United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J.
PHIL GILBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Celadon
Trucking Services employed Myron Wilson as a truck driver.
(Compl. ¶¶ 14-16, ECF No. 1.) The plaintiffs say
that Wilson rammed his truck into the plaintiffs' car on
Interstate-55 during icy weather conditions-which were
apparently so bad that many drivers had pulled onto the
shoulder and parked, including the plaintiffs-so they sued
both Celadon Trucking and Wilson in tort. (Id. at
¶¶ 17-22.) There are three counts: (1) negligence
against both defendants; (2) negligence per se
against both defendants; and (3) negligence under a
respondeat superior theory against Celadon Trucking only. The
defendants then filed partial motions for summary judgment on
Count III and the claims for punitive damages in every
count-but following a joint stipulation of dismissal as to
Count III, only the punitive damages issue remains. (ECF No.
58.)
The
defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
on the punitive damages requests because (1) the plaintiffs
use the same factual allegations in support of their requests
for both compensatory and punitive damages, and (2) the
allegations are only sufficient for compensatories-not
punitives. The defendants point to several Illinois state
cases on the matter that rely on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 909 (1979), which says:
Punitive
damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing
and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal
ratified or approved the act.
See, e.g., Mattyasovszky v. W. Towns Bus Co., 61
Ill.2d 31, 36, 330 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1975); Pendowski v.
Patent Scaffolding Co., 89 Ill.App.3d 484, 489, 411
N.E.2d 910, 913 (1980) (applying the holding of
Mattyasovszky).
Although
the defendants frame their motion as one for summary
judgment, it is really a motion to dismiss: it relies purely
on the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint rather
than the facts at-issue in this case. To avoid a motion to
dismiss like this one, a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint: (1)
describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests; and (2) plausibly suggests that the
plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly.,
550 U.S. at 556). And as always when reviewing one of these
types of motions, the Court must accept as true all
allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (2007)).
The
defendants' motion does not meet those standards. The
complaint makes numerous allegations in each count, including
“Defendants operated the vehicle in a careless and
reckless manner”; “Defendants failed to cease
operating the vehicle under the hazardous road
conditions”; “Defendants operated the vehicle at
an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances”;
and “the acts and omissions as set forth herein
constituted violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations as set forth in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, including but not limited to: 49 C.F.R.
§§ 385.5, 392.3, 392.6, 392.7, and 395.3.”
(Compl. ¶¶ 27, 36, ECF No. 1.) The complaint then
ends each count with: “The negligence and carelessness
of Defendants Wilson and Celadon Trucking as described above
showed gross negligence, a complete indifference to or a
conscious and wanton disregard for the safety of Plaintiff
Sheryl Ray and others, thereby justifying an award of
punitive damages.” (Id. at ¶¶ 30,
41.) That is clearly sufficient to state a claim for punitive
damages, as punitives are properly awarded when a defendant
acted in a grossly negligent manner such that it shows a
wanton disregard for the safety of others-just as the
complaint pleads. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74
Ill.2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 565
(1978).
Nor
does the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 change
anything here. That provision says that you can obtain
punitives against both a principal and an agent when
“the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, ” or
when “the principal or a managerial agent of the
principal ratified or approved the act.” The complaint
makes those factual allegations-making the matter an issue of
fact. But the defendants did not point to any issues of fact
here-only issues as to allegations in the pleadings. And
there is nothing incorrect with the complaint.
That
leads into a third motion in this case. When the plaintiffs
responded to the defendants' motion, they asked the Court
to defer considering the motion to “allow the parties
time to complete Corporate Representative discovery on the
issues raised by the pending motion.” (ECF No. 64.) The
Court will deny that request. First, the Court has already
extended discovery in this case twice, so it is puzzling why
the parties never engaged in corporate discovery before
now-on the eve of trial. Second, discovery is unnecessary to
resolve the defendants' motion-which was really just a
motion to dismiss on the bare allegations in the complaint.
For
those reasons, the Court DENIES the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the punitive
damages claims (ECF No. 58), DENIES the
plaintiffs' motion to deny or defer considering the
defendants' motion (ECF No. 64), and because of the
stipulation of dismissal, FINDS AS ...