United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division
JAMES E. TOMAN, Plaintiff,
CRAIG FINDLEY, et al. Defendants.
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
DARROW CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
proceeding pro se, brings the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights for events that allegedly
resulted in the revocation of his parole. The matter comes
before this Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C.
§1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court takes all
factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in
Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418,
422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
alleges that he resided in Michigan while serving a term of
mandatory supervised release (parole) for an Illinois
conviction. The conditions of Plaintiff's parole
required, in part, that Plaintiff “not access or use a
computer or any other device with Internet capability without
the prior written approval of the Department.” 730 ILCS
5/3-3-7(a)(7.11)(i).Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in
Michigan for allegedly violating this rule, and that a later
forensic examination of the phone revealed no child
pornography or contraband of any kind. Despite this fact,
Plaintiff alleges he was extradited to Illinois, found guilty
of violating the above provision at a parole hearing, and
sent back to prison after Illinois officials revoked his
parole. Plaintiff alleges that he was otherwise in compliance
with the terms of his parole, and that he regularly emailed
his parole agent in Michigan.
a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence….” Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). If it would, a
plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983
“unless and until the conviction or sentence is
reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of
a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 489. In other
words, “a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 claim
that involves issues cognizable in habeas corpus until he
complies with the procedural prerequisites for relief under
[the federal habeas statute].” Clayton-EL v.
Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1996).
is a form of custody defined by the conditions a parolee must
follow. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850
(2006); Hankins v. Lowe, 786 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir.
2015). The provision Plaintiff challenges led directly to the
revocation of his parole and currently remains in effect
until he is discharged. Any successful challenge to this
provision would necessarily imply the invalidity of a portion
of Plaintiff's sentence. See Henderson v.
Bryant, 606 Fed.Appx. 301, 303-04 (7th Cir. 2015).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's challenge to
the constitutionality of the conditions of his parole is
barred pursuant to Heck.
also appears to assert claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments related to the search of his cell phone and the
parole revocation proceedings, respectively. These claims are
not necessarily Heck-barred, however,
Plaintiff's allegations foreclose any possible claims.
See Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[D]istrict courts may bypass the impediment of
the Heck doctrine and address the merits of the
alleges that he “volunteered his passwords to his cell
phone and email accounts…, ” which he was
apparently required to do pursuant to the statutory
conditions of his parole. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.9) (requiring
a parolee to consent to search of cellular phones and other
electronic devices). The Supreme Court has held in
Samson that parolees do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in these circumstances, and,
therefore, the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 852.
also alleges that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a
parole revocation hearing without indication that he lacked
notice of the hearing, was denied an opportunity to be heard,
or was otherwise denied the minimum protections due process
required. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
 is DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel 
and Motion to Admit Documents  are DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. Any amendment to the Complaint would be futile. This
case is therefore terminated. All pending motions not
addressed in this Order are denied as moot. The clerk is
directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.
dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three
allotted “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(g). The Clerk of the Court is directed to record
Plaintiff's strike in the three-strike log.
Plaintiff must still pay the full docketing fee of $400 even
though his case has been dismissed. The agency having custody
of Plaintiff shall continue to make monthly payments to the
Clerk of Court, as directed in the Court's prior order.
Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry
of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, ...