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Parker v. Baldwin

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

August 5, 2019

CHRISTOPHER L. PARKER, #S07242, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN R. BALDWIN, IDOC RECORDS OFFICE, and GLENN JACKSON, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          STACI M. YANDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Christopher Parker, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[1] In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was denied credit toward his term of mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) for 906 days he spent in IDOC custody following reincarceration for violations of his MSR. (Doc. 6, pp. 1-10). The IDOC Records Office denied Plaintiff's request for discharge of his MSR term pursuant to 730 ILCS § 5/3-14-2.5(e), an Illinois statute that tolls MSR terms of certain sex offenders during periods of incarceration. (Id.). Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of 730 ILCS §§ 5/3-14-2.5(d) and (e). (Doc. 6). He brings related claims against the Defendants under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and money damages. (Id.).

         The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) supersedes and replaces the Complaint (Doc. 1) and is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a Complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

         First Amended Complaint

         Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6, pp. 1-10): Plaintiff was convicted of criminal sexual assault and required to serve a term of MSR for three years to life pursuant to 730 ILCS § 5/5-8-1(d)(4) following completion of his underlying sentence. He began serving his MSR term on July 3, 2012. (Id. at p. 3). Less than three months later, he was reincarcerated for violating unspecified conditions of his MSR. (Id.). Although the Prison Review Board approved Plaintiff for re-release on condition that he find a suitable host site in November 2012, Plaintiff was unable to secure one from September 12, 2012 until May 12, 2015. (Id.).

         In July 2015, three years after his original release from incarceration, the IDOC Records Office denied Plaintiff's request for discharge of his MSR obligation[2] and advised that he would receive no credit toward MSR for the time he was reincarcerated. (Id.). The IDOC Records Office explained that the tolling provision in 730 ILCS § 5/3-14-2.5(e) applied to him, and the office took this position until Supervisor Glenn Jackson retired on December 31, 2017.[3] (Id. at pp. 2-3). As a result, Plaintiff served “dead time” for which he received no credit toward MSR from July 2015 until December 31, 2017.[4] (Id. at pp. 3-4, 7). He now claims that this 906-day period of confinement violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 6). He seeks money damages for these constitutional deprivations against Supervisor Jackson, in his individual capacity. (Id. at pp. 5-8). He also seeks an order declaring 730 ILCS §§ 5/3-14-2.5(d) and (e) unconstitutional on due process and vagueness grounds and enjoining the IDOC Director and IDOC Records Office, in their official capacities, from enforcing the tolling provisions of the statute against anyone. (Id. at pp. 6, 9-10).

         Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the following Counts in this the pro se action:

Count 1:
Constitutional due process and vagueness challenge to 730 ILCS §§ 5/3-14-2.5(d) and/or (e), which toll MSR during incarceration but provide no process for seeking discharge, fail to define the reasons for denying discharge applications, and authorize MSR beyond the 3-year minimum term.
Count 2:
Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Supervisor Jackson, in his individual capacity, for applying 730 ILCS § 5/3-14-2.5(e) to toll Plaintiff's MSR for 906 days from July 2015 until December 31, 2017.

         The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed herein should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly [5]

         Discussion

         Coun ...


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