United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division
TERRY C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
SCHUYLER COUNTY, et al. Defendants.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
DARROW CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeding pro se and presently civilly committed at
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, brought the present
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourteenth
Amendment claims for excessive force, retaliation, and
inhumane conditions of confinement. The matter comes before
this Court for ruling on the Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 65). The motion is granted.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a
“genuine” issue, there must be more than
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
times relevant, Plaintiff was civilly detained at the
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center
(“Rushville” or “TDF”). Defendants
were employed at the facility as security personnel.
November 12, 2014, Defendant Clayton read Plaintiff his
Miranda rights in the presence of Defendants Mayes, Rose, and
Wear before attempting to interview Plaintiff about a staff
assault. UMF 2-3. Defendant Winters was not in the room. UMF
9. Defendant Clayton told Defendants Mayes, Rose, and Wear to
take Plaintiff “out of here” after Plaintiff
remained silent. UMF 4. Defendant Mayes left the room first.
Defendants Rose and Wear flanked Plaintiff on each side
before the three “squeezed” through the door at
the same time. UMF 5. Once through the door, Plaintiff
“felt Clayton kick [him] twice, ” first in the
left foot, then Plaintiff's right leg. Pl. Dep. I
37:19-21. Plaintiff later clarified that Defendant
Clayton struck Plaintiff's left ankle, then his right
calf. Id. 43:6-20; 51:10-11. Plaintiff does not know
if Defendant Clayton “used one kick or two kicks,
because…[Clayton] was behind [Plaintiff].”
Id. 38:11-12. At his second deposition, Plaintiff
testified that “it was three kicks. Because the first
kick was the kick in the leg and then [Clayton] tried to trip
me with a sweeping motion…so how about three
contacts.” Pl.'s Dep. II 45:8-11. Plaintiff
immediately yelled that Defendant Clayton had assaulted him.
UMF 11. Plaintiff suffered no physical injuries. UMF 12-13.
that day, Defendants Rose and Wear drove Plaintiff to the
Schuyler County Jail and transferred custody of Plaintiff to
county officials. UMF 14. The jail is located 1.4 miles from
the TDF and the drive between these two locations typically
takes three-to-four (3-4) minutes. UMF 15. During transport,
Plaintiff wore a jumpsuit without a coat or underwear. Per
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the recorded high and low temperatures on November 12, 2014
in Rushville, Illinois was 37 degrees Fahrenheit and 28
degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. UMF 16.
civil detainee at the time the relevant events took place,
Plaintiff's rights arise under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d
330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015).
Force & Failure to Intervene
the Fourteenth Amendment, a detainee “must show only
that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). This inquiry
turns on the facts and circumstances of each case and must be
made “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
a court may consider include, but are not limited to:
“the relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; the extent of the
plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to
temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the
security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by
the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively
resisting.” Id. An official who fails to
intervene to try to prevent a known, unconstitutional use of
force, despite a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be held
liable under § 1983. See Wilborn v. Ealey, 881
F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir. 2018).
force applied must rise to a level that warrants
constitutional scrutiny: “[n]ot every push or shove,
even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge's chambers, violates the [Constitution].”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (applying
an objective reasonableness test to a pre-arraignment
detainee's claims of excessive force); see also Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n. 21 ...