United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. Yandle, United States District Judge.
Antonio Nathaniel Speed, an inmate of the United States
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) currently incarcerated
at United States Penitentiary Marion (“USP
Marion”) brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the validity of his
sentence (Doc. 1). This matter is now before the Court for
review of the Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District
Courts, which provides that upon preliminary consideration by
the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) gives the Court the authority to
apply the Rules to other habeas corpus cases.
was convicted of one Count of felon in possession of a
firearm on January 8, 2014. United States v. Speed,
No. 13-cr-295-RWS (E.D. Mo. 2014). He was sentenced to 84
months of imprisonment, 2 years of supervised release, and a
$100 special assessment (See Doc. 90, Criminal
Case). Speed appealed his conviction to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which affirmed both his conviction and
sentence. United States v. Speed, App. No. 14-1841
(8th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).
October 27, 2016, Speed filed a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
raising two grounds for relief: (1) his future custody under
a judgment of the district court would violate the
Constitution and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over him
because he is an alien detainee. Speed-Bey v. United
States, No. 16-cv-1699-RWS (Doc. 2, p.1) (E.D. Mo.
2016). (Doc. 2, p.1). The Motion was denied in all respects.
Id. In dismissing the Motion, the Court specifically
found Speed's claim that his term of supervised release
was unconstitutional was without merit. (Id. at p.
2). It does not appear from the docket that he appealed the
then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2241
in the United States District Court, District of Kansas.
Speed v. Maye, No. 15-cv-3136-RDR (D. Kan. 2015). He
claimed that he was being improperly held “as
collateral for a fraudulent security that was created and
marketed in the name of Antonio Nathaniel Speed
without” his assent or agreement. (Doc. 2, p. 1, First
Section 2241 Petition). That Petition was dismissed as
legally frivolous. (Id. at p. 2).
filed a second § 2241 Petition in the Eastern District
of Missouri on April 18, 2016. Speed-Bay v. United
States, No. 16-cv-544-ERW. That case was transferred to
the District of Kansas. Speed-Bey v. United States,
No. 16-cv-3145-JWL (Doc. 24, pp. 1-2) (D. Kan. 2016). Speed
asserted he was “not a prisoner convict” because
he was not charged or convicted under his true name, Antonio
Nathaniel Speed-Bey. The Petition was dismissed on the bases
that his claim was non-meritorious and was previously
presented in his criminal case as part of a motion to dismiss
and objection to sentencing. (Id. at p. 3).
instant Petition, Speed challenges his sentence from the
Eastern District of Missouri. Specifically, he challenges the
two years of supervised release imposed by that court. (Doc.
1, p. 2). He raises numerous arguments in support of his
Petition including: (1) the judgment of supervised release is
a fraud; (2) supervised release does not replace a portion of
the imprisonment; (3) conditions of supervised released are
authorized but not required by statute; (4) supervise release
is a trust contract that he did not consent to; and (5) the
sentencing judge failed to state the reasons for supervised
release in the judgment. (Id. at pp. 2-3).
prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally
limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by
bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the
court which sentenced him. See, Kramer v. Olson, 347
F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). Under very limited
circumstances, a prisoner may employ 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge his conviction and sentence. More specifically,
§ 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” which
authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition
where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
“A procedure for postconviction relief can fairly be
termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a
convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial
rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as
having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
petitioner must satisfy three conditions to trigger the
savings clause: (1) he must show that he relies on a new
statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional
case; (2) he must show that he relies on a decision that he
could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion
and that applies retroactively; and (3) he must
demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental
defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012).
does not rely on new statutory interpretation nor has he
demonstrated a “fundamental defect” in his
conviction or sentence. He also fails to explain how a §
2255 proceeding would be “inadequate and
ineffective.” He merely states that it is inadequate
and ineffective because he is challenging his judgment of
supervised release. But he is in fact challenging the
validity of his sentence, which could be raised in a §
2225 proceeding. As such, his claims could have been brought
in his direct appeal or in his original § 2255
foregoing reasons, § 2241 is not the proper vehicle for
review of Speed's sentence, and the ...