United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
D. Leinenweber, United States District Judge.
States Attorney General, City of Chicago, Chicago Park
District, Illinois Department of Natural Resources, and Cook
County Animal Control (“Defendants”)-move
separately to dismiss Plaintiff Kenneth Mayle's
(“Mayle”) Complaint. For the reasons stated
herein, the Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 19, 22, 48, 51, and
54) are granted in part and denied in part.
case arises from Mayle's disability and inability to
access public facilities owned by certain Defendants,
allegedly in violation of his constitutional and statutory
rights. Mayle suffers from bipolar disorder. Because Mayle is
allergic to dogs, he depends on his Guinea Hog, Chief Wiggum,
to provide service and emotional support. The Guinea Hog
performs tasks such as massage therapy on Mayle's hands
to mitigate feelings of anxiety and depression. The Guinea
Hog also encourages Mayle to engage in physical activity:
Mayle transports the Guinea Hog with a shopping cart attached
to his bike. Finally, Mayle is a Satanist and uses his Guinea
Hog during his religious practices.
alleges that Defendants, through various means and measures,
repeatedly denied him the right to bring his Guinea Hog to
places of public accommodation in and around the Chicago
area. These places include: North Avenue Beach, Montrose
Beach, Millennium Park, Grant Park, and other unnamed parks
maintained by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources.
on the foregoing, Mayle brought the instant action, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief: He requests the Court to
designate his Guinea Hog as a service animal equal to dogs
and miniature horses. Mayle asserts the following four counts
against the various Defendants:
I. A violation of Title II of the ADA against the City of
Chicago, Chicago Park District, and the Cook County Animal
II. A violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act against the
City of Chicago and the Illinois Department of Natural
III. Deprivation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment against the United States Attorney General.
IV. A violation of the First Amendment against the City of
Chicago and the Illinois Department of Natural Resources.
V. A violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), against
the City of Chicago and the Illinois Department of Natural
now move separately to dismiss the entirety of Mayle's
Complaint, asserting that (1) the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1);
and (2) Mayle has failed to state any claims under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Each basis to dismiss will
be discussed in turn.
Pro Se Complaints
has filed and litigated this case on a pro se basis. Courts
construe pro se complaints more liberally than pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). Typically, courts will treat “allegations
of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id.
Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal
Court will first address subject matter jurisdiction before
turning to the merits of the underlying claims. See Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
94-95 (1998). Standing is a jurisdictional matter; thus, a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly brought
under Rule 12(b)(1). Goleta Nat'l Bank v.
O'Donnell, 239 F.Supp.2d 745, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
A plaintiff lacks standing when the complaint lacks
sufficient facial allegations to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. See St. John's United Church of Christ
v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007).
Cook County Animal Control
asserts that Cook County Animal Control violated his rights
under Title II of the ADA by not issuing his Guinea Hog a Dog
Friendly Area (“DFA”) tag-a rabies vaccination
certification that allows owners to bring their dogs to dog
parks and dog beaches. Defendant Cook County Animal Control,
however, asserts that Mayle does not have standing to bring
this claim. To have standing, a plaintiff must show that he
has (1) suffered an “injury in fact”; (2) the
injury is reasonably traceable to the defendant's
challenged action; and (3) it must be likely, rather than
speculative, that the plaintiff's injury will be
redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan v. ...