United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Larue ("Plaintiff), a prisoner at Stateville
Correctional Center ("Stateville"), brings this
action against the Illinois Department of Corrections
("IDOC"), IDOC Health Administrator Donald Mills
("Mills"), IDOC Director John R. Baldwin
("Baldwin"), Ghaliah Obaisi ("Obaisi") as
executor of the estate of Dr. Saleh Obaisi, who was an IDOC
medical doctor, former Stateville warden Randy Pfister
("Pfister"), current Stateville warden Walter
Nicholson ("Nicholson"), and Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. ("Wexford"), alleging claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law. (R. 1, Compl.; R. 14-1,
Second Am. Compl.) Before the Court is Wexford and
Obaisi's (collectively, "the Wexford
Defendants") motion to dismiss (R. 31, Wexford
Defs.' Mot.) and Nicholson, Mills, Baldwin, and
IDOC's (collectively, "the IDOC Defendants")
motion to dismiss. (R, 37, IDOC Defs.' Mot.) For the
following reasons, both motions are granted.
is a prisoner at Stateville. (R. 14-1, Second Am. Compl.
¶ 15.) Since at least 2015, he complained to numerous
medical professionals and administrators of pain and a bulge
in his left testicle. (Id.) Over time, his pain
intensified and, as a result, he began to have trouble
walking, standing, sleeping, and breathing. (Id.
¶ 16.) In October and November 2017, Plaintiff filed two
grievance reports, complaining of his worsening condition and
about how his requests for medical attention since 2015 had
been ignored. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.)
November 2017, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Saleh Obaisi,
who diagnosed Plaintiff with a hernia and told him that he
would be sent for surgery. (Id. ¶I9.) He was
seen again by Dr. Obaisi later that month because his pain
had intensified. (Id. ¶ 20.) Dr. Obaisi told
Plaintiff that he would be sent for surgery soon.
(Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs pain continued to
worsen and he continued complaining to nurses and
correctional officers regarding his condition. (Id.
¶¶ 21, 24.) Plaintiff requested to see Mills, who
informed him that he would look into it and let him know when
the surgery would take place. (Id. ¶ 23.) He
also wrote letters to Pfister, who was the warden at the
time, but he never received any response. (Id.
¶ 24, ) Plaintiff was sent for surgery on July 10, 2018,
roughly eight months after his first visit with Dr. Obaisi.
(Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff complains of the delay in
obtaining the surgery and of the pain he suffered as a
result, (Id. ¶ 26.) He brings a Section 1983
claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against all
defendants, a negligence claim against all defendants, and a
breach of contract claim against IDOC and Wexford.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-57.)
filed a pro se complaint against Defendants on
February 2, 2018. (R. 1, Compl.) Counsel was appointed on May
25, 2018, and Plaintiff thereafter filed a first amended
complaint. (R. 11, First Am. Compl.) Several months later,
Plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint,
incorporating additional facts. (R. 14, Mot. Second Am.
Compl.) Plaintiff properly attached his proposed second
amended complaint to his motion. (R. 14-1, Second Am. Compl.)
Although leave was granted to file the second amended
complaint (R. 22, Min. Order), Plaintiff did not subsequently
separately file it. The Court nevertheless considers the
second amended complaint attached to the motion as the
February 8, 2019, the Wexford Defendants moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs first amended complaint in part despite that by
then it had been superseded by the second amended one. (R.
31, Wexford Defs.' Mot. at 1.) On March 1, 2019,
Plaintiff responded in opposition, without noting the
oversight. (R. 36, Resp. Wexford Defs.' Mot.) The Wexford
Defendants filed a reply on March 15, 2019. (R. 40, Reply.)
On the same day, the IDOC Defendants also moved to dismiss
the first amended complaint. (R. 37, IDOC Defs.' Mot.)
Plaintiff responded in opposition on April 17, 2019 (R. 43,
Pl's Resp. IDOC's Mot.), and the IDOC Defendants
filed their reply on May 1, 2019. (R. 45, IDOC Defs.'
Reply.) Because the parties fully briefed the motions, and
the allegations of the second amended complaint do not vary
from the allegations of the earlier one in a way that affects
this Court's analysis on the motions, the Court construes
them as if they had been directed against the operative
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the viability of
a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted." Firestone Fin. Corp.
v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation omitted). In order to survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough factual
information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782
F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2015). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content which
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pled
facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Camasta v. Jos A. Bank Clothiers,
Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). However, mere
conclusory statements are insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss, and the Court is "not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."
Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
Section 1983 Claim (Count 1)