United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PHIL GILBERT DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on defendant HSHS Medical
Group's (“HSHS”) motion to dismiss plaintiff
Connie Dailey's complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc.
11). Dailey has responded to the motion (Doc. 19).
Standard for Dismissal
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
accepts as true all allegations in the complaint.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This
requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the
claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and
(2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to
relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl., 550
U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.,
550 U.S. at 556). “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court rejected the more
expansive interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) that “a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief, ” Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at
561-63; Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d at 777.
Now “it is not enough for a complaint to avoid
foreclosing possible bases for relief; it must actually
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief . . . by
providing allegations that ‘raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.'” Concentra Health
Servs., 496 F.3d at 777 (quoting Bell Atl., 550
U.S. at 555).
Bell Atlantic did not do away with the liberal
federal notice pleading standard. Airborne Beepers &
Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667
(7th Cir. 2007). A complaint still need not contain detailed
factual allegations, Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555, and
it remains true that “[a]ny district judge (for that
matter, any defendant) tempted to write ‘this complaint
is deficient because it does not contain . . .' should
stop and think: What rule of law requires a
complaint to contain that allegation?” Doe v.
Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
original). Nevertheless, a complaint must contain “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555. If the factual detail of
a complaint is “so sketchy that the complaint does not
provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8, ” it is subject to
dismissal. Airborne Beepers, 499 F.3d at 667.
legal conclusions asserted in Dailey's complaint are
numerous, but the factual allegations are sparse. Viewing all
the factual allegations in Dailey's favor, the complaint
establishes the following relevant facts:
point, Dailey was employed by HSHS, which employed more than
fifty people. While she was employed, she was injured. She
had a medical condition and/or a record of one, and HSHS may
have perceived that she was disabled. Nevertheless, she was
able to perform her job as HSHS expected.
asked for and was given leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. After missing work and asking for FMLA leave, she
was harassed and was discharged
treated Dailey worse than it treated similarly situated
employees because of her disability, her history of
disability, and/or HSHS's perception that she was
disabled. Dailey also experienced discrimination in the form
of harassment and a hostile work environment and was
terminated because of her disability, her history of
disability, and/or HSHS's perception that she was
complained of the aforementioned disability discrimination to
supervisors. She was terminated and suffered other
unidentified adverse employment action because of these
knew its conduct violated federal law.
exhausted her administrative remedies with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department
of Human Rights before filing this lawsuit on February 1,
2019, in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial
Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois. She alleges claims for
violation of the FMLA (Count I), violation of the prohibition
on discrimination of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(Count II), violation of the prohibition on retaliation of
the ADA (Count III), violation of the prohibition on
discrimination under the Illinois Human Rights Act
(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.
(Count IV), and violation of the ...