United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. Rosenstengel, Chief U.S. District Judge.
matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 30) filed by Defendants Josh Ehler, Jason Leek, Scott
Rice, and City of Anna, Illinois. For the following reasons,
the motion is granted.
and Procedural Background
facts of this case are undisputed. On the evening of July 19,
2015, Officer Josh Ehler observed Roderick Hileman holding a
beer can and standing in the parking lot of a liquor store in
Anna, Illinois (Doc. 30, Ex. 1). Hileman was intoxicated and
belligerent and eventually threatened Ehler, telling him he
was going to “beat” his “f***ing ass”
(Id.). Ehler attempted to take Hileman into custody,
but Hileman resisted and fled (Id.). Ehler chased
Hileman and apprehended him after using a taser
was charged under Illinois law with one count of escape,
three counts of obstructing a peace officer, and one count of
aggravated assault (Doc. 30, Ex. 3). Hileman proceeded to a
jury trial on November 15, 2017, and was found guilty on all
five counts (Id.).
February 6, 2018, Hileman filed a Complaint in this district
court, alleging he was sitting on rocks in a parking lot on
July 19, 2015, when Ehler drove up in his patrol vehicle and
became verbally combative (Id. at p. 2). Hileman
alleges Ehler exited the vehicle, shocked him with a taser,
and severely beat him (Id.). Hileman asserts he had
not violated any law, and there was no probable cause for his
arrest (Id.). Hileman brings claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) for unreasonable
seizure (Count I); false arrest (Count II); excessive force
(Count III); failure to intervene (Count IV); and supervisor
liability (Count V) (Doc. 1). The Court has federal question
jurisdiction over the Section 1983 claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Hileman also brings claims under Illinois
state law for indemnification (Count VI); intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Count VII); battery (Count
VIII); willful and wanton conduct (Count IX); false arrest
(Count X); and respondeat superior (Count XI) (Id.).
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
March 6, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing Hileman's Section 1983 claims are
barred by the Heck doctrine, and the Court should
refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims (Doc. 31). Alternatively,
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity, and
Hileman has not produced any evidence to support his claims
Judgment is only appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d
1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for
summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for
trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The nonmoving
party must offer more than “[c]onclusory allegations,
unsupported by specific facts, ” to establish a genuine
issue of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d
767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). In
determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court
must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the party opposing the motion. Bennington v.
Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001);
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). A “court may not assess the
credibility of witnesses, choose between competing inferences
or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence . . .
.” Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of
America, 749 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 769 (7th
argue that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
bars Hileman's Section 1983 claims. In Heck, the
plaintiff was convicted of manslaughter and subsequently
brought suit under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution.
Id. The Supreme Court held the claim was not
cognizable under Section 1983 because Heck would have to
prove that his underlying criminal prosecution was terminated
in his favor, which would amount to a collateral attack on
his conviction. Id. at 484-86. The Court held,
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if
the district court determines that the plaintiff's
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the
plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.
Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
False Arrest and ...