United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY MCDADE UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendant Adam Lee Ware's
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence (Doc.
21) and Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 22). The
Prosecution has responded (Docs. 25, 26), and a hearing was
held on July 17, 2019. For the reasons stated below,
Defendant's Motions (Docs. 21, 22) are DENIED.
to the application for the search warrant at issue, Defendant
was known to the police for having dealt narcotics in the
past; indeed, he was on parole for manufacture/delivery of
cocaine. (Doc. 21-1 at 2, 4). In July of 2018, an anonymous
tip was provided to Peoria Police Sergeant Erin Barisch
stating Defendant was dealing narcotics; the initial tip did
not mention the residence subject to the search warrant at
issue. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). The same anonymous source followed
up twice and informed the police Defendant was still dealing
narcotics and storing them at a residence located on 1103
South Warren Street. (Doc. 21-2 at 2). The application for a
search warrant provided no further detail about the informant
or how the information was acquired, the timeline of the
calls, any other information provided by the anonymous tip,
or steps taken to corroborate the tip before February 2019.
February 6, 2019, Peoria Police Sergeant Matthew Lane was
surveilling the residence at 1103 S. Warren. (Doc. 21-1 at
2). He saw Defendant leave the building and get into a silver
car. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). Lane followed the car and saw it park
outside of a different house on the 2300 block of Millman
Street. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). Lane then observed a man exit the
house and get into Defendant's car. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). The
man sat in the front seat of Defendant's car for about
five minutes before exiting the car and reentering the house
on Millman. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). In the affidavit supporting his
application for a search warrant, Lane reported he believed,
based on his training and experience, a drug transaction had
occurred. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). Lane was unable to follow the car
when it drove away. (Doc. 21-1 at 2). However, he and other
officers returned to 1103 S. Warren and saw the same silver
car parked in front of the residence, at first with someone
inside and the lights on, then empty with the lights off.
(Doc. 21-1 at 2).
thereafter, Barisch noticed someone leave 1103 S. Warren, go
back to the car, and begin driving. (Doc. 21-1 at 3). Barisch
followed it as it drove away until it reached the
intersection of Shelley Street and Lincoln Street.
(Suppression Hrg. on 7/17/2019). At that intersection, the
driver failed to signal a right turn for the last continuous
100 feet before turning onto Lincoln; Lane's affidavit
stated the vehicle stopped at the stop sign controlling the
intersection before the turn signal was activated. (Doc. 21-1
at 3). Barisch informed another pair of officers who had
begun following the car and instructed them to stop it. (Doc.
21-1 at 3). Those officers reported seeing the car cross the
road centerline on Moss Avenue and pulled it over. (Doc. 22
at 4). The officers determined Defendant had an open
container of alcohol in the vehicle. (Doc. 21-1 at 3). They
asked Defendant to step out of the car and told him they
would search him and the vehicle; Defendant responded that
was fine. (Doc. 21-1 at 3). The officers searched Defendant
and the vehicle, discovering a plastic bag in his jacket
pocket that contained a white powder, later determined to be
cocaine. (Doc. 21-1 at 3). Although no other contraband was
located in the search of Defendant and his car, the officers
did find $1, 140 in his pockets. (Doc. 21-1 at 3).
and one of the officers who stopped Defendant proceeded to a
Hardee's. (Suppression Hrg. on 7/17/2019). There, they
met a judge of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial
Circuit of Illinois to present an application for a warrant
to search 1103 S. Warren. In addition to the above
information, Lane's application for a search warrant
included information that Defendant had previously been
stopped for speeding in May 2018. (Doc. 21-1 at 4). During
that stop, a drug dog alerted, leading to a search of
Defendant's vehicle. (Doc. 21-1 at 4). The search did not
yield contraband, but officers did discover $18, 000 in cash,
wrapped in a way Lane states in the February 6, 2019
application for a warrant is consistent with how narcotics
traffickers bundle money. (Doc. 21-1 at 4).
on Lane's application, the judge issued a warrant to
search 1103 S. Warren. (Doc. 21-1 at 1). The warrant was
served the same evening. (Doc. 26 at 1-2). The subsequent
search uncovered over five kilograms of cocaine, 86 grams of
cocaine base, $200, 000 in cash, evidence of drug
manufacturing, and firearms. (Doc. 26 at 3-4). Defendant was
indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and
possession of a firearm by a felon. (Doc. 11 at 1-3).
instant motions argue the stop of his vehicle was an unlawful
seizure of his person, so the fruits thereof should be
suppressed, and there was not probable cause to search 1103
S. Warren, so the evidence uncovered there should be
may stop a vehicle where they have probable cause to believe
a traffic violation occurred. United States v.
Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019). This standard
is met when “the circumstances confronting a police
officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has
committed even a minor traffic offense.” United
States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586
(7th Cir. 2000)). “But when a police officer mistakenly
believes that the law prohibits an act that is, in fact,
perfectly legal, even a good faith belief that the law has
been violated will not support the stop.” United
States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir.
review of a search warrant is deferential. “[I]n
reviewing the issuing judge's probable cause
determination, the district court need only evaluate whether
the judge had a ‘substantial basis' for concluding
that probable cause existed.” United States v.
Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1080 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
“Probable cause exists when the supporting affidavit
presents a total set of circumstances which create a
‘fair probability' that a search will uncover
evidence of a crime.” United States v. Haynes,
882 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gates,
462 U.S. at 238). “Those circumstances need only
indicate a reasonable probability that evidence of crime will
be found in a particular location; neither an absolute
certainty nor even a preponderance of the evidence is
necessary.” United States v. Aljabari, 626
F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010). When a judge is presented with
only an affidavit to support the search warrant, “the
validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the
affidavit.” United States v. McMillian, 786
F.3d 630, 639 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2003)).
a reviewing court determines a warrant was issued without the
requisite probable cause, “the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by
police officers who acted in objectively reasonable reliance
upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.”
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987)
(explaining the holding of United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984)). The good-faith inquiry “is
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal” given “all of the
circumstances.” Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 145 (2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922
n. 23). The issuance of a search warrant is prima
facie evidence of good faith. United States v.
Reichling, 781 F.3d 883, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, when
a search warrant has issued, a defendant seeking exclusion
(1) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role and
failed to perform his neutral and detached function, serving
merely as a rubber stamp for the police; (2) the affidavit
supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; or (3) the issuing judge was misled by
information in an affidavit that the ...