United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
E. ASPEN, DISTRICT JUDGE
us is Petitioner Mario Howard Lloyd's motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. (Pet. (Dkt. No. 1).) For the reasons that follow, we
dismiss Lloyd's motion for lack of jurisdiction.
1990, a jury convicted Lloyd on several federal drug and
conspiracy charges and sentenced him to 15 life terms of
imprisonment. Lloyd v. United States, No. 14 C 3929,
2014 WL 5614857, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2014)
(“Lloyd II”). Lloyd challenged his
sentences on a Section 2255 motion in 1997. Id.;
U.S. v. Lloyd, 983 F.Supp. 738 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(“Lloyd I”). As it appeared that, as the
“result of a clerical error, ” 10 of his life
sentences exceeded the statutory maximums for the underlying
offenses, we vacated those 10 sentences and resentenced Lloyd
to the maximum available terms of imprisonment for those
counts. Lloyd I, 983 F.Supp. at 744 & n.7. We
also vacated Lloyd's conviction for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine (Count 1), finding it to be a lesser
included offense of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise. Id. at 743-44. We rejected the remainder
of Lloyd's claims, and in so doing, upheld 5 of his other
life sentences. Id. at 741-45.
2014, Lloyd filed another petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 in this Court. See Lloyd II, 2014 WL
5614857, at *1. We dismissed that petition for several
reasons, including that we likely lacked jurisdiction to hear
a second or successive petition under Section 2255.
Id. at *2 (recounting that “Lloyd ha[d] filed
at least two other unsuccessful motions seeking § 2255
relief since his 1997 resentencing” (citing U.S. v.
Lloyd, 398 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2005); Lloyd v.
Yeach, No. 6 C 1200, 2006 WL 2640217 (C.D. Ill. Sept.
2018, Lloyd moved that we correct the electronic docket on
his criminal case to reflect our 1997 decision stemming from
his first Section 2255 motion. (See United States v.
Lloyd, No. 89 CR 427-1, Dkt. No. 820.) We observed that
“the electronic docket summary in Lloyd's criminal
case does not reflect the entry of an amended judgment
following our 1997 Order.” (Id., Dkt. No. 843
at 2.) We granted Lloyd's motion and entered an amended
judgment consistent with our 1997 order. (Id., Dkt.
present petition, again pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
asserts several grounds for relief from his underlying
criminal conviction and sentence. (Pet. at 4-6.) He claims
that the Government committed fraud upon the Court by relying
on the fruits of an illegal search warrant, argues the Court
erred in our sentencing determinations, and alleges his trial
attorney was biased by a conflict of interest. (Id.
at 4-5.) Lloyd also questions whether our recent entry of an
amended judgment to reflect our 1997 decision constitutes a
new judgment that re-opens the window for him to file an
additional Section 2255 motion. (Id. at 5-6.)
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for
the United States District Courts, a court must dismiss a
Section 2255 motion “[i]f it plainly appears from the
motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior
proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to
relief.” Here, we lack jurisdiction to consider
Lloyd's Section 2255 motion because it is a second or
successive motion that the court of appeals has not
authorized him to file. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h),
background recounted above makes clear, Lloyd has filed
several prior Section 2255 motions. See Lloyd I, 983
F.Supp. at 741-45 (1997 opinion granting in part and denying
in part Section 2255 motion); Lloyd II, 2014 WL
5614857, at *2-4 (2014 opinion dismissing successive Section
2255 motion and listing two other such motions since 1997
ruling). Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b),
“[a] district court must dismiss a second or
successive petition, without awaiting any response from the
government, unless the court of appeals has given approval
for its filing.” Nunez v. United States, 96
F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). There is no indication in
Lloyd's petition or relevant court filings that he has
obtained permission from the Seventh Circuit to file an
additional Section 2255 motion. Accordingly, we lack
jurisdiction to entertain Lloyd's motion and must dismiss
it. Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings 4(b).
suggests that his present petition is not successive because
we amended his judgment in 2018. (Pet. at 6.) Lloyd cites
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788
(2010), for the proposition that “[w]here there is a
new judgment intervening between two habeas corpus petitions,
an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not
second o[r] successive at all.” (Pet. at 6.) While
Lloyd correctly distills the holding of Magwood, 561
U.S. at 341, 130 S.Ct. at 2802, the case is inapplicable here
because there is no “new judgment” for Lloyd to
challenge. We did not, as Lloyd contends, give him a new
sentence in 2018; we merely codified the adjusted sentence we
gave him in 1997. We changed nothing else. Even if our
decision in 1997 arguably restarted the clock for filing a
Section 2255 motion under Magwood, Lloyd has filed
at least three such motions since that decision. Lloyd
II, 2014 WL 5614857, at *2 (dismissing third Section
2255 motion and recalling two others after 1997 judgment). In
sum, Lloyd's Section 2255 motion is “second or
successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2255(h) and 2244(b).
Lloyd has not received authorization from the Seventh Circuit
to file a successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255(h), we hereby dismiss his ...