relief
available under Section 2241. Thus, the motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
Kessler wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice
of appeal with the Court within thirty (30) days of the entry
of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). A motion for leave
to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the
issues Kessler plans to present on appeal. See Fed.
R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Kessler does choose to appeal and
is allowed to proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion of
the $505.00 appellate filing fee in order to pursue his
appeal (the amount to be determined based on his prison trust
fund account records for the past six months) irrespective of
the outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.
Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien
v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious,
Kessler may also incur a “strike.”